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INTRODUCTION BY THE WORKSHOP ORGANISERS 
In a letter dated 2 September 1975, Prof, Robert B. Seidman 
of Boston University asked us to explore the possibility of hosting a 
seminar on law and development at the University of Nairobi, Our view then, 
as now, was that seminars of this kind ought to be encouraged, particularly 
since they provide a much needed opportunity for academics of various 
disciplines, legislators and administrators to sit together and exchange 
their views on legal regulations„ Beyond this, of course,we were delighted 
to host such a seminar because the material prepared could be used to build 
up teaching materials in this fast-growing area of public concern. 
The seminar, which was held from 26 to 30 July 1976, drew 
participants from the following departments of the University of Nairobi 
and the Kenya Government: 
University of Nairobi 
Faculty/Department 
Law 
Institute for Development Studies 
Sociology 
Government 
Economics 
Kenya Government 
Invited Participating 
4 3 
3 8 
2 1 
2 1 
1 
Total 11 14-
Ministry/Department 
Office of the President 
Ministry of Lands and Settlement 
National Assembly 
Ministry of Home Affairs - Prisons 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Attorney-General's Office (Kenya School of 
Law) 
East African Customs and Excise 
Invited /Participating 
4 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
Total 12 7 
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From Boston University there were two participants Professor R.B. Seidman, 
a lawyer and Professor AW- Seidmanj an economist., 
Only about half the total number of participants took part in 
the seminar continuously throughout its duration. This was because on 
several occasions a number of participants, especially those in Government, 
had to leave in order to respond to official duties. Nonetheless, the 
level of participation was generally high and individual contributions 
extremely valuable. 
The following papers were presented for discussion: 
1. The Domain of Study of Law 
2. A Vocabulary for Law and Development: A General Model 
3. Commercial Law and Development in Kenya 
I. Reforms in the Field of Land Adjudication, 
Consolidation and Registration in Kenya 
5. Why People Disobey Law: The Problem of High-Level Bribery 
6 . Law and Development Administration 
7. Law and Underdevelopment in Kenya: A 
Theoretical Analysis 
8. Facilitative Law 
9 . The Need for Flexibility in Law as an Administrative Tool in 
Development 
10. The Methodology of Law and Development Research 
II. The Intellectual Control Over Value Choice in Research 
and the Definition of Development 
12. The Implementation of Law: In General 
13. The Components of a Theory of Law and Development 
14. Law and Development Administration with Illustrations from 
Kenya. 
These papers have been reorganised and edited in order to make the 
present volume more readable, integrated and internally coherent. This, we 
hasten to add, has been done without intentionally altering any of the 
substance or the theoretical perspectives of the individual authors. 
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The plea of the seminar organisers is that readers of the present 
volume will find time not simply "to read the papers, but to offer 
substantive suggestions for future action, 
Finally we would like to acknowledge the financial assistance of 
the Ford Foundation (Eastern Africa Office), the National Science Foundation 
(U.S.A.) and Boston University, without which the seminar would not have 
been possible . 
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 
Department of Public Law 
University of Nairobi 
C.O. Okidi 
Institute for Development 
Studies 
University of Nairobi . 
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PART I: THEORIES OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
by 
A.W. Seidman and 
R,.B. Seidman 
THE DOMAIN OF STUDY 
It is the torment of the Third World that triggers the primal 
scream of our age. Two thirds of the human race suffer in abject poverty. 
Hunger haunts their days, malignant disease is an overhanging threat, the 
spectre of early death lurks in their doorways. Trussed in ancient bonds 
not of their own making, they control neither their own resources nor destinies. 
Today all the world plucks at the sleeves of the academy, asking, 
What do you know? What are you good for? Any answer must include a statement 
of the discipline's response to the Third World's scream. How lawyers respond 
ought to define the domain of the study of law and development. 
Lawyers, however, march to a discordant beat. They have suggested 
at least three different definitions of the domain of the study of law and 
development: conflict amelioration, law and society studies, and problem 
solving. 
Conflict Amelioration: Law and Society Studies 
The dominant Western jurisprudential and sociological tradition 
perceives conflict amelioration as the law's primordial function. Law is an 
'integrative' mechanism. 
The function of the law is the orderly resolution of disputes. 
As this implies, 'the law' (the clearest model of which I shall 
take to be the court system) is brought into operation after there 
has been a conflict, The court's task is to render a decision 
that will prevent the conflict -- and all potential conflicts 
like it --from disrupting productive cooperation. 
This tradition celebrates the law as a great wall against Hobbesian anarchy. 
Some modern writers on law in the less developed countries 
(hereafter, the LDCs) have assumed that the function of law in these countries 
will be the same as in the developed countries. The role of law is 
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to create a milieu in which social and cultural 
diversities are harmonized, values essential to societal 
and governmental purposes are unified (and others left 
alone), and tensions resolved*..to maintain stability within 
a climate of desired, necessary and inevitable change. 
The Third World's imperative is social transformation, a painful, 
tension-ridden, conflict-plagued, inescapable Middle Passage , The reduction 
of tension and conflict in that passage too easily becomes a device for 
delaying social change, thus bolstering the status quo. Conflict amelioration 
as a domain of study responds to the uncertainties of power, not the pain 
of poverty. 
Other lawyer-academics have responded not to the cries of the 
Third World, but the more muted whimpers of the US. academic community. 
These scholars have defined the domain of study for law and development as 
'the general connections between law, culture and development,' 'The basic 
goal', writes David Trubek, 'is to understand "law" as a social phenomena.' 
These theorists explicitly warn against trying to understand law in conditions 
of development as a phenomenon different from law and social change generally . 
They begin with a variable, derived from their academic discipline 
'universalistic rules' or 'the legal culture' or 'the autonomous legal 
system.' The law-ways of the Third World are then studied not in order to 
ameliorate the torment of the LDCs, but as an exotic laboratory in which to 
test the chosen variable. 
Problem Solving 
Another method of selecting the domain of study requires the 
researcher to consider initially not the difficulties faced by academics, 
but by real people, 'Good research should scratch where people itch.' 
In real life, investigations do not begin with a variable. They begin with 
real-life troubles: poverty, pain, suffering, conflict, power. 
The pervasive troubles of the poor countries are poverty and 
oppression. How are lawyers and the law engaged with these troubles? To 
answer that question is to define our domain of study, We examine first 
the function of law in development and second the role of lawyers in that 
process, 
The Function of Law in Development. Modern social science conceives that 
each society is defined by the repetitive interactions of its members. 
Nigeria differs from the United State because its members interact with each 
other in different patterns. They behave differently. 
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By the same token, to say that a society changes is to say that 
the kind and intensity of these repetitive interactions change. Social 
change can therefore be defined as a change in the repetitive patterns of 
behaviour of the members of a society. Development is a form of social 
change . 
Repetitive patterns of human behaviour are defined by norms, 
supported by sanctions, expressing how the various roles in society are 
expected to behave. A few of these norms are promulgated, communicated or 
sanctioned by state officials. We shall use the phrase 'the legal order' 
very broadly to mean all or any part of the normative system in which the 
state has a finger. It includes the processes by which rules are promulgated, 
communicated or sanctioned by persons acting at least under the colour of 
official capacity, as well as the rules themselves, D.J. Black defines 
the law in the same very general way as 'governmental social control. ' The 
legal order enters into the processes of development in two ways. First, 
the burden of trying purposively to induce social change today usually falls 
upon the state. No other institution ordinarily has sufficient capacity, 
resources, or legitimacy to undertake so formidable a task. Typically, the 
state does this by changing the rules defining repetitive patterns of 
behaviour, and by directing its officials to bring about desirable new 
behaviour by various actors. 
Demands for development therefore appear in the guise of demands 
for new law: new rules of land tenure, of marketing boards, of planning 
machinery, of electoral politics, of educational institutions, of monetary 
systems, of taxation. The International Congress of Jurists in 1959 recognize 
these functions in its modified definition of 'The Rule of Law.' That 
concept, they said, 'should be employed not only to safeguard and advance the 
civil and political rights of the individual in a free society, but also 
to establish social, political, educational and cultural conditions under 
which his legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realized. 
This function of the legal order is thrust upon the governors by 
circumstance. The patterns of behaviour that define society are in constant 
flux. Society is constantly changing. However little a government changes 
its law, upheavals inevitably occur: wars, revolutions, famines, education, 
the introduction of cash crops, industrialization, foreign or domestic 
investment, The romantic vision of an unchanging tropical society—poor, 
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to be sure, but in the unhurried idyll of its days blessedly free of future 
shock —is a lie. 
Since societies change even within the constraints imposed by 
their legal order, a decision to try to induce new patterns of behaviour by 
changing the legal order is not, as is frequently thought, a decision to 
introduce change into an otherwise static world. Rather, it is an attempt 
to deflect existing processes of change into channels thought to be more 
desirable. To do nothing about the existing legal order is to accept the new 
configurations which social processes themselves imduce. Law-makers cannot 
avoid that decision. 
Besides being an instrument for channelling social change, the 
legal order enters into development processes in another, perhaps even more 
fundamental way. It is mainly the nation-state which today has thrust upon 
it the initiative to determine the course of social change—rather than the 
church, family or village, and this reflects the great transformation from 
kin-oriented, village, agricultural subsistence communities into societies 
with a high degree of specialization and exchange. In such societies, the 
shoemaker must know not only that others will supply him with leather, but 
that some will keep a monetary system going, and others will create and maintain 
markets in which he can purchase food, and in which he can sell his product. 
'Modernization requires a whole range of new, specialized roles. This can 
only succeed if the persons who occupy them mesh their activities with each 
other. This requires a high degree of co-ordination.' Hence the long-term 
trend in Western Europe was 'toward the perfection of systems of obligations 
and their transformation from a network of individual relationships into 
obligations to the community'. The legal order is the most available 
instrument to state, create, enforce and coordinate these obligations. 
Black makes the same point in general terms: 'Law tends to become 
implicated in social life to the degree that other forms of social control 
are weak or unavailable.' In conditions of development, the problem posed for 
social control is not merely to restrain deviance from the old order and to 
restore the status quo ante, but to induce change. Existing non-governmental 
agencies of social control tend to be meliorative, tens ion-management systems. 
They are not designed as change-mechanisms . The legal order has significance 
for development not because law influences behaviour significantly - in many, 
perhaps most, cases its actual influence on behaviour is peripheral - but 
because, with all its manifest limitations, the legal order is probably the 
most important tool available to induce development. 
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Despite this potential, however, too frequently the legal order 
fails to induce the prescribed behaviour. Development programmes remain on 
paper, plans die in parturition, policies remain uninplemented. 
Myrdal has described the consequences of'soft development. By 
this he means 
...a general lack of social discipline in underdeveloped countries, 
signified by many weaknesses: deficiencies in their legislation 
and, in particular, in law observance and enforcement; lack of 
obedience to rules and directives handed down to public officials 
at various levels; frequent collusion of these officials with 
powerful persons or groups of persons whose conduct they should 
regulate; and, at bottom, a general inclination of people in all 
strata to resist public controls and their implementation. Also 
within the concept of the soft state is corruption, a phenomenon 
which seems to be generally on the increase in underdeveloped 
countries. 
To explain the soft state is to discover the limits on the legal order as a 
tool of social change in conditions of development. 
The Roles at the Interface of Means and End. It is sometimes argued that 
these issues are of no concern to lawyers. The content of law is determined 
by policy-makers—politicians, cabinet, revolutionary councils. Lawyers, 
it is maintained, (frequently by lawyers) while of course involved in the 
drafting or rules relating to development, are mere scriveners, technicians 
who translate programmes developed by others into the obscurantist language 
of the law. By the same token, it is argued that the policy-makers have 
nothing to do with the law itself --that is the concern of the lawyers, civil 
servants, bureaucrats and other technicians concerned with the detailed 
drafting and implementing of rules. 
When asked what we do, we respond with only an idealized part 
of what we are supposed to do. 'It is as if a policeman were to describe 
his role by saying that he catches criminals; as if a businessman were 
to say, he makes soap;...a priest., /'that / he celebrates mass;...a congress-
man /that /he passes laws.' So to separate 'technical' from 'policy' roles 
insulates both technicians and policy-makers from the full moral consequences 
of their actions, and from responsibility for their effectiveness. On the 
one hand, 'to limit judgment solely to "autonomous" technical criteria is 
in effect not only to permit but to require men to be moral cretins in their 
technical roles'. On the other hand, to formulate 'policy' unanchored to 
implementation assumes that the ends adopted will justify any means - a 
proposition no less morally cretinous, 
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In every government, there are some actors whose roles place 
them at the interface between ends and means, between policy formulation 
and implementation. Very frequently, this interface is at the point at 
which policies are transformed into law, for it is at that point that the 
generalities of policy are given programmatic content. That interface is a 
broad one, comprising many actors: those who draft the legislation, structure 
options, raise queries, and submit or review drafts, as well as those who 
finally decide yea or nay on particular formulations. Titles vary: 
permanent secretary, ministerial counsel, consultant, civil servant, 
parliamentary draftsman, solicitor general, and so on. In every country that 
we know, some of the roles at the interface are occupied by law-trained 
professionals. Their positions place them at the very cortex of decision-
making. Unless these lawyers, and the other actors at the interface, are 
explicitly aware of the policy implications of their contributions to the 
decision-making process, too frequently the ultimate outcome is defensible 
neither pragmatically nor morally. 
The title of the roles at the interface are unimportant. The 
detailing of specific rules is a complex process in which many participate 
in varying ways. Until these details are formulated, however, it is impossible 
to specify the actual content of the 'policy,' Their formulation is part 
and parcel of the policy-making process. For lawyer or civil servant to 
insist upon a sharp division between 'policy' and 'law' is to ensure that 
nobody raises those crucial questions which are indispensable if the end-in-
view is to be both effective and consistent with broader perspectives. 
Sometimes this task at the interface of broad policy and detailed 
implementation is called 'problem-solving,' The phrase 'problem-solving' 
raises uncomfortable visions of mindless pragmatism, whose 'solutions' to 
problems often create most difficult problems of all, To 'solve' a problem 
in such a way as to magnify troubles, rather than to alleviate them, is 
plainly no solution at all, 'Problem-solving' must include some methodology 
to avoid this sort of confusion. 
Lawyers, to some degree, have always played a problem-solving 
role in society. In more developed communities, it sometimes appears that 
the lawyer's principal technique in 'solving ' emerging social problems is 
to operate an ongoing relatively stable system of law. In conditions of 
development, the lawyer frequently is more clearly engaged with the process 
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of creating a new set of rules, 
The contemporary lawyer..,in the developing nations 
must become an active and responsible participant 
in development plans » 
An ever-increasing. . .part of the work of the 
lawyer is neither litigation nor the resolution 
of disputes. It lies in the scope and formulation of policies, 
in the exercise of legal powers constructively establishing 
or altering the relations between private legal parties inter 
se, between public authorities and private parties, between 
governments and foreign investors, and the like.... In all 
these questions, the lawyer must play an important, often 
decisive part, It is he who must draft the necessary 
legislation, or the complex international agreements; it 
is he who will usually be the principal or one of the 
principal representatives of his country in international 
trade negotiations .... It would be as artificial as it 
would be wasteful of the still desperately scarce trained 
manpower resources of developing countries to believe that 
the lawyer should or could confine himself to strictly 
legal issues. 
These policy-formulating tasks are not sought out by lawyers or 
by the civil servants with whom they work. They are thrust upon them by the 
necessities of developing detailed programmes for action. Their successful 
accomplishment requires careful analysis of the uses and limits of governmental 
power to influence the direction and intensity of social change. 
This problem has been little studied. 
The view that government is an integral part of the social structure, 
but may have the capacity of altering it significantly, is not in 
the mainstream of social theory. The opposite view is more common: 
that the formal government and its actions are epiphenomena, the 
product of forces arising from the social and economic structure 
of society,, 
'Mainstream' social science lags behind. Every government today 
perceives its function to be in part one of influencing ongoing processes 
of change into desirable directions. The study of 'soft' development ought 
to lead to knowledge likely to make that function more effective. At the 
same time, such a study should also lead a consideration of the uses to which state 
power ought to be put -- that is, into the nature and meaning of develop-
ment, and the interests it does and should serve . That is our domain of 
study. 
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THE COMPONENTS OF A THEORY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
The initial efforts made everywhere to solve the problems of poverty 
and oppression were to copy the laws of the developed countries, usually the 
former imperial powers„ This has never worked, in the sense that the laws 
did not induce in the LDCs the sorts of behavior that it was believed they 
had induced in the metropolitan countries. The reason is obvious. Role-
occupants make choices among the range of constraints and resources with 
which they are confronted as they perceive them. The behaviour of the role-
occupant is the consequence of his choice; it is, therefore, a result of all 
the constraints and resources in his environment. Behaviour of a role-occupant 
in an LDC, faced by a rule of law which is identical with a rule of law in the 
former metropolitan country, will be different from that of a role-occupant in the 
law's original metropolitan home. The reason is again obvious: the total range 
of constraints and resources as perceived by the role-occupant in the metropolitan 
country is inevitably vastly different from that effecting the choices of the 
role-occupant in the LDC. 
A second effort to induce developmental behaviour began from the 
assumption that behaviour is a function of the sort of person the actor is. 
The British believed that what they perceived as the successes of colonial 
rule flowed from the sort of men the colonial civil servants were. The 
colonial civil servants were all carefully selected from the upper middle 
classes of England, To be selected one had preferably to be from a 'good' 
family to have attended one of the great English public schools (which are 
not 'public' in any conventional sense of the word), to have been a senior 
prefect (that is, a member of the top governing elite of the student body), 
to have attended Oxford or Cambridge, and preferably to have received a 'blue' 
in athletics (that is, been a member of Varsity athletic team) . 
The colonial service made vigorous efforts to train an African elite 
in their own image. They created schools modelled more or less on the 
public school pattern (Achimota in Ghana, King's College in Nigeria, Tabora 
Boys in Tanganyika), They created universities that aped Oxford's and 
Cambridge's patterns of residential living and curricula — even to gowns and 
high table. Many of the products of these institutions are today leading 
senior civil servants in the Anglophone African countries. 
These African senior civil servants, however, are no more competent 
than their British predecessors to solve the problems of poverty and oppression 
in their countries. The range of constraints and resources within which they 
have to act has been created for them by the institutions within which they 
live. They were not trained to change these institutions, but to operate them. 
- 12 - IDS/OP 29 
Within this limited range of choice, development is unlikely, no matter 
who are the operating decision-makers, 
Given the failure of the theory that development could be brought 
about by copying the laws of another country and the theory that good men 
make good government, there is no alternative except for each country to 
solve for itself its own problems. The function of a theory of law and 
development is to guide the acquisition of knowledge iv. order to better 
accomplish this task. 
Underpinning any attempts to control the world must lie knowledge 
of the world. Long ago, Sir Francis Bacon described the objective of learning 
as the discovery of the 'secret motion' of things, so that man can control 
his environment. An airplane designer ignores the law of gravity at 
peril. Lawmakers are equally at risk who ignore the 'secret motion' 
of man-in-society. Solutions aimed at symptoms rarely succeed. We must 
first understand causes, the 'secret motion' of things. 
Of what does knowledge of law and development consist? Three 
positions have been put forward,all basically incompatable, which we shall 
denote as positivist, ideal-type and problem-solving. The first is 
exemplified by a proposition put forward by Lawrence Friedman and Stuart 
Macaulay: 
The ideal for the social sciences is the situation of the physical 
sciences; what is true of falling bodies in New York today is true 
of them in Brisbane tomorrow and Nairobi yesterday . It is a view 
which assumes that there are systematic, universal ties between law 
and society, and that these can be uncovered through the methods 
of the physical sciences. 
Other writers argue that knowledge of law and development consists 
the construction of ideal types in the Weberian mode. David Trubek writes: 
...Our program should be guided by the following criteria. First, 
to analyze the relationships between law and other variables, we must se-
parate 'legal' phenomena from key social variables which interact 
with them. With these key variables in mind, we must construct ideal 
types...Legal and social variables should be set forth in terms which 
guarantee that similar things are observed in all societies and that 
discrete states or quantities of the variables can be observed and 
measured..., Finally, it must be possible to go beyond the 
establishment of mere correlations to true causal analysis. That 
is, it must be possible to posit the independent and dependent ••'* 
variables in our theory of law and development. 
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The theorist stipulates the definitions of the variables he deems 
to be salient legal phenomena and key social variables, He then deduces 
their presumed relationships through logical operations. 
A third position, which we adopt, holds that the output of law and 
development studies should consist of intellectual tools appropriate to 
the solution of real-life troubles. The difficulty is that every historical 
situation is unique. How can we learn from one unique situation something 
useful for solving another problem, in another place, involving different 
people? Propositions answering this question we subsume under the heading 
of theory. Theory in this sense consists of three sorts of propositions: 
methodology, perspectives, and categories. 
Methodology 
Reliable knowledge is expressed in propositions (or sentences). 
Facts are not sentences. Propositions are not immanent in facts, Logic is 
a characteristic of knowledge, not of facts. Causal relationships exist. 
Trees grow from seeds, not stones, Propositions constitute our mode of 
understanding these causal relationships. The great task of methodology 
is not merely the .description of techniques of gathering data, but the more 
inclusive function of moving from the apprehension of data to propositions 
expressing knowledge about causal relationships in the real world. 
The human mind is capable of generating a vast number and variety 
of propositions about the world. Most of these are erroneous. The long 
history of well-accepted propositions that were later shown to be invalid 
demonstrates the obvious: that only a few of the propositions that men formulate 
about the world are valid. Of these, even fewer are useful to the task of 
changing the world. A methodology of research must provide criteria by 
which to identify those propositions which are both valid and useful. 
Perspectives 
Methodology alone is not sufficient, An adequate theory of law 
and development must provide a means of dealing with the question of 
perspectives (or values). In the course of the formulation of propositions 
expressing reliable knowledge about our domain of study, and in formulating 
policies to deal with emergent problems of development, discretionary choices 
are inevitable, Which choices are made determines what propositions are 
formulated and accepted. How are these choices to be made. 
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Categories 
The final element in an adequate theory of law and development is a 
set of categories to guide empirical investigations. These are perhaps the 
most fundamental criterial of relevance. If we have no category within 
which to classify an item of data, it is meaningless to us. English has 
only a few words for different sorts of snow: slush, powder snow, corn snow. 
The Eskimo are said to have 32 words, each for a different sort of snow. The 
differences that Eskimos perceive between one kind of snow and another are 
lost to us or want of categories into which to classify the information. 
Any choice of categories (or vocabulary) implies an evaluation. 
To create a category is to express a judgement that the category is important 
in explaining the phenomena at issue. A category is important if it is in 
some sense in a causal relationship with the observed phenomena which in our 
case is the social construction of reality in a particular setting. 
If one is to select categories consciously, one must a) explicate 
the characteristics of the phenomena to be explained and b) detail their 
logical connections to the assumed independent variables which are believed 
to have caused them. That is to say, in the first instance, one creates the 
categories for investigation by formulating an ideal type. Such constructs 
are an indispensable first step towards the acquisition of reliable knowledge. 
By explication the characteristics of the phenomenon they propose to explain, 
they expose for discussion and analysis the utility of the investigation of 
these rather than other characteristics. By stating the logical relationships 
between independent and dependent variables, they raise directly the question 
of relevance. 
The ideal type of capitalism as an analytical construct, for 
example, united those characteristics which give it its origi-
nality as an economic doctrine, although any one of them may 
be absent in a concrete economic organization. The ideal type 
of capitalism also comprises its various trends and its final 
goals, even if they are nowhere fully attained. 
To the extent that the ideal type includes the key variables 
of reality, and excludes that insignificant ones, is serves 
its function of identifying the categories for investigation. 
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To be useful, such ideal-type constructs must point to the 
variables that in fact explain the phenomena at issue. Weber's notion of 
the ideal type was that it included the characteristic traits of the phenomena. 
Methodology3 perspectives, categories - these are the three 
elements of an adequate theory for the study of a particular domain. They 
cannot, however, be understood as unchanging. Like all propositions 
expressing knowledge, the sentences stating what methods work best, which 
perspectives are most desirable, and which categories most useful for 
organizing data must themselves be taken as no more than problematical. 
However one investigates an area of interest, the theory used must contain 
built-in guarantees of self-correction. The processes by which methods are used 
and tested, perspectives formulated, and categories identified must themselves 
provide for continual change, Without such built-in self-corrective processes, 
our knowledge must remain static and hence sterile. The world always changes. 
Our knowledge of the world must therefore always change, and the processes 
by which we acquire knowledge must likewise be in constant flux. The unending 
dialectic between the world and our knowledge of it must be reflected as well 
in processes of investigation. 
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A VOCABULARY FOR LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A GENERAL MODEL 
To generate knowledge relevant to the solution of 
problems in the existential world requires at the outset some 
categories within which to classify the world. We undertake 
to specify these by developing a very general model (or expla-
nation) for the domain of study, i.e. by creating an ideal type. 
To do this, we discuss first the structure of choice, second,the 
available tools for social engineering through law, third ,model 
that purports to relate law to behaviour, and finally ,a few of 
the implications of the model. 
The Structure of Choice 
Human history, as contrasted with geology for example, 
concerns acts, not events. Acts imply choice. The most simple 
and also the most general statement about human society is that 
it consists of individuals and collectivities making choices 
among the constraints and rewards of their environments as they 
perceive them. A science of law and development must begin with 
a model which directs attention to the categories that are useful 
in explaining choice. 
There are two questions that or.e can ask about choice. 
First, the environment of the actor provides a complex web of re-
wards and disrewards, resources and constraints. What are the 
constrains and resources, the rewards and punishments within 
which the actor must choose his course? Second, why does this 
actor choose as he does, within these constraints and resources? 
This model of behaviour denies any dichotomy between 
determinism and freedom. Both are always present. The environ-
ment imposes constraints. Within those constraints there is 
always the potential for choice. 
Alternative courses of action are defined by all the 
social and physical forces of the world: technology, geography, 
the behaviour of others. In a society built upon human inter-
dependence, the expected behaviour of others is the most important 
and pervasive factor. For example, if a farmer requires cxiedit, 
and the only source of credit in his village is a money-lender 
who charges extortionate rates of interests the choice for the 
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the farmer is structured by that fact: he can either borrow money 
at the extortionate rate and continue farming, or he can cease 
farming. 
Within the range of resources and constraints defined by 
the existential world, people do make choices. Despite this, 
it is also true that people act in repetitive ways. That fact 
defines society, as opposed to anarchy. Why do people make 
repetitive choices? 
What has been called ;role perspective' i.e., the 
perspective of role-theory, suggests an answer:-
Individuals in society occupy positions, and their role 
performance in these positions is determined by social 
norms, demands and rules; by the role performances of 
others in their respective positions; by those who 
observe and react to the performance; and by the indivi-
dual's capabilities and personality. 
Norms are statements of expected behaviour. The attendant 
sanctioning statements prescribe the consequences to be expected 
from a breach of the norms. The individual exercising choice 
does so because he believes that the knows what behaviour to expect 
from others, both as they occupy their own positions and as they 
respond directly to his own behaviour. 
It is the concept of norm which bridges the internal World 
of t'he actor as he makes choices and the existential world 
of society. To explain why a person makes the particular choices 
he does, we must take into account his notion of what he ought 
to do as well as what he believes he is compelled to do by 
circumstances. To understand the normative structure which an 
individual knows about, of whose consequences he is aware, and 
towards which he may (or may not) hold sentiments of obligation, 
is in part - but only in part - to understand why with any given 
range the individual makes the choices he does. 
This perspective holds the potential for conscious social 
change. Social prescriptions are susceptible of statement in 
words. Rules explicitly stated hold a potential for influencing 
choice. Both human and animal colonies exhibit a high degree 
of regularity of behaviour. The human condition, however, is 
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distinguished from that of the lower orders by the normative 
system„ 
By contrast, the intricate interactions of an ant 
colony or a beehive, like those of a prairie dog 
village, are governed mainly by the instinctive 
reactions of natural and social stimuli.,.. 
Obviously if the structure of human societies is to 
be understood, if human behaviour is to be adequately 
explained, the normative aspect must be dealth with. 
It is precisely because human beings do possess consciousness, and 
hence can, to some extent, be induced to respond to a change 
in the prescriptive rules addressed to them, that there is a 
possibility of consciously induced social change. 
The word 'role' we mean only 'a norm or set of norms 
defining what the behaviour of a position should be'. The position 
may be that of an individual or a collectivity (a corporation, 
a cooperative, a marketing board). The individual who happens 
to be occupying a particular role at a particular time is the 
'role-occupant'. How a particular role-occupant or set of role-
occupants behave is called 'role-performance', The role-
performance may or may not correspond to the behaviour prescribed 
by the norm. By the word 'norm' we mean only 'a rule prescribing 
the behaviour of a role' . Since it is addressed to a role, it is 
also addressed to each role-occupant. Finally, the word 'sanction' 
has usually been defined in jurisprudence as a pain or punishment 
imposed by the state in consequence of a breach of a law. This 
definition is insufficient for our purposes. The state has other 
tools besides punishment to induce behaviour conforming to a 
rule oflaw. We shall call these several tools collectively 
'conformity-inducing measures'. We recognize the difficulties 
in these definitions -- e.g., the circularity of the definitions 
of 'norm' and 'role'. They are, we think, nevertheless 
sufficient for our purposes here.) 
We represent this perception of man-in-society by a 
simple diagram:-
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The behaviour of any role-occupant is a function of his 
making a choice within a range of constraints and resources 
thrown up by his physical and social environment. Since the 
role-occupant is a human being, the actual choice made is 
dependent upon his perceptions, domain assumptions, inter-
nalized norms and so forth -- that is, how he views the environ-
ment within which he lives. Thenodel thus directs attention to 
the two sorts of causal explanations for human behaviour: pro-
positions describing the range of constraints and resources within 
which the role-occupant must choose, and propositions explaining 
why the role-occupant chooses the way he does within that range. 
The problem is to identify those tools which government 
has available to change behaviour. We turn now to this question. 
The Tools of Legal Engineering 
What is law? This is the oldest question in juris-
pruedence. Physicists do not debate with each other over what 
is physics. Plumbers do not worry about what is plumbing. 
Lawyers concern themselves about the 'nature' or 'essence' 
of law because they are so generalist a profession. To 
define law is to state what the author believes to be the 
proper concerns of lawyers. Our definition of law reflects a 
concern with the use of law as a tool of social engineering. 
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Every rule of law is a norm, John Austin graped this 
proposition when he defined law as a 'command'. It is a rule 
prescribing the behaviour of the set of role-occupants -- i.e., 
of the role. One can divide all norms between law and custom. 
By custom we mean any norm which people come to hold or to follow 
without its having been promulgated by an agency of the state. 
By a 'law' or a 'rule of law' we mean any norm so promulgated. 
A custom becomes a law when it is so promulgated. 
Whether a rule of law has been internalized by a role-
occupant is irrelevant to this definition. It is rule of 
law if it is a norm prescribing the behaviour of a role-occupant, 
promulgated by an agency of the state. The definition leaves 
problematic whether role performance will march the behaviour 
prescribed by the rule. What has been called 'phantom' laws--
i.e. , rules promulgated by the state which do not induce the 
prescribed behaviour-~may still appropriately be denoted as 
'rules of law'. 
Soft development arises, in the main, because the rules 
of law do not induce the desired behaviour. In the terms used 
by the legal: realities, there is a wide gap between the law-
in-the-books and the law-in-action. In the vocabulary of role-
theory, soft development exists when role-performance does not 
match role-expectation. That is the event to be explained by 
a model for law and development. 
To say that role-performance does not match role-expecta-
tion is to say that the role-occupant is not making the choices 
with respect to behaviour that the law-maker desires him to 
make. Since behaviour is a function of choice within perceived 
rewards'and constraints, to say that role-performance does not 
match role-expectation is only to say that the structure of 
choice facing the role-occupant, as he perceives it, leads him 
to solve his problems by behaviour different from that prescribed 
by the rule of law. He behaves deviantly. 
Role-occupants behave deviantly because the net rewards 
for deviant behaviour within their social 'field', as they 
perceive it, are greater than the rewards to be received if they 
conform. Of this 'field', the behaviour of state officials is 
the variable over which the governors believe themselves to have 
the greatest control. 
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The relationship between rules of law and behaviour-
inducing activity by state officials is suggested by Kelsen's 
idealized model of the legal order. He taught that 'the legal 
norm does not, like the moral norm, refer to the behaviour of 
one individual only, but to the behaviour of two individuals, 
at least: the individual who commits or may commit the delict, 
the delinquent, andthe individual who ought to execute the 
sanction'. The law that instructs a role-occupant not to 
commit murder, simultaneously instructs the judge to convict 
him of the crime if he disobeys, and to sentence him to punishment. 
Kelsen maintained that the first norm, (which he called the 
•secondary' norm) which forbids the substantive delict, was only 
an epiphenomenon of the primary norm addressed to the judge. 
He conceded, however, that 'the representation of law is greatly 
facilitated if we allow ourselves to assume also the existence 
of the first norm'. We can represent the form of the legal 
order thus postulated: 
Law-
maker 
primary form of 
norm 
Secondary form of norm 
This model holds a clue to how law affects behaviour. 
The role-occupant, as we have already argued, makes choices 
within the constraints and rewards of his environment as he 
perceives them. The rules of law, and the behaviour of 
officials in sanctioning them, are part of that range of 
cho ice. 
Law operates by structuring the choice .of role-o'ccupants 
through rules and through sanctioning processes. It does so, 
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in Kelsen's model, a) by stating a rule which the role-occupant may feel 
obligated to obey, or b) by instructing the judge to act in such a way that the 
benefits and rewards offered the role-occupant in conseque'nce of his 
behaviour will be altered: 'The secondary norm stipulates the behaviour 
which the legal sanction endeavours to bring about by stipulating the sanction.' 
A Model of Law and Development 
Kelsen's model only depicts the relationships among the rules of 
law themselves. The various actors in the model, however, are themselves 
all role-occupants. Each of them acts within a 'field' of social forces. 
Thus we can assimilate our two diagrams:-
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The demand by the American legal realists to study 'law-in-action' 
—i.e., behaviour — as well as the law in books—i.e., the normative 
structure — led them to much the same sort of model. The model is, however, 
insufficient for five reasons. First, it assumes that the judge is the 
principal sanctioning institution. That assumes that the legal order is 
based on universalistic norms, with an autonomous legal system. As we 
saw earlier, to focus on these concepts inevitably directs attention to 
the courts. This is plainly too narrow a focus, The objection is met, 
however, by broadening the category of 'judge' to include the entire machinery 
of government concerned with inducing desired behaviour - the bureaucracy, 
the police, state corporations, and so forth. 
Second, the realist model directs attention only to explicit laws 
addressed by law-makers to role-occupants--i.e., to Austinian 'commands,' 
for which there is a stipulated sanction if broken. It does not address 
the question of whether a particular law or set of behaviour-inducing 
activities is achieving conformity to less formally articulated policy. 
An example may help. The government wished to induce citizens to 
hunt and kill coyotes (a wolf-like predator in the western United States). 
It offered a reward or bounty for each one killed. The form of that offer 
was contained in a law directing county agricultural extension agents to 
pay one dollar for each pair of coyote's ears presented, with a small 
criminal penalty if a county agent failed to make the payment on demand 
and production of the pair of ears. The realist model would concern itself 
with the law directed to the county agent and his behaviour. That question 
is, however, relatively trivial. The important question about the law is 
whether it induced the desired behaviour in the citizen. In fact, it was 
reported that farmers bred coyotes for the bounty. Because the realist 
model limits itself to rules of law, however, it does not explicitly provide 
a guide for examining the relationship between the activity of the county 
agent, to whom a rule of law was directed and the behaviour of the citizen, 
to whom a policy, but no explicit rule of law, was directed. 
In short, the realist model does not accommodate itself to the 
study of law and government policy. We can adapt it to that study if we 
broaden the concept of the norm addressed to the role-occupant, defining 
the role expectation held for him by the government. It may also be 
articulated in exhortation or other form of persuasion, Indicated by a wavy 
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line. A government may wish to induce farmers to grow cash crops. If it 
enacts a statute (such as exists in Tanzania) making it a crime to fail 
to grow a stipulated acreage of cash crops, the rule addressed to the 
role-occupant can be symbolized by a stright line. If it merely exhorts 
the role-occupant to grow cash crops, and seeks to induce this behaviour 
by rules addressed to bureacrats directing them to provide credit, seed, 
adequate marketing facilities and the like for cash crops, the exhortation 
directed to the role-occupant can be symbolized by a wavy line. The test 
of the success of the rules addressed to the bureaucracy is then plainly 
not merely a question of whether they provide credit, seed, and marketing 
facilities , but the more important question of whether their behaviour 
induced the farmers to grow cash crops, 
Third, any law, once passed, changes from the day of passage, 
either by formal amendment or by the way the bureaucracy acts. It changes 
because the various forces embodied in the social 'field' change. Of 
these, it is important to identify various messages communicated between 
the several actors in the model. Citizens express their reactions to a 
particular law or programme to the lawmakers. They send signals to bureau-
cats about the acceptability of sanctioning behaviour, and the bureaucrats 
communicate to the lawmakers. In addition, there are various sorts of 
monitoring devices, both formal and informal, by which lawmakers and bureau-
crats learn about the relative success or failure of a rule. We include 
all these various sorts of communication under the very general term 
'feedback'. 
Fourth, the crude concepts of 'lawmaker' and 'bureaucracy' require 
explication. Laws are not generated by a single 'lawmaker'; they arise out 
of a process of lawmaking involving many roles in complex relationships. 
Sanctions are not applied by individuals; they are the consequence of 
complex sanctioning processes. These sanctioning processes are composed 
of a set of roles, each defined by rules of law. Many of these rules of 
law are not right-duty rules, but power-conferring rules. Each of these 
roles can be analyzed, however, by substituting it for the role-occupant 
in our general model, 
Finally, as suggested earlier, the concept of 'sanction' is too 
narrow. As we shall see below, conformity-inducing measures may be aimed 
directly at the role-occupant as rewards or punishments, at changing the 
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constraints and resources of the environment, or at changing the perceptions 
of the role-occupant through education of moral suasion. Our diagram must 
indicate this broader category. 
The proposed model can be completed thus:-
Constraints and resources 
of the environment 
Law-making 1 
processes * 
r 
Law-enforcing 
processes 
Conformity-inducing 
me as urea.-—y y 
Constraints and / 
resources of th^ 
environment 
Constraints 
resources of the 
environment \ 
We can now state in very general terms whey role-occupants behave 
as they do in the fact of a particular norm addressed to them by law 
makers. 
Role-occupants act pursuant to choices they make among the 
constraints and resources of their environment, according to 
the way in which they perceive reality, and the rewards and 
disrewards which they believe are likely to follow upon their 
behaviour. 
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2. Among the resources and constraints some are attendant upon 
behaviour of others:-
a) By sanctioning behaviour consequence upon the failure of 
the role-occupant to match his performance to the expecta-
tion of the role, or 
b) By the performance of others in their roles. 
3. Role expectations are. defined by norms. 
4. Rules of law are norms promulgated by the state. 
5. Every rule of law or government programme is aimed at changing 
the role-occupant's arena of choice in one or more of four 
ways:-
a) By providing psychological rewards for compliance or 
deviance, depending upon the acculturation of the role-
occupant , 
b) By instructing government officials at various levels 
to provide different sorts of rewards or punishments in 
consequence of the role-performance of the role-occupant; 
c) By instructing government officials to act in such a way 
as to change the behaviour of third parties whose bh 
behaviour in turn alters the arena of choice of the role 
occupant, and 
d) By instructing government officials to try to change the 
perceptions, attitudes, assumptions, etc. of role-occupants. 
6. The occupants of roles in the law-making processes will perform 
in the face of a rule of law for all the same reasons that move 
any role-occupant to comply or be deviant, by the behaviour 
towards them of role occupants and of participants in the 
sanctioning processes, and by the fact that they occupy 
roles within law-making institutions. 
In what sense is this a 'model1? We argued earlier that there is 
no such thing as a legal system discontinuous with society. There are, 
however, plainly a vast number of specific systems, involving particular 
laws, bureaucracies and feedbacks. What is the relationship between the 
model and its existential referent? 
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A model is a method of organizing thought. A physical model of 
an airplane is not the airplane, no matter how detailed the model may be. 
A diagrammatic representation of the system of law concerning the agri-
cultural sector is not the law of the agricultural sector. The model 
put forward here is not a diagram of a legal system: It is no more—and no 
less—than a device directing attention to particular categories of data 
for investigation, a perspective to guide discretionary choice in social 
inquiry. It is an agenda for research. It cannot be proven to be valid. 
It can be diswarranted, however, by the discovery of instances in which 
significant variables not included in the model do affect behaviour in 
response to a rule of law. 
Finally, this model implies a definition of law. It is an 
operational definition that addresses law's function in channelling behaviour. 
Law is a process by which government structures choice. The consideration 
of law as a device to structure choice expresses at once law's usual 
marginality in influencing behaviour and its importance as the principal 
instrument of government to influence behaviour. Since society itself 
determines the range of choice in most respects, it is society which 
determines the limits of law. We can understand law only by understanding 
it as part of society. 
Implications of the Model 
In the preceding section, a variety of variables discussed in the 
jurisprudential literature were examined. Some of these, such as' the 
bargaining model, appear to be special cases of a more general theory. 
Others, such as custom, seem to be significant variables. We.next discuss 
how the model offered here treats these variables. 
Autonomous Legal System,. Universalistic Rules, Legalistic Law-finding. These 
categories advanced by Weber,implied by Lon Fuller,and equally implicit in 
analytical positivism concern the form of rules and the legal order. They 
operate through sanctioning processes and law-making processes, and they 
have consequences for the behaviour of role-occupants. The model proposed, 
therefore, suggests lines of inquiry to discover if, in fact, this triad 
of concepts induces behaviour appropriate to a free market. In this sense, 
these concepts are plainly only a special case of the more general hypotheses 
advanced here. 
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The Bargaining Model. The bargaining model asserts that all 
behaviour in the face of law is the consequence of interactions between the 
various actors. The model advanced here makes this explicit in two ways. 
In the first place, the relative power of others is an important factor 
in determining the range of choice open to law-makers and other role-
occupants. In the second place, the model expressly includes a feedback 
mechanism. How the law-making processes operate and how rules are enforced, 
is a function of the interactions indicated by the feedback mechanism. Unlike 
the bargaining model, however, the model advanced here does not take these 
interactions as the sole or even the principal determinants of official 
behaviour. The model only advises that these interactions must be investigated 
in order to explain specific behaviour. They must be taken into account with 
a host of other factors structuring the choices made by the actors in the 
legal order. 
Custom. Custom, both in the sense that it provides a set of norms 
defining the behaviour of others and in the sense that the role-occupant 
is likely to feel internally obliged to follow it, forms a part of the social 
forces operating upon the role-occupant. It is included in the elements 
which structure his choices. Unlike the explanations which assert that it 
is the implacable, determining factor in behaviour, however, the model 
advanced here leaves the question of the force of custom in a particular 
case problematical. 
The Legal Culture. In Lawrence Friedman's model, the legal 
culture is 'the term we use apply to those values and attitudes which 
determine what structures are used and why; which rules work and why'. That 
values and attitudes may be significant variables in explaining behaviour 
is accepted in the model advanced, for it explains behaviour in part by 
the ways in which role-occupants perceive reality. It does not, however, 
take as given that these values and attitudes necessarily determine behaviour. 
As in the case of custom, it identifies the legal culture as a variable, 
but leaves problematical its effect in any concrete historical situation. 
Conflict vs. Consensus. By leaving for further examination the 
precise content of the constraints and resources affecting choice, the 
model leaves their structure problematical. We could argue, that the very 
existence of law is strong evidence that society lacks a consensus. Never-
theless, this issue is not prejudged by the model advanced. 
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The Dialectic Between Law and Society. Marxist legal theory 
focusses attention upon the interaction between law and society, while 
urging that in the final analysis, the economic base determines the legal 
superstructure. Our model, too, draws attention to this interaction. The 
choices open to law-makers and to the other actors in the legal process 
are all limited by society itself. To this extent, society determines 
the legal order. Within the socially-defined set of options, human beings 
can deflect the course of society itself by conscious action through law. 
The task of developing a true science of law and social change is to 
generate propositons that express knowledge about this symbiosis. 
Governors and Governed. Finally, Kelsen's model assumes that there 
are law-making and law-enforcing processes, each with their specific roles. 
It assumes, in short, a state of affairs, in which identifiable governors 
are distinct from the masses of the people. This model unquestionably 
matches the situation in practically every modern state. 
We argue below that the separation between law-making and law-
enforcing processes and the ultimate targets of these processes is perhaps 
the single most serious barrier against induced social change. The bureau-
cratic state is designed to tend the machine, not to redesign it. The 
opposite of bureaucracy is participation. A model of law and development 
is insufficient unless it directs attention to the processes by which social 
transition can be accomplished. 
The model described here purports to do this by its specific 
inclusion of feedback channels. To the extent that role-occupants and 
bureaucrats provide inputs to decision-making by the governors, they 
participate in the decision-making processes. To the extent that the 
institutions of feedback are strengthened the separation between governors 
and governed tends to disappear. When this takes place, the model we 
have suggested will of course be useless. New perspectives will be required. 
The model, as it were, contains the seeds of its own destruction. 
THE METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 
The domain of study has been defined as 'soft' development. This 
is clearly a subject appropriate for a policy-oriented, problem-solving approach: 
How do we go about generating knowledge concerning the domain of study, and 
proposals for solution of specific, identified difficulties relating to 
poverty and oppression? 
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At first glance, the dual functions of generating knowledge and 
policies seem mutually contradictory. Knowledge necessarily simplifies 
reality. It is impossible to know the world meaningfully in all its 
complexity. A map on a one-to-one scale includes all the detail, and 
tells us nothing. The propositions of reliable knowledge simplify and 
generali ze; that is part of the process of understanding. 
Policy, on the other hand, is inevitably singular and particula-
ristic. It is designed to solve specific problems in specific places at 
specific times. Its outcomes are sentences in the form of normative 
statements 'So-and-so should be done' - rather than general statments 
about what is the case. The great paradox posed for a methodology of law 
and development — as it is the great paradox of a civilization that 
boasts of its 'scientific' biasses — is to relate the generalities of 
knowledge to the specifics of policy, to invoke the learned experiences 
summed up in the propositions of reliable knowledge in determining what 
is a good thing to do. In short, how do we use knowledge to create a just 
society? 
There are two principal methodologies for the generation of policy. 
The first rests upon a supposed dichotomy between means and ends, between 
'policy' and 'implementation'. It is a dichotomy deeply reinforced 
by the institutional structure of Western society. High-level bureaucrats 
or politicians are supposed to formulate policies: lower-level bureaucrats 
implement them. Boards of directors and corporate managers determine 
ends; the rest of the employees carry out the means. The difference in 
function of various roles in society seemingly is based upon the difference 
between ends and means., It is inevitable that all of us living in societies 
structured in this way will come to believe that hthe institutions of the 
society are the way they are because of an ineluctable difference between 
ends and means. 
Concomitent with the distinction between ends and means is the 
notion that ends are not susceptible to control through data, that is, 
through experience. Some argue that there is an unbridgeable discontinuity 
between the Is and Ought. Ends represent the Ought. Means constitute the 
Is. Data and experience are relevant to determining what are appropriate 
means for accomplishing any given end. But it is impossible to use experience 
to determine ends. They are, ultimately, fixed by the individual's internal 
'values' or 'residues'. 
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Another explanation for the distinction between means and ends is 
possible. Rather than the institutions themselves reflecting an inevitable 
distinction, perhaps our concepts reflect our institution. To say that 
ends are determined merely by the sort of man one is, and to lodge responsi-
bility for determining them in the power of a few roles in society, is to 
ensure that the shape of things will be determined by the particular interests 
of those who occupy those roles. The distinction between means arid ends, 
and the orthodox accompanying notion that they are discontinuous as the Is 
and Ought are discontinuous, is thus seen to be another of the manifold 
rationalizations of power, rather than a distinction immanent in the existen-
tial world. 
There is, we believe, an alternative implicit in the methodological 
writings of authors seemingly so diverse as Dewey, Popper, Sartre and Marx. 
This can be conceptualized as consisting of four stages: the selection of 
a troubled situation; its explanation; the proposal of a solution; and its 
implementation. 
The first task is to determine what real-life troubled situation 
one will investigate. Empirical research is needed to ensure that what we 
believe to be a trouble is a trouble in fact. A law professor may be quite 
sure that his students are not studying very hard, but empirical research 
may reveal that in fact they are working very hard indeed. 
It is sometimes urged that the very definition of a trouble is 
merely a reflection of the researcher's 'values'. I am concerned with oppression 
and poverty, it is said, because I hold the values or ends of freedom and 
prosperity. The argument is circular. The evidence that I hold those values 
or ends is my concern with oppression and poverty. An 'explanation' whose 
proof is the very event it is supposed to explain, explains nothing. The 
statement, that one values freedom and prosperity, is only another way of 
stating, one's aversion to oppression and poverty. Of course, the choice 
of a "trouble for research is discretionary, as are many choices in the 
research process. How to gain intellectual control over these discretionary 
choices is itself an appropriate subject for investigation. 
Secondlys having defined a specific trouble, one must propose 
alternative explanations for it. Explanations are syllogistic in form. They 
require both a major and a minor premise. The task is to generate as many 
such potential explanations as possible, and then to try systematically to 
eliminate them. There is a variety of criteria to use in making the choice 
between potential explanations -- generality, parsimoniousness, logical form, 
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and so forth. The most important are, we believe, the criteria of falsifi-
ability and empirical falsification. An explanation which is not in principle 
subject to falsification is either definitional (that is, merely another 
way to state the trouble), or it rests upon mysticism or intuition (neither 
of which are falsifiable). One cannot use experience to determine its 
validity. One can only learn through experience in an organized way if one 
generates alternative explanations which are in principle falsifiable, and 
then conscientiously tries to falsify them by empirical research. The most 
arduous task of research, of course, is the effort to falsify possible e 
explanations systematically. 
Third-, having eliminated most of the possible explanations and 
thus indentified the 'causes' of the trouble, one can propose alternative 
solutions addressed to those causes. The choice between these alternative 
solutions depends upon the constraints and resources inherent in the 
situation and a notion of their probable consequences. Again, empirical 
research will be required to discover what are in fact the constraints 
and resources and to make an educated guess concerning what the desirable 
an undesirable outcomes of the proposed solutions are like to be. 
Finally, the research is not complete until one has tried to 
implement the proposed solutions and monitored their success or failure. 
The success of the action taken warrants or diswarrants all the previous 
steps. Building a bridge that works validates not only the actual design 
of the bridge but the rules of physics upon which it is based. Thus, as 
Dewey says, we learn by doing. Marx and Sartre call it praxis. (Of course, 
no rule of law ever works precisely as designed. That it does not is a 
new trouble, calling for new explanations, new solutions, new efforts at 
implementation, and therefore — new troubles. Life is indeed one trouble 
after another.) 
In the course of proposing explanations, we must articulate general 
propositions as major premises. If they work in one case, these propositions 
have some status as knowledge -- i.e. , as useful heurisms for further 
research. The principal task in the generation of knowledge thereafter 
is to falsify the general propositions suggested, to amend them or to 
propose new ones. The general stock of knowledge consists in the main of 
these 'middle-level' propositions or theories, all of them heurisms, all of 
them never more than problematical. 
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It is these propositions that, in our view, together constitute 
a social theory of law. The methodology proposed, therefore, does not 
distinguish between the tasks of developing general theory and proposing 
'instrumental' solutions. We generate theory in the course of solving 
problems. 
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LAW AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: 
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
By 
S.B.O. GUTTO 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
INTRODUCTION 
Any theoretical analysis of the role of the legal system in economic 
development which is observation within an agrarian-capitalist, underdeveloped 
economy is confronted with many problems. The most basic of these problems 
is that of definition"1" - not so much of a definition of law and its potential 
role in development, but rather the problem of defining the concept of 
development. Development is a most elusive concept and is highly contentious, 
irrespective of the discipline from which it is defined. Is it development 
to be able to manufacture bottled orange juice half diluted with water, or 
is the concept measured by the extent to which people of a defined social 
unit have access to natural, unadulterated orange? But more precisely, there 
is no consensus on the meaning of development: whether it is mere industrial-
ization or the more meaningful satisfaction of basic human needs, with or 
without industrialization. The task before us is an unenviable one of attempt-
ing to describe what development should mean, and, having done that, to 
ascertain the extent to which the legal machinery has in the past contributed 
and is today contributing to the process. 
In this chapter development will be considered in its normative 
socio-economic sense, and in relation to the basic desires and needs of 
every member of a society. It is conceived as a process whereby human beings 
become capable of achieving, to use Dudley Seers triology (1972, pp. 21-36), 
a reduction in poverty, unemployment and inequality. The presence and/or 
growth of any one or all of these inter-related phenomena, in absolute or 
relative terms, must be conceded to be antithetical to the realization of 
human personality. Kay, among many other serious development economists, 
1. Note, for instance, the extreme difficulty experienced by the 
Research Advisory Committee on Law and Development which, in our opinion, 
avoided defining the concept, giving the lame excuse that this was outside 
the scope of their mandate. See International Legal Centre, 1974, p. 15. 
Dudley Seers: "What are we trying to Measure?" in, Journal of Development 
Studies, vol. 8, No. 3, 1972. pp. 21-36. 
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has in his classic analysis of the concepts of development and underdevelop-
ment stressed the fact that even '... national sovereignty can have no real 
meaning unless it is joined to the idea of development as progress towards 
a social and economic equality ...' (1975, p. 1, emphasis added). Here 
we ektfend Kay's macro definition to the individual level so that whatever 
is inimical to the achievement of social and economic justice may be seen 
as undermining the achievement of human personality growth and national 
sovereignty. 
To guard against misinterpretation, Seers' three indicators of the 
development process must be qualified and redefined. The concepts of poverty 
and inequality are seen in their relative and absolute sense. In this way, 
it is quite in order to contend theoretically that there can exist absolute 
poverty within a nation without inequality, but relative poverty presupposes 
inequality. Thus, industrial growth may eradicate absolute poverty, but not 
relative poverty and inequality. It is at this level that we reject the 
neo-classical economists' approach that sees development as reflected in the 
2 . 3 growth of per capita incomes or rates of national economic growth. We are 
not implying that these indicators are not associated with development - what 
we mean is that they are false indicators when used, as is usually done, 
without regard to the elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality, 
which should be the target of development, rather than the growth rates 
per se. Non-growth is also, of course, non-development, unless its effect 
is to achieve the growth of human personality. 
The concept of employment as one of the basic needs of human life, 
since it is the only way to ensure survival through production of use-values 
and commodity values, must also be viewed in broader terms of social justice. 
We are concerned not only with ending unemployment, but also with ending 
unproductive employment and over-employment. The latter term includes all 
the exploitative modes of employment that verge on slavery and are considered 
2. See the 1970-74 and the 1974-78 Kenya Development Plans which, at 
p. 1 and p. 17 respectively, stress as a measure of development during the 
period since independence that the annual per capita income has increased 
from £43 (1967) through £55 (1974) to £68 (1978 - projected). 
3. The 1974-78 Development Plan states that since independence the 
economy has achieved a steady 6.8% average annual growth (Part I, p. iii); 
the IL0 report gave an average annual increase of 7% since independence 
(pp. 106, 107, 109). 
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in theories of the political-economy of underdevelopment. Overemployment 
leads to relative poverty and inequality, particularly in a capitalist 
economy where property and other means of production are in the hands of a 
small bourgeois class. It is this control of the means of production by 
a few which generates the exploitative over-employment characterized by the 5 purchase of the workers' labour-power at a price quite below its real value. 
Having established what development is and is not, we are also 
concerned with the role of law in achieving development. The task of defining 
the appropriate approach to conceptualizing law in its developmental perspective 
is made much easier by the work of the Committee on Law and Development (see 
International Legal Centre, 1974). The Committee reviewed the jurisprudential 
theories of what law is, what it ought to be, and what it is doing in society 
and concluded that 'the social and policy perspective of law' is the best 
approach to understanding the role of law in development. I have chosen as 
the most appropriate approach the notion that law can be an instrument of 
social change and also that it is an expression of 'values' (International 
Legal Centre, 1974, p. 16). These two theories are dynamically interrelated 
and must not be viewed independently, though the Committee did not stress 
this point. The reason for this is that being an instrument or tool, law 
must quite naturally be used by those who have the power to enforce it 
to further their own values. Of necessity there, where society is stratified 
into antagonistic classes as in a capitalist state, law becomes not only a 
tool in the hands of the ruling bourgeois class but also substantively 
c 
expresses the values of this class in opposition to the workers and the 
poor including the peasants. 
4. Over-employment is used here to designate the employment of workers 
whose work is disproportionate to the wages they are paid for such work; 
rather, fruit of their labour is realised by the bourgeoisie in the form of 
profits '... Profit is unpaid labour' (Kay, 1975, p. 46) which originate 
in the sphere of production that characterizes the underdeveloped economies. 
5. We all need property in order to be able to initiate and complete a 
mode of production and hence achieve use-values: it is the way social 
relations in production are structured that either creates equality in 
development or inequality in underdevelopment. As Marx and Engels said, 
t.. . The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property 
generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property' (1972, p. 95). 
6. This argument is drawn from two theories: the Marxian theory concerning 
the dialectic between the superstructure and the economic base, and the obser-
vation that law is an expression of economic relations (and, as we have said, 
political relations) as stated by Engels. See the letter from Engels to C. 
Schmidt, 27 October 1890. In socialogical theory, we may indentify law with 
Mills' 'master symbols of legitimation' which are value-enforcing tools in a 
conflicting social system (Mills, 1959). 
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Accepting that during the transition from colonialism to independence 
political power was inherited by a class interested in preserving the status 
quo, at least as far as the flow of economic commodities was concerned, 
between the metropolic and the satellite nation law became an expression 
not only of economic relations but also of political values (see Engels to 
Schemidt, 1890). This connection is stronger in a system where the division 
of labour has not reached an advanced stage, where one finds that those in 
direct political control are the same people engaged in business activities 
either as industrialists or merchants. We must also remerber that statutory 
laws are made by poltical legislatures, though the residual powers of 
promulgation are conferred on the administration. 
Having identified law as a tool for imposing the values of the 
ruling class on the masses, we go on to maintain that this process may take 
the form of supporting the existing order, of opposing it or of realigning 
the economic relations and the supporting legal principles and institutions. 
There exists ample er.pirical evidence supporting the view that law is 
generally used to maintain or even intensify the basic colonial economic 
structure. Since by definition colonialism means domination, exploitation 
and inequality, the role of a legal system that contributes to this process 
is not developmental. This is the basic hypothesis that emerges from our 
analysis; we shall now support it with some empirical evidence. To guard 
against an accusation of being simplistic we must mention that contradictions 
do emerge from the role of law as part of the state superstructure and law 
as the basic economic reactor. As we have indicated however, the two 
functions are very closely interrelated in a political-economic situation 
such as in Kenya. Developmental legal orders will only occur out of the 
contradition between the ruling class and the masses - the masses vote for 
political leaders and obviously ruling class occasionally gives in to the 
mass's demands. This analysis will demonstrate on the whole, however , that 
the history of law and development in Kenya is a history of underdevelopment. 
THE ROLE OF LAW IN UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 
We have so far deliberately concentrated on dispelling the myth of 
development as economic growth which has been supported by most affluent 
members of Kenyan society to defend the existing structure. Merely pointing 
to economic growth at macro level does not address the problems of bridging 
the gap of inequality, eradicating unemployment or stamping out relative and 
absolute poverty within the social organization, and these must be our 
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primary concerns. Economic growth policies in this context are only 
minimally developmental, or non-developmental, or (and this is the central 
feature of Kenya's economy) underdevelopmental. 
Most of the published work todate on the theory of underdevelopment 
in the ex-colonies has concentrated on analysing the dependency relations 
that exist between the metropolitan advanced states and the exploited 
7 . peripheries. The classic work on Kenya is Colin Leys's, where he traces 
the origin and development of the process as characterized by:-
'... the application to them /the underdeveloped countries / of 
western capital, know-how and political power ... in ways which 
had structured (and continued to structure) their economies and 
societies so as to continually reproduce poverty, inequality and, 
above all, political and economic subordination to the interests 
of western capital (1975, p. xiv). 
This is ensured through unequal terms of exchange (Leys, 1975, p. 8) 
and monopoly foreign capital which prevents the emergence and growth of 
an indigenous national industrial bourgeoisie (Leys, 1975, pp. 5, 10). 
Whereas the argument regarding unequal rates of exchange and 
dominance of international capital is not disputed, the notion that no 
indigenous industrial class can emerge within such a framework is highly 
questionable. Kay has disputed this point on a theoretical plane and it 
has been empirically refuted for Kenya by Swainson's analysis of the 
emergence of a strong class of indigenous industrial capitalists who have 
been able to challenge international capital (1976). This emergent class 
has successfully tbtipulated state power ; and used the knowledge gained by 
association with international capitalism to enhance their own positions. 
It must be noted however that the presence of indigenous industrial capitalists 
does not make an economy developmental, since the local capitalists are 
tuned to export manufacturing which is subject to international capital in 
the world market. Also, it should be noted that in many cases the apparently 
indigenous industrial capitalist enterprises are infact partnerships with 
7. See Kay, 1975, p. 9, as well as Engel's letter to Schmidt and Mills, 
1959). Kay designates this school of though as 'structuralist economists', 
as opposed to the : 'neo-classical economists' who emphasise per capita 
income and gross national product. 
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international capital, thus perpetuating exploitation by the agents of the 
metropolis. The economy is not developed merely by the emergence of a local 
exploiting class. As long as the economic actors, whether international or 
local, fail to address themselves to the basic problems of society, we must 
reject them as underdevelopmental. Otherwise we shall be arguing for a 
capitalism whose growth depends on inequality and the exploitation of human 
labour. In fact, Kay has warned appropriately that, '...industrialisation 
is now such an integral part of underdevelopment that it can no longer be 
considered as its solution, at least not in its present capitalist form' 
(1975, pp. 125-126). 
Given the nature of Kenya's political-economy of underdevelopment, 
we go on to indicate the.role that law is playing in this process. From our 
conceptualisation of law and its potential contribution to the process of 
economic development or underdevelopment, we must pay attention to situation 
where legal lacunae permit either development or underdevelopment. We have 
accepted that it is the political cum economic actors who make laws in the legis-
lature, so that any failure of legislation to intervene in the economy must be con-
strued to be in their interest. In the case of underdevelopment as it has 
been described, legal machinery, either through laws or the absence of restrictive 
laws, was used * to permit the investment of exploitative industrial capital 
in Kenya. Merchant capital, which concentrated on buying and selling the surplus 
of production, was also allowed to operate in a favourable legal atmosphere. 
Even without mentioning specifically the particular laws that were involved 
we can see from their general effect that they aided underdevelopment. Similarly 
at the level of exploitation of workers, the lack of legal constraints con-
stitutes the contribution of the legal system to underdevelopment. 
There are laws governing the expropriation of profits to the 
metropolis which contribute to underdevelopment by limiting the incentive for 
local capital accumulation. Legal machinery has also been used to create 
monopolies in certain industries which bar entry even by the very poor whose 
primary need is only to employ themselves in the face of widespread un-
employment. The development of the self-employment in the informal sector 
especially in the urban areas, has been restricted (.by such legal monopolies. 
Finally, legal principles have been used to support the development 
of two social groups in the rural areas - land owners and the landless, who 
have the option of either becoming wage labourers or serfs. We are here 
concerned with the entrenchment of the capitalist legal principle of the 
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sanctity of private individual ownership of agricultural property. Our 
choice of this area for more detailed analysis is prompted by the obvious 
fact that agricultural land has been and is by far the most important pro-
ductive asset for the majority of the population. 
Through the use of force and later the retrospective employment of 
legal principles to help create a semblance of justice and the rule of law, 
the colonial state aided in the individual appropriation of land by the 
settlers. It supported their efforts to demonstrate the supremacy of 
individual private owners his over the traditional communal land tenure-
ship pattern which was made out to be primitive and inferior. Ironically 
the state continued to rely heavily on the production of small farmers who 
operated under communal land tenureship in the reserves (Leys, 1975, pp. 
36-40). In fact, the insistance on private ownership of agricultural 
land was based on the desire to develop inequality and unemployment in order 
to produce a landless class whose labour could easily be exploited. The 
creation of two classes - of the haves and the have-nots - was viewed as a 
'development' along the lines of capitalism as initiated by the superimposed 
8 colonial state. 
In the 19 50s, the Swynnerton Plan was proposed, not to change the 
inequitable economic structure, but rather to bolster it up in the face 
of the political pressures of the time. It stated explicity that: -
Former government policy will be reversed and able, energetic or 
rich Africans will be able to acquire more land and bad or poor 
farmers less, creating a landed and landless class... a normal 
step in the evolution of a country (Swynnerton, 1954, p. 10). 
Here then was a theory postulating that, in order to develop along the 
• lines of western capitalist states, the creation of inequality, poverty and 
unemployment which result from the displacement of the majority from their 
means of production was a necessary step. 
Law was immediately invoked to compel the implementation of this 
economic philosophy. It was done, we must stress, at a time when the arable 
8. According to Leys, 'The "inner secret" of the drive towards complete 
individual free-hold land tenure was thus not so much its particular merits: 
it flowed logically from the critical decision to accept the general structure 
of the colonial economy' (1975, p. 72). 
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land available to the Africans was extremely limited, particularly in terms 
9 
of the population involved. The Native Land Tenure Rules (Legal Notice 
No. 452/1956) were the first 'command type of law in this area.1^ This 
was superceded by the Native Lands Registration Ordinance, Legal Notice 
No. 27 of 1959. In 1961 the Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance 
took over, only to be followed a few days before independence by the Regis-
tered Land Act of 1963, which is currently used to create the classes 
necessary for capitalist economic development (chapter 300, Laws of Kenya). 
Registration is not optional. 
Having created the landed and the landless, some free market laws 
were created to ensure that only those who had means were guaranteed security 
in land ownership and use. Increasingly, most demarcated plots are unviable, 
even for subsistence, let alone production for the market. Many family 
members are excluded from inheritance of land, since only upto five in-
dividuals can be registered on one plot. Land has acquired the status of 
a market commodity, and can be bought up by wealthy salary-earners or those 
with political connections who can acquire loans from private and parastatal 
finance institutions. More and more smallholders have been bought out 
of their land and have only their labour power which is purchased at prices 
set by the landlords or owners of merchant and industrial capital. 
The property gained through this 'free' economic intercourse is 
protected by the general law (Section 95 (3), Registered Land Act) and firmly 
entrenched under the constitution (Article 203 of the 1963 Constitution 
and the whole of Part XII). Even the state is denied the right to expro-
priate individual private agricultural property at a reasonable price -
not the highly inflated legally set price - for re-distribution. Here 
is a good example of one of the few instances when the law becomes supreme 
in preserving property relations. 
9. The history of the limitation of land available to Africans is 
already well documented, as well as the laws that were used. Two new 
pieces of legislation were added at that time, which served to exclude 
even more Africans, especially those who had affliations with the mau mau 
movement. See the Forfeiture of Lands Ordinance, No. 11 of 19 54, as amended 
by No..40 of ,1955, and ult^tg^y repealed by No. 27 of 1959, and The 
Indemnity Ordinance, No. 36/1956. 
10. This argument is taken from Prof. Trubek's analysis of the nature 
of law within command and market economies. See Trubek, n.d., pp. 1-40. 
* (see the Land Acquisition Act, 1968 (Cap. 255, Laws of Kenya), and 
Article 19 of the 1963 and Article 75 of the 1969 Constitution). 
- 42 - IDS/OP 29 
Law then has been effectively used as a tool in the hands of those 
who stand from the entrenchment of inequality. Poverty arises automatically 
from the inequal distribution of the means of production, as does unemployment. 
The role of law in underdevelopment in Kenya is simply demonstrated by 
empirical observation. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have attempted in this paper to develop a coherent theory of law 
and underdevelopment, not so much because law usually acts as an underdevelop-
ment tool - it doesn not - but because it is an independent instrument that 
can be utilized to put into effect the whims of the ruling class. It can 
create injustice and it can implant justice. In other words, law can be 
perceived as an instrument of administration. Once we are clear on this 
fairly obvious fact, it becomes easy to study the role of law in any type of 
socio-economic structure and the process of change which may result. We must 
only ascertain who is in control of power relations within a given political 
economy - these are the people shape the law for their own ends. 
Kenya's political economy is characterized by economic development 
strategies which concentrate on economic growth, the increase in per capita 
income and industrialization, but not the realization of human needs for the 
masses through the destruction of poverty, inequality and unemployment as 
goals of development. It is the type of change that is now popularly referred 
to as underdevelopment and law is a tool used in the administration and 
perpetuation of this perverse process. We conclude, then, that the question 
is not whether or not law can be an instrument for effecting socio-economic 
change, rather, it is what kind of law is necessary for promoting the desirable 
change or development. 
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PART 2: THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 
GENERAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT 
ADMINISTRATION 
by 
Ann Seidman and 
Robert B. Seidman 
FACILITATIVE LAW 
The legal order, as we know it in the Western world and as it has 
been replicated in most of the less developed countries, is highly authoritarian. 
Lawmakers promulgate laws which are supposed to affect the activities of role-
occupants and law-enforcers. Law-enforcers impose sanctions on role-occupants. 
Classical elite theory argues that oligarchy was the inevitable result. Social 
engineering in the interests of the mass is a chimera. The oligarchy will 
inevitably use the state to coerce the masses through sheer power, or manipulate 
them to accept their dictate. 
The classical response has been the celebration of the free market 
economy. Social engineering and planning are perceived as the very opposites 
of the free market; intervention is the opposite of nonintervention. The 
legal expression of social engineering is perceived as a set of commands 
directed by the state to various citizens. The legal expression of the free 
market is perceived as facilitative law, of which the law of contract is the 
archetype. As social engineering is the opposite of a free market, so command 
law is the opposite of facilitative law. 
We examine here these supposed dichotomies, and put forward two 
alternative theories that purport to explain how facilitative law (and 
contract law is the archetypical sort of facilitative law) actually works. 
Many sorts of law, on their face, are rules expressing how the law-
maker expects the targets of the law to behave, on pain of sanction. Criminal 
and tort law fit this model nicely. A rule is promulgated; if a person 
violates the rule he is punished, either directly as in criminal law, or 
through the imposition of a judgement for damages as in tort law. 
Many other sorts of law, however, seem to be cut from a different 
bolt of cloth. Contract law does not require people to do anything. It 
merely prescribes that if certain agreements are entered upon, and broken, 
t 
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the courts may be required to levy a sanction. General corporation laws do 
not require anyone to enter into a corporation. They provide a facilitative 
form. If parties wish to enter into a corporate relationship, the law 
prescribes some of the consequences. Because role-occupants are not required 
to enter into particular contracts, or to enter into particular organizations, 
the facilitative form seems to free the role-occupant of coercion and to 
release him from the shadow of overarching power. 
Is it true that facilitative law frees the role-occupant from coercion? 
I shall denote'the^two contrary answers to this question as the classical and 
the anti-classical views. 
The Classical Perspective 
The classical paradigm asserts that facilitative law does free the 
citizen from state coercion. Long ago Sir Henry Maine said that the movement 
of all progressive societies heretofore has been from status to contract. 
By this Sir Henry meant that:-
The Individual is substituted for the Family, as the unit of 
whiijh civil laws take account . . . Starting, from one terminus 
of "history, from a condition of society in which all the 
relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, 
*' seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order 
in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of 
individuals. 
Jurisprudential theories were developed which gave ideological 
support to the idea of contract. Thomas Hobbes said that the definition of 
injustice 'is no other than the nonperformance of Covenant'. Nietzsche, 
perhaps sarcastically, was even more extravagant: 'To breed an animal 
that is able to make promises — is that not precisely the ,.. task which 
Nature set for herself as regards man?' 
Contract is a device for social cooperation. In a highly complex 
society, people must do many different things. Manufacturers must buy from 
suppliers, employ labour, sell to customers; landlords must rent to tenants; 
submanufacturers must contract with manufacturers; wholesalers and retailers 
and customers must interact with each other to keep the vast engine of the 
economy moving. 
Without planned organization of the interchanges necessitated by 
the division of labour, it seems preferable for every man to seize his own 
opportunity. Through contract, the parties to an exchange define the norms 
of conduct for the, occasion. The market becomes a giant communication 
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system, by its 'invisible Hand' advising individuals concerning the sort 
of norms to demand and accept in order to maximize their personal benefit. 
From the point of view of the parties to a contract, they are 
merely exercising a personal freedom to conduct their affairs in accordance 
with their emergent needs and desires. They exercise freedom by themselves 
determining the norms to which they will be bound. 
The notion that contract law embodies 'freedom' is closely intertwined 
with the ideal type of the market economy. If perfect competition prevails, 
then by definition no individual has the power to affect market price. The 
availability of other potential bargaining partners, who offer their services, 
or goods on terms and conditions, defined not by themselves, but by the 
'Invisible Hand' of the market, protects both parties from the possibility of 
arbitrary power exercised by the other. 
What ideal type of legal order is apt for this ideal conceptualization 
of the economic order? Unless an individual can exclude others from interfering 
with his possession of things, he will not purchase them. The law of property 
and of torts purports to guarantee rights of peaceable possession. Unless 
there are guarantees that the law of marginal utility will not continue to 
operate after a bargain is struck, promises of future performance become mere 
pious intentions. The law of contract purports to ensure that promises, once 
made, will be kept. 
The classical view implies a model of the state as a value-neutral 
framework whose task it is to ensure only that in case of dispute these 
bodies of law are enforced. It presupposes a sharp discontinuity between 
state action in the private sphere and state nonaction. The former consists 
of intervention and social engineering; the latter consists of adjudicating 
disputes arising in the private sector. In this view, the lasissez-faire 
ideal of the state is the very opposite of social engineering. State inaction 
is markedly different from state action. 
We can summarize the classical perspective in a series of propositions 
1) facilitative law permits the parties to an interaction to determine their 
own norms of conduct; 2) the perfect competitive market ensures that neither 
party has power over the other; 3) the state is a neutral, impartial frame-
work within which bargaining can take place and conflict can be resolved 
peaceably; 4) the state , by limiting its function to conflict resolution 
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does not engage in ordering the society; there is, therefore, a sharp 
discontinuity between state inaction and state action; and 5) facilitative 
law therefore ensures 'voluntariness'. 
The Anti-classical Perspective 
The anti-classical paradigm is at issue with the classical on all but 
the'first of these propositions. Facilitative law does permit the parties to 
the transaction to determine between themselves the norms defining their 
interchange. Through it, the state delegates to the contracting parties 
a portion of its sovereign power. The two parties legislate for themselves 
in the act of bargaining; they lay down rules; the state proceeds to enforce 
them. 'From this point of view, the law of contract may be viewed as a 
subsidiary branch of public law, as a body of rules according to which the 
sovereign power of the state will be exercised in accordance to the rules agreed 
upon between the parties to a more or less voluntary transaction.' 
Parties to bargains are seldom of equal bargaining strength. To the 
extent that they are not, contract, however it may appear to the parties, is 
not a matter of freedom of choice, but of command. Is it significantly 
different to say to a man, 'I will pay you a wage if you will work for me' 
rather than, 'You will get no wage unless you work for me?' Two hundred 
years ago Lord Chancellor Northington expressed it succinctly: "Necessitous 
men are not, truly speaking, free men.' 
« 'At law, to treat unequals notionally as equals is in fact to elevate 
the stronger to a position of domination. In a bargaining situation, the 
stronger imposes upon the weaker the norms of conduct which he desires. There 
is no 'equality' between African labourers and a giant copper mine or 
plantation. An African who must raise cash to pay a poll tax, or go to 
jail, has no freedom to decline to work for cash wages. 
The power to create norms of conduct, that is, to legislate, and 
the use of state power to enforce such normes are two of the three familiar 
attributes of government. The net result of contract law is to transfer 
to the economically superior classes in the community the most significant 
powers of the state, all under the fictional disguise of equality and freedom. 
Facilitative law and 'voluntariness begin with notions of 'freedom'. They 
end by subjecting the weaker party to the power of the stronger. Facilitative 
law manipulates the weaker party, as does planning law or social engineering. 
The principal difference lies in who does the manipulating. 
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Classical theory meets this claim by reliance upon the 'Invisible Hand' 
of the market to determine 'objectively' the terms and conditions of any 
particular interchange. The anti-classical model argues not only that the 
perfectly free market in fact never appears in the real world, but also that 
it is theoretically impossible for it to exist. The model of perfect compe-
tition assumes that all preferences can and must be expressed through the 
market. Before the principle of marginal utility nothing is sacred. If 
there are effects of economic activity which are not taken into account in 
setting prices, that is, externalities, to that extent the market mechanism 
does not function. 
All laws and customs are externalities in this sense. They impose 
constraints on bargaining, constraints that do not fall before the principle 
of marginal utility, for they are supported by police, judges, bailiffs, 
sheriffs, jailers and, ultimately, the army. Willard Hurst has made the 
consequences of this proposition central to his jurisprudence. 
Law influences the decisions made by 'private orders'.... Every 
entrepreneur in deciding how to invest his time, energy and money, 
calculates the profits expected from the course open to him. Every 
calculation includes an assessment of the law's impact on profits: 
subsidies, make some investments more attractive while laws that 
force the entrepreneur., to absorb the 'external' costs of an 
activity make that activity less attractive. To each entrepreneur, 
then, the law appears as a factor which affects his decisions but 
over which he has no control. 
Warren Samuels, following Robert Lee Hale, makes a useful distinction 
between voluntary freedom (the opportunity or capacity to determine the 
alternatives themselves) and volitional freedom (the choice between existing 
alternatives). Since law structures the range of alternatives open to 
participants in any given market, the participants have only 'volitional 
freedom'. The state alone has 'voluntary freedom'. 
Society conveniently can be defined in terms of its normative (or 
institutional) 
system. That is what distinguishes it from a hive of bees. 
Norms can be expressed only in terms of law or of custom. To' state that all 
law and custom are externalities is to say that all society is external to 
the ideal type construct of the free market. At precisely the point at which 
the ideal type conceivably could exist, society disappears. To state that 
the market cannot exist without law, but that all law is an externality, is 
to state a paradox. 
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To the extent that the free market does not exist, its 'Invisible 
Hand' does not limit the power .of one aparty in making an exchange with 
another. Since law and custom to a very great degree define the extent 
to which .t" ideal type free market does not exist, the pwoer of one party 
over another must itself be a function of law and custom. Since law and 
custom are the indispensal .e components of organized society, this is to say 
no more than that the 'free market' exists in society, and society itself 
determines the relative power of the participants. 
The anti-classical understanding of facilitative law, therefore, 
focusses upon the framework of institutions within which bargains are struck 
and upon the power relationships of the parties. A bargain implies 'freedom' 
only in that, given the available alternatives, both parties prefer the 
bargain struck. It is the framework which structures the alternatives 
available to each party which determines the extent of their volitional 
freedom. 
It is further argued that the model of the value-neutral state 
providing an impartial framework within which conflict can be resolved peace-
ably is not only empirically, but also theoretically impossible. A decision-
making structure—and the state is, par excellence, a decision-making structure-
"ft3fi?fot be value-neurtral. The rules that define any decision-making process 
necessarily limit the range of potential inputs, conversion processes and 
feedback functions. These rules, to that degree, predetermine the outputs, 
that is, the decisions. The state, perceived as a framework for the 
resolution of conflict, is a decision-making structure. No more than any 
other decision-making structure can it be value-neutral. 
If the decision-making structure cannot be value-neutral, its output 
cannot be value-neutral. The ±a:rs' of property and contract which are required 
by the ideal type model of the market economy therefore cannot be ^alue— 
neutral, for they are products of a decision-making structure. 
The law of property, for example, contains a huge number of separate 
normative propositions: No other person may appropriate my desk unless 
certain conditions are met; I may dispose of it as I will: I may rent it, 
and so forth. The conventional definition of the word property is that it 
is a bundle of rights, duties, powers and liabilities with respect to some-
thing. In most societies, the content of that bundle buttresses the shape 
of the economy. In an interdependent society, property is necessary to the 
livelihood of many more people than its owner. Ownership gives the proprietor 
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the power to command others, through the exercise of contract. The precise 
scope of this power is determined by the details of property, tort and contract 
law. 
This normative character of property law is exemplified in the 
laws of land tenure. They define much more than who has the right to sell 
land or to exclude others. They limit who can obtain credit (if I do not 
own land, I cannot use it as security for a loan); who can hire labour Cif 
I do not own land, I cannot hire anyone to work it); who can market crops 
(if I do not have an interest in land, I cannot farm and therefore have 
nothing to sell). 
In short, the 'free market' is not merely an ideal type which is 
approximated more or less closely by various cocieties. It is an impossibility. 
The market cannot exist without law, but law is an externality. The market 
cannot exist without a value-neutral law and state; but the state and its 
principal output -- law — cannot be value-neurtral. Behind the 'Invisible 
Hand' there is a thumb on the scales. Gunnar Myrdal makes the same point:-
Price are manipulated. They are not the outcome only of the 
forces in the market: they are in a sense 'political prices', 
depending also on the regulating activity of the state, of quasi-
public and private ortanizations and of private businesses. The 
state interferences in the price system are, in a sense, the 
ultimate ones.... 
The state must, willy-nilly, favour some and disadvantage others. 
For the state to stand by and permit the private activity of citizens to 
determine the configurations of the economy is as much state action as overt 
intervention. Cui bono? is not simply a possible query; it is the most 
significant question of all. 
We can summarize the anti-classical model in a second set of pro-
positions^ 1) facilitative law permits the parties to an interaction to 
determine their own norms of conduct; 2) failitative law ensures that the 
more powerful party to an interchange will impose his desires upon the 
weaker. Furthermore, the perfectly free market does not and cannot exist 
as a protection against the imposition of private power; 3) the state, by 
enforcing private agreements, lends its reserved monopoly of violence to 
enforce the norms agreed upon by the parties of the interchange; 4) since 
every decision-making function is necessarily value laden, the state is not 
and cannot be a value-neutral arbiter; 5) the enforcement of private bargains 
made under the guise of facilitative law is therefore as much a form of state 
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intervention as more direct commands from the state to citizens; and 6) facili-
tative law therefore ensures that the state will delegate its power to the 
more powerful party. 
Implications 
If the anti-classical explanation is in fact not diswarranted, and 
the classical one is, a variety of implications arise. We discuss two of 
them here. 
State Action and Non-action. It is obvious that the existence of positive 
law on a given subject raises legal questions. Does the absence of positive 
law on that subject also raise a legal question? 
The problem has arisen directly in the United States by the line 
of cases growing out of racially restrictive convenants. In Shelley v. 
Kraemer, a racially restictive covenant prohibiting any 'non-Caucasian' 
occupancy was denied enforcement by a court on the ground that to enforce 
it would require state action depriving the Shelleys , who were blacks and 
the contract purchasers of a parcel of land purportedly covered by the 
covenant, of the equal protection of the laws. Car Auerbach and others 
have asked: 'Shall we say, then, that when the state chooses not to exercise 
its power to prohibit racial discrimination, it is sanctioning such dis-
crimination and such inaction constitutes state action subject to constitutional 
commands?' 
Questions of the same order can be asked about the problems of law 
in Africa. In colonial Kenya, the colonial state patently intervened 
on a massive scale into the economic order. In colonial Gold Coast, apparently 
the colonial government was content with the market economy at a time when 
the 
economy oper,a.*ted "to "the g3?ea."t a.dva.n'ta.ge of "the English "tpa.di.ng fipms# 
Shall we say that by not appearing to intervene, the Gold Coast colonial 
government was exercising state power on behalf of the trading firms? 
If the answer is affirmative, the consequences for one's understanding 
of the interactions between the legal system and the social order seem far-
reaching. But for the particular application or nonapplication of state power 
at hand, the social situation might be otherwise. The shape of institutions, 
whether formed overtly by legal rules or covertly by custom in the face of 
which the state has some power to effectuate change, is determined by the 
state. Society is not a mindless, accidental concatenation of roles and 
statues. It is the existence of state power which makes possible rational 
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directed social change. Given that potential, the state must be charged 
with responsibility for whatever institutions exist if there are resources 
in the state sufficient to change them. 
The perception that explicit state nonaction and action equally 
forms* of state action requires the conclusion that there is no such thing 
as an economy without state intervention. The form of intervention may be 
relatively obvious, as in the Kenya case, or relatively concealed, as in 
the West African case. Both economies were shaped by state intervention 
through law. 
So radical a perception is a necessary preliminary to any meaningful 
science of directed social change through law, that is, of a discipline of 
law and development. Unless one perceives a potential for change, it is 
fatuous to talk of inducing change. If there is a potential for change, then 
the state is responsible for permitting the existing situation to continue. 
Conversely, the fact that the state is responsible for maintaining the status 
quo demonstrates the potential for change through the use of state power, 
that is, through law as it was defined earlier. 
Conflict or Consensus. Rather tenatively we propose one other consequential 
propositon which seems to flow from the analysis so far. We have asserted 
that, however desirable it may be for the state to constitute a value-neutral 
framework within which struggle can take place, it is not only practically 
difficult but also theoretically impossible for it to fill that role. The 
pluralist conception, which rests upon the ideal of a value-neutral state, 
is equally implausible. 
If the state cannot be value-neutral, then it is impossible to argue 
that it rests upon value consensus. The modern school supports the notion 
of value consensus upon the theory that the state exists to adjust conflict. 
Both classical and anti-classical perspectives agree that conflict is 
pervasive in society. The value consensus claimed by the structural-
functional school is limited to the neutral, peacekeeping, society-conserving 
function of the state as arbiter of conflict. Once the impossibility of 
that function is demonstrated, then the minimum basis of societal consensus 
likewise is destroyed. 
- To say that there is no value consensus, of course, is' not to deny 
that there are particular sets of values, or paradigms of society, which 
are very widely shared. Yet consensus, as opposed to the values or interests 
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of a shifting majority, can exist only upon the terms of survival. Survival 
of the polity, in the pluralist view, requires a value-neutral state as 
the framework of struggle. That ideal is conceptually impossible. 
That the state has a monopoly of legitimate violence in the 
polity is an axiomatic proposition. If its use of violence is not limited 
to a supposedly value-free function which rests upon a value consensus as 
to its appropriate role, then, as Ralph Dahrendorf says of the conflict 
"model, 'every society rests on constraints of some members by others'. In 
short, it is the very existence of law and its enforcement institutions which 
best demonstrates that the conflict model, rather than the value consensus 
model, best explains society. 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW 
Societies consciously bring about social change by inducing a 
variety of actors to change their patterns of behaviour. To do this, govern-
ments apply conformity-inducing measures to role-occupants. That is the 
business of development administration. Soft development is characterized 
by the wholesale failure of this process. 
The myth of laissez-faire has it that the administration is 
concerned internally only with law and order and the collection of taxes. 
The regulation of the economy is accomplished by the market. Conflicts 
within the economic system are adjudicated by the courts. They also serve 
to keep the boundary between government and the citizen immune from 
bureaucratic poaching. Besides the courts and the civil service, there are 
no other governmental implementation institutions. 
Self-evidently, this myth bears no resemblance to the reality of 
the African world. Courts have been largely irrelevant to development 
(although they have served a significant dispute-settlement function). 
The administration has been deeply involved in activities very different 
from maintaining law and order and collecting taxes mainly, but not 
exclusively, inducing new economic activity. An entirely new sector of 
governmental institutions concerned with implementation has arisen — 
the parastatals and government corporations. 
Neither courts, administration nor parastatals have worked very 
well to bring about development. The result has been clouds of rhetoric, 
even some laws purporting to bring about radical institutional transformation, 
but little actual change — that is, soft development. 
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In order to generate a theory explaining this widespread failure, 
we must first characterize the sorts of decisions required of the implemen-
tation institutions. We shall then put forward a general model of decision-
making structures as the basis for their analysis, and, finally a very 
general theory explaining the relative failure of the institutions of imple-
mentation. 
The Decisions Required for Development 
The general model of government that ?we all learn in school 
separates its functions into legislative, administrative and judicial. Law-
makers create rules; the bureaucracy or a private individual in the first 
J--
instance asserts that there has been a breach; the courts decide guilt or • 
innocence and assess punishment. Administration in this view ;is usually 
thought of as accepting goals from outside the system, as depending upon 
resources from other systems and being instructed in the use of means'.. 
These instructions as to goals and means are packaged as rules 
"laid down by higher authority. ^The-^function of the administration is to 
apply rules. 
Another function of these institutions may be distinguished. This 
we denote as problem solving: '...developing goals within the system using 
resources over which the system has control, and being free in the use or 
means'. In this function, the law-makers do not enact rules to guide the 
behaviour of the administration. Rather, they identify problems and turn 
them over to the administration to solve. 
Difficulties for which government has always accepted responsibility 
— for example, maintaining law and order have long since been solved in 
ways more-or-less satisfactory to the ruling elite. Because they are long-
term they are defined by rules. The criminal law is an example. That is 
what is meant by 'institutionalization'. New difficulties arising in these 
areas can be resolved by incremental changes in the existing corpus of 
rules. Of course, this leads frequently to frustation, for it happens some-
times, that the existing solutions will no longer do, no matter how much 
incremental tinkering is attempted. When that happens, the system is in 
crisis. The criminal justice system in the United States today is an 
example. 
When the African countries achieved independence, their govern-
ments inherited institutionalized systems for dealing wi^hlaw, order, taxes 
- 55 - IDS/OP 29 
and the economy. Now, however, they ahad a whole new set of difficulties 
thrust upon them, the demands for development, The existing sets of rules 
are plainly insufficient for dealing with these new problems. The structure 
of the formal law-making organs (cabine, party and legislature) has been 
incapable of generating solutions. The best that they have been able to 
do has been to identify the difficulties at hand and turn them oyer to 
the bureaucracies to solve. 
Much the same process took place in the United States. Federal 
judges have increasingly found themselves trying to solve problems such as 
school integration, due process for prisoners and the like, rather than 
applying fixed rules to neatly defined cases. The great administrative 
agencies of government, too, have been called upon to solve problems, and 
in the course of doing this to create the necessary rules. 
As a result, the traditional allocation of decision-making to the 
legislature and implementation to the bureaucracy has become inapplicable. 
The task of the highest political authorities has become only the ordering 
of priorities in solving problems. The process of actually analyzing the 
difficulty, devising a programme to solve it, implementing the problem and 
then learning from that experience how to improve it was turned over to 
the bureaucracy or other 'implementation' agencies (such as parastatal 
organizations). The determination of policy in the traditional sense of 
devising a fairly detailed programme to solve mergent difficulties passed 
from the supposed policy-makers to the supposed implementers. Typically, 
formal legisltion has done little more than define a difficulty and empower 
a minister to promulgate subsidiary legislation looking towards its actual 
solution. 
The received implementation machinery of the African states did 
not succeed very well in their new task of problem-solving because they could 
not. Decision-making machinery is never capable of universal application. 
That is to say these institutions lacked the capacity to meet the new require-
ments imposed upon them. 
Decision-Making Systems and the Range of Decisions 
In order to explain why it was that the implementation institutions 
in Africa lacked the capacity to generate the sorts of decisions required 
for development, it is necessary first to provide a framework for analysis 
of decision-making systems. Every decision-making system can be conceptualized 
as consisting of inputs, conversion processes, outputs and feedbacks:-
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Inputs include the recruitment and socialization of decision-makers, 
the troubled situations chosen for examination, the candidate explainations 
selected, the data collected, the proposals for solution, the bodies of 
reliable knowledge and data against which these are tested, and the sorts 
of large-scale paradigms or ideologies (or values) used to guide discre-
tionary choice in problem-solving. The conversion processes are processes 
by which these materials are combined into a decision. That decision, usually 
purporting to solve the difficulty poses by the input process, is the output. 
The feedback is the process by which the output and its performance in the 
real world becomes an input to new decision-making, so that the system can 
learn from what it has done to improve its subsequent decisions and, some-
times, its own working rules. 
Decision-making systems in government always consist of many roles. 
Some provide inputs, some are involved in the conversion process, others 
in feedback. As roles, they of course act in patterned ways, defined by 
formal rules or informal conventions. These patterns define the range of 
choice of the decision-making system as a whole. 
Human behaviour can be explained by asking two questions: What is 
the range of choice and why do the individuals involved in the conversion 
process make the choices they do within that range? When this decision-
making model is used to analyze individual decisions, too often it takes 
as given the patterned behaviour which makes it a system. The only question 
asked is, 'was the particular choice made within the range thrown up by the 
system?' The model then directs attention only to those matters that actually 
arise for decision and the range of choice thrown up. It does not analyze 
non-decisions. 
So used, the model is inherently static. It assumes as given the 
existing structure of the system. It -therefore cannot lead to explanations 
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in terms of structure upon which to ground changes in the working rules. It 
leads to explanations for decisions which rest upon the personal character-
istics of the decision-makers. 
Our interest is in structure - that is, in the working rules 
that define the structure and explain, not the values of individual decision-
makers, but why decision-makers of this sort are so consistently recruited. 
This requires that we examine the working rules. Thus used, we think the 
model avoids being static. 
In an abstract never-never land of decision-making, the most 
rational decision would be one which considered all the potentially useful 
data, all the potential hypoth eses, all the various bodies of ideas against 
which suggestional might be reasoned and all the possible consequences of 
a decision. Real life is more difficult. Inputs and conversion processes 
are necessarily limited. First, as a simple matter of logistics, not every 
potential solution can be weighed in the balance. In the real world, every 
decision-making body, even the government, has some substantive restraints 
placed upon it when dealing with particular subjects. A constitution may 
prohibit the legislature from enacting any statute impairing the right of the 
people to carry arms, A corporate charter may limit the decision-making 
power to the manufacture of cement. Second, every real life decision-making 
body follows repetitive patterns of behaviour which define its processes -
its working rules, These rules, too, whether of law or custom, necessarily 
limit the activity of the various role-occupants. In consequence, inputs 
and feedback are also limited, which limits the range of potential.outputs. 
Conversion processes are limited as well. First, every decision-
maker brings to the decision a set of culturally acquired values or (which 
comes to the same thing) a model of society. These values or models place 
limits upon the variables which the decion-maker will consider appropriate 
to take into account. The decisions of British judges concerning maters 
involving witchcraft in Africa plainly excluded various considerations 
which might have seemed germane to the Africans involved. 
In consequence, to the extent that the rules of recruitment and 
socialization of law-makers limit selection to those apt to have a particular 
set of values, these rules pro tanto preform the conversion processes and 
hence the output, 
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Conversion processes are also constrained by the working rules 
which determine how decisions are to be taken. A conversion process that 
requires the output to be only incrementally distant from an existing 
rule for example, may have a very different output from one which operates 
with rules that admit the possibility of more radical solutions. His own 
values and ideologies further limit the decision-maker's range of choice. 
In short, the scope of grants of power and the working rules of 
the decision-making process necessarily constrain the range of inputs, 
feedbacks and the conversion process. The result is to limit the range 
within which potential outputs must fall. 
'Values' and the working rules of the system are thus seen to be 
functional equivalents. They both serve pro tanto to preform the decisional 
output, for they both guide the discretionary choices made in problem-
solving. In this sense, every decision-making process is necessarily value-
laden, for process and capability are functional equivalents to values. A 
genuinely neutral decision-making process is inconceivable. 
In designing decision-making structures, therefore, lawyers must 
determine what sorts of inputs, what sorts of conversion processes, and what 
sorts of feedbacks will be functional to achieve rational decisions within 
the range of outputs required. The rules that define the processes of 
decision-making, by determining their limits, preform the range of decisional 
output. 
A Theory of the Law of Development Administration 
The misfit between the problem-solving tasks faced by development 
administration and the existing rules defining its structure suggests an 
explanation for its relative failure. Courts and administration in the 
laisser-faire model were designed to apply rules. That function requires 
rules imposing responsibility, accountability and the instrumental character 
of administration. 
Discretion is their very opposite. Discretion unconfined is the 
essence of authoritarianism. Bureaucracy is inherently hierarchical. Only 
the fact that it is rule bound, and therefore accountable (it must conform 
its behaviour to the rule), prevents it from becoming dictatorial. To 
give broad discretion to a bureaucracy insulates it from accountability. 
IDS/OP 29 - 59 -
In the colonial period, the bureaucracy was Janus-headed. With 
respect of the white settlers, it was usually rule-bound and accountable 
and, where discretion existed, there was great participatopm om decosopm-
making by its white public. With respect to Africans, it was a dictatorial 
machine characterized by broad discretion and freedom from rules and no 
participation by Africans at all. 
On independence, the new administration continued as the old. In 
form it was hierarchical and compartmented. As such, it was useful for 
applying rules. It was not very well organized to solve problems. 
Yet the broad discretion given high-level bureaucrats by the law 
continued. Now, however, they were given new problems to solve, and with 
them came new grants of discretion. Whole areas of jurisdiction were carved 
out and given to the parastatals, precisely because it was believed that 
parastatals had the discretion and power required to be 'dynamic' and 
'entrepreneurial' — that is, to solve problems. 
In neither case was the discretion gtanted easily held to account. 
As a result, the administrators and managers used their discretion as 
administrators and managers are wont to do everywhere: to maximize rewards 
and minimize strains for themselves and their bureaucracies. They 
aggrandized themselves, or did favours for friends and relatives — hence 
the development of a 'bureaucratic bourgeosie'. Rather than creating new 
solutions for difficulties, it was usually easier and more rewarding for 
them to fall back into old ways of doing things — or, what is the same 
thing, to do nothing to induce change.' Radical change threatens the existing 
holders of power and privilege, who are best able to reward bureaucrats. 
This can be formulated as a theory to explain the pervasive failure 
of African systems in the administration of development, and hence of the 
laws which define them. We put forward here a very general set of hypotheses:-
1. The working rules defining the inputs, conversion processes and 
feedbacks of a decision-making system preform the potential 
range of outputs. 
2. At independence, the working rules defining African systems for 
the implementation of law (i.e., the courts and the civil 
service) created authoritarian, compartmented systems capable 
of applying punishments as behavior-inducing measures and 
endowed with broad grants of discretion. 
- 60 - ID'S/OP 29 
3. Development requires problem-solving, not rule-applying. 
4. The working rules defining problem-solving institutions must 
allow wide discretion, must be capable of providing rewards 
and educative conformity inducing measures as well as punish-
ments , and must provide that the role-occupants themselves 
engage in a problem-solving process leading to decisions 
concerning how to behave. 
5. Courts have been only marginally relevant to development. 
6. The substantive law of development in Africa vested broad 
discretion in the civil service and created the parastatal 
sector, whose managers also had broad discretion and which 
were also authoritarian. 
7. The received rules of administrative law, and the structure 
of the parastatals, contain only very weak controls over 
discretion. 
8. Role-occupants vested with broad discretion in authoritarian 
organizations will tend to use their discretion to maximize 
rewards and minimize strains upon themselves and their 
organizations. 
9. In Africa, the existing economic and political elite have been 
the most important source of rewards and strains for the 
bureaucracy and parastatal managers. 
10. In Africa, bureaucrats and parastatal managers have maximized 
rewards and minimized strains for themselves and their 
organizations by:-
a. Aggrandizing themselves, their friends, associates and 
relatives, and 
b. Making incremental rather than radical changes in institu-
tions, or not changes at all. 
This explanation can be condensed: authoritarian institutions 
whose managers are vested with great discretion are incapable of generating 
decisions which foster development. Paternalism is an authoritarian system 
with broad grants of discretion. It cannot work. 'Development from above' 
cannot work. When it was tried in Africa, the consequences have been soft 
development and the bureaucratic bourgeosie. 
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PERSPECTIVES: THE INTELECTUAL CONTROL OVER VALUE CHOICE IN RESEARCH 
AND THE DEFINITION OF 'DEVELOPMENT" 
In the course of research following the methodology we have 
suggested, there are a host of discretionary choices to be. made. Whose 
trouble should we attend to? What stock of propositions should we draw 
upon to put forward possible explanations? What proposals for solutions 
should we try? What counts as adequate or successful implementation? In 
this sense all social science is value-laden not only in the selection of the 
troubles to examined, but at every stage except one. That exception is in the 
conscientious search for falsifying evidence. The scientific temper 
implies a commitment to truth. If we cannot falsify explanations by data 
publicly accessible, which any two scientists using the same methodology 
must accept, then knowledge itself is impossible, That one critical 
point aside, every step in the research agenda is discretionary. It is 
dependent upon 'values'. Since this is so, the policy advocated as the 
result of research depends upon these 'values'. 
Mainstream social science generally at this stage abandons the 
scientific enterprise. Max Weber taught that all that social science can do 
is to tell one the probable consequences of alternative courses of action. 
What sort of choice I make depends upon what sort of man I am. That is 
(as Pound called it) a give-it-up philosophy. 
How to impose intellectual controls over these discretionary choices 
made in the course of research? We believe that the answer can be found in 
the functional equivalence of values, ends, paradigms (models) and 
explanations. 
Large-scale ends-in-view such as legal liberalism are related 
to paradigm as proposals for solution are related to explanations. Paradigms 
(or models of society) are explanations of how social systems work. Adam 
Smith did not write a propaganda tract for capitalism. He put forward an 
explanation for the wealth of nations. Karl Marx in Capital did not write 
an exhortation for socialism. y fie s6t out an explanation for the political 
economy of nineteenth-century England, 
What are commonly called 'ends' (that is, desirable states of 
affairs) are proposals for solutions. Capitalism is a solution to the 
difficulties examined by Smith, corresponding to, the explanation of capitalist 
society. Every so-called 'end' or value in principle rests upon an explanation, 
implicit or explicit. For every end, therefore, it is possible to discover 
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The function of values, ends, paradigms and explanations in the 
research enterprise is the same: they guide the discretionary choices that must 
be made in deciding what troubles to examine, what possible explanations to 
test, what solutions to offer. For example, it does not matter whether I 
make certain choices because I adhere to socialism as an end or because I 
believe the Marxist explanation of underdevelopment to be true. The choices 
will be the same. 
The great difference is that explanations are in principle falsifiable. 
They are propositions about facts. Ends are not. They are expressed in 
propositions about matters of faith. The bulk of the Wealth of Nations 
is data to support the explanations advanced. So is the bulk of Capital. 
The choice between the two ought not to depend upon the sort of man one 
is, but upon the persuasiveness of the data. Passion is all very well in the 
research enterprise :n ifact it is required1-except at the point of assessing 
data. There, an icier mood is appropriate. 
The function of large-scale explanations (that is, models) in policy 
research is to guide the search for a just (and therefore also practical) 
solution to a specific trouble. The success or failure of that solution to 
resolve the difficulties which excited the research is the validation or 
falsification, not only of the particular design but of the underlying 
principles upon which it was based. The activity of implementation generates 
data to test every aspect of the research. The systematic examination of 
exrorience^ converts it from mere ongoing activity into activity whose purpose 
is in part at least to generate knowledge - that is, into experiment. 
It is well known that there is no general agreement on large-scale 
explanations for the problems of poverty and oppression in the less developed 
countries: (LDCs). Rather, there are a host of explanations in all the 
social sciences. 
These are divided in. tvo '.'ays. Some theories ask only why people 
behave as they do within the existing institutional order, and others also a?1 
why the existing order is as it is. The first asks why people choose as 
they do, taking the existing range of choice as given, the second treats the 
range of choice itself as problematic. 
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The other division is between theories which view the world from 
the perspective of the Establishment, of those with power and privilege, and 
those which view the world from the view point of those without power or 
privilege. Four categories of theories thus emerge :-
Point of View 
Range of Variables Considered. 
Institutions 
as given 
Institutions 
as variables 
Elites/ruling class Mass/the poor 
- 1 
- (1) 
1 
+ (3) 
- (2) 
— i 
+ 
+ (4) 
We shall discuss '•each of these theories in turn according to 
...ei^ ht" headings 
1. The trouble examined, and the principal explanations advanced, 
2. The rate of change - from doing nothing, through incremental 
change to radical institutional change, 
3.. Conflict or consensus theory, 
The sort of social theory involved, 
5. The sort of political theory involved, 
6. The sort of economic theory involved, 
7. The prescriptions for change derived from the theory, and 
8. The definition of 'development' typically used. 
Theories that examine the poverty and oppression of the LDCs from 
the viewpoint of the elite or the economic ruling class and which take 
existing institutions as given typically argue that the troubles of the LDCs 
are function of the values' of the people who live there (for example, their 
lack of 'entrepreneurship'). They are sometimes implicitly or explicitly 
based on racist assumptions. They argue that no real change is possible until 
these 'values' are changed, a long, slow process. Usually they invoke notions 
of consensus — that is, that there is a set of values that are possessed 
by practically everyone within the polity. The social theory involved is 
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usually some variant of elitist theory. Those with power and privilege 
have reached their position.! because of their superior personal qualities. 
I'-T • i 
Political theory tends to match social theory, justifying existing political 
arrangements by the qualities of the elites. Economic theory is ordinarily 
some variety of laissez-faire economics, which takes the institutions of the 
economic order as a given which need not be examined. Given an ongoing 
economic order, changes in inputs of land, labour and capital should 
lead to corresponding changes in output of goods and services. The prescrip-
tions for change ordinarily are simply to do more of what is already being 
done--to produce more coffee or cocoa or copper-based upon exhortations or 
education of peasants (especially 'progressive' farmers) to import capital 
and technological skills from abroad and to improve the infractructure in 
order to lay the basis for capital enterprise. 'Development' is usually 
defined in terms of increased per capita' GNP. An example is the work of 
David McLelland on 'high N Achievement' of the "Achieving Society. 
Theories that take the viewpoint of the elite or ruling class, but 
perceive institutions as potentially manipulatable variables, tend to 
explainn poverty and oppression by the weaknesses of existing institutions 
to provide entrepreneurial opportunities -- land tenure systems or .".>.' f.V 
family institutions, for example. They propose, therefore, incremental 
changes in these institutions in order to facilitate a market system. They 
usually advocate state corporations as a source of 'soft' financing for 
private enterprise, or even as productive enterprises where there seems 
no possibility of private entrepreneurship providing specific productive 
facilities. Sometimes the advocacy of state corporations is coupled with the 
proposal that, once established, they should be sold to private enterprise. 
In terms of social theory, these theories lean heavily upon structural-
functionalism, finding inspiration principally in the work of Max Weber 
and the American sociologist Talcott Parsons, Political science theory 
tends to be some version of American pluralism, emphasizing differentiation 
of function as a mark of modernity. 
In economics, theories of this type are a limited version of 
institutional economics. Typically, they prescribe some form of state 
capitalism as the solution for underdevelopment. Entrepreneurial initiative 
is the principal engine for development, with the state acting as surrogate 
where entrepreneurs are not likely to come forward to initiate economic 
activity. 'Development' is usually defined by reference to Western, capitalist 
models, and measured in terms of differentiation of function, secularism, 
an 1 n.-.r.e itvir* r"Tn. ^ •».->• .1.::;; a n - '• : '. '. <> ••'•< '. ' 'thur 
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and increased per capita GNP. Examples are legion: W.W. Rostow, V/. Arthur 
L"?ti.y, Almond and Powell, and a host of others. 
Theories that take institutions as given, but take the perspective 
of the mass rather than the elite or the ruling class, tend to see elite self-
interest as the sole cause of poverty and oppression, usually in alliance 
with the rapiciousness of foreign exploiters. They sometimes involve race 
or ethnicity as an explanatory variable. Their proposals for change tend 
to focus on replacing the existing elite or ruling class with a counter-
elite whose sympathies will be with the masses. Theirs is, of course a 
conflict theory, which perceives all society as based on the opposing interests 
of rulers and ruled. Their social theory explains behaviour in terms of theA > 
conflicts of self-interest between mass and elite or the economic ruling 
class. Their political theory, therefore, tends to explain the political c 
choices made by the various strata in society according to their respective 
economic self-interests. Since that fails to explain why the mass of the people 
do not iamediately revolt, they fall back upon elitist theories that 
characteri 
ze the peasantry as 'fatalistic' or dominated by false consciousness. 
In economics, they tend to adopt a kind of dependency theory that blames all 
the ills of underdevelopment on international corporations and foreign 
exploiters. Some theorists in this category offer no prescriptions for 
change. If the explanation of the difficulty is the world capitalist system, 
and the LDCs are impotent to change that system, what can be done? Other 
theorists in this category call for immediate revolution, usually violent. 
'Development1 is usually defined, if at all, in terms of success in changing 
the dependency relationship of the national economy upon the world capitalist 
system. I n a ^ l ^ ^ are Walter Rodney's How Europe Underdeveloped Africa and 
much of the writing of Franz Fanon. 
Theories that adopt the viewpoint of the mass, and take institutions 
as a manipulatable variaMe, perceive the institutions of society themselves 
as the principle explanation for poverty and oppression, and the intervention 
of the state as the principal vehicle of change. Since it is the institutions 
of society which cause poverty and oppression, their radical change must be 
accomplished. These theories are invariably based on a conflict interpretation 
of society. The social theory explains behaviour principally by the 
that people make choices among the constraints and resources thrown up by 
institutions of their society, , as they perceive them, and that they are 
motivated in the final analysis by self-interest. The power of elites and 
ruling classes can be explained, by such institutions as property and contract 
law, or by the system of political rule by which various individuals are 
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recruited for their roles and the power which they are given once recruited. 
In economics, such theories base themselves on Marxist explanations, or on 
those versions of dependency theory which include institutional explanations. 
Such theories prescribe radical institutional change, looking to a severance 
of dependency upon the world capitalist system, widespread participation by 
the' mass in political decision-making, and the creation of an integrated 
economic system with a high degree of internal production and exchange 
consciously created by the state. 'Development' is typically measured by 
an increased per capita GNP and a progressive improvement in the quality of 
life of the mass. Examples, again, are legion: Samir Amin, Colin Leys, 
Giovanni Arrighi, R.H. Green, and many others. 
Of these four sets of theories, only the third and fourth are of 
interest with respect to law and development. The legal order is an instru-
ment to change repetitive patterns of behaviour and 'institutions' is only 
another word for repetitive patterns of behaviour. The very definition of 
the subject matter of law and development requires that institutions be 
considered as the principal manipulatable variables. 
In fact, theorists of the first and third types have surprisingly 
little currency today in the social sciences. Classical laissez-faire, 
like the old soldier in the song, does- not die, but has 3,lowly faded away. 
Romantic revolutionaries congregate in cocktail lounges as well as in 
universities. The real choice for the LDCs lies in perspectives derived from 
the second and fourth sets of theories, that is in explanations pointing 
either to state capitalism or to socialism. 
Both of these sets of theories, of course, insist that they are 
directed to resolving the problems of poverty and oppression. We sketch 
here an example of each of these theories, and their consequences for the 
legal order. We label these respectively contract and plan theories. 
Contract Theory 
How should societies move away from a regime of status to some 
other regime of high specialization and exchange? There are many explanations 
for poverty which lead to quite different prescriptions for action. Most 
of these can be placed into one of two categories. A typical example of the 
first sort is that of Paul Samuelson, in an early edition of his textbook on 
economics . His explanation can — very sketchily—be restated thus:-
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1. The poor countries are deficient in the four 'economic 
fundamentals', viz., population, natural resources, capital 
formation and technology. 
2. Without these economic fundamentals, there can be no 
opportunities for profitable investment nor investors with 
capital. 
3. Without opportunities for investment and investors with capital, 
there will be no investment. 
4. Without investment, the productive capacity of a country 
remains low. 
5. Poverty exists where the productive capacity of a country 
remains low. 
Lurking behind this explanation lies an important unstated assump-
tion put nicely by Herbert A. Simon. He distinguishes between the 'inner' 
and 'outer' environment of a system. The former is the substance and 
organization of the system itself; the latter, the surroundings in which it 
works. Since any given system has made some sort of an adjustment to its 
environment, it can be supposed that given a small change in the environment 
there will be a corresponding adaptive change in the system. Thus, 
we can often predict behaviour from knowledge of the system's 
goals and its outer environment, with only minimal assumptions 
about the inner environment. An instant corollary is that we 
often find quite different inner environments accomplishing 
identical or similar goals in identical or similar outer 
environments— airplanes or birds, dolphins or tunafish, weight-
driven clocks and spring-driven clocks, electrical relays and 
transistors. 
Samuelson makes an analogous assumption. Underlying his analysis is the 
belief that if adequate incentives are offered, individual I entrepreneurs 
will come forward to invest in such a way as to increase production. Given 
a change in the supply of 'economic fundamentals', one can expect a change 
in the economic output. This assertion can be made without an particularly 
close examination of the inner environment —the institutional structure of 
the economic system itself. His explanation directs attention away from 
that structure as a 'cause' of poverty. 
Proposals for solutions are invariably addressed to governments 
not to? private entrepreneurs. Only governments consciously have the goal of 
development in mind. Entrepreneurs act with profits as their goal. 
Society, it is assumed, benefits incidentally from entrepreneurial profit-
seeking. 
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As a consequence of Samuelson's implicit acceptance of the notion 
of system adaptability, his proposal for government action in aid of develop-
ment is not to change the institutions of the inner environment (the economic 
system itself). Rather, it is only to change the outer environment so as to 
provide the conditions in which private entrepreneurs will invest, i.e., to 
create favourable investment opportunities. Governments must reform 
existing institutions which do not encourage or give free play to individual 
entrepreneurship--tax systems, land tenure, and systems of private commercial 
law. In addition, the state can help private entrepreneurs directly, by 
providing cheap risk capital or soft loans through development finance 
corporations. Many states also seek to create entrepreneurial spirit and 
skills through institutes of business administration and the like. 
Most theorists today, like Samuelson, <ro beyond classical laisser-
faire. Despite his commitment to the premise that the initiative for develop-
ment can only be taken successfully by private entrepreneurs, Samuelson recog-
nizes that there are practical difficulties. Certain sorts of enterprises 
are socially desirable, but not profitable, and the profit motive can 
sometimes lead to undesirable uses of capital, e.g., speculative real estate 
operations. Hence he urges that the state undertake 'social overhead projects 
which, while extremely' valuable..create intangible benefits that cannot be 
expected to yield pecuniary profits to private investors'. Many theorists 
also urge that the state use its taxing poweri, pioneer industry statutes and 
the like to channel investment into socially desirable projects. 
Samuelson's economics resonates easily with a popular paradigm 
of politics. Because Samuelson excludes as causative factors the institutions 
of the economic system-especially the institutions for the production of goods 
and services-he necessarily excludes any changes in these institutions from 
the purview of state activity. He bifurcates the policy between economics 
and government. 
According to this view, the functions of government are sharply 
limited. It must maintain or create the conditions within which enterprises 
can function; it must extract enough taxes to maintain government itself. 
Since most African governments came to power under a rhetoric which promised 
the people the benefits of the welfare state--roads, water systems, schools, 
hospitals, better housing, and so forth—the state must extract from the 
economic • System as much as it can to be spent for these various infrastruc-
tural and consumption purposes. Theorists such as Samuelson generally, however, 
- 69 - IDS/OP 29 
perceive the legal order as <J- scontinuous with the economic order. Most 
of the-: ways in which states seem to intervene in the economy — i.e., by the 
purchase of 51% of the shares in major industries—are not devices to 
change the institutions of the -economy. Rather, their function is to extract 
a larger share of the surplus from the existing economic system for governmental 
purposes, without changing the behavioural patterns involved. 
Samuelson's explanations of underdevelopment by implication imposes 
a political imperative. The main political problems are perceived as dual: 
first, to insulate:-: the economic system against tinkering by social radicals, 
and second, to ensure that the government is honest and competent and that it 
will use government revenues in ways consonant with the wishes of the majority. 
This model implies, therefore, a state which is neutral and within which social 
conflict can take place—the model suggested by interest-group pluralism. 
Samuelson's explanation focusses in part on the insufficiency of 
capital for development. After all, capitalism cannot succeed without 
capitalists. By definition, a capitalist is one who has managed to accumulate 
capital. Samuel's explanation requires sharp differentials in income, so, 
that capital can be accumulated- in private hands. He therefore defined ' j 
'development' without regard to distribution:-
An underdeveloped nation is simply one with real per capital income 
that is low relative to the present day per capita income of such 
nations as Canada, the United States, Great Britain, France and 
Western Europe generally. Usually an underdeveloped nation 
is one regarded as capable of substantial improvements in its 
income level... 
What legal order is implied by this explanation and set of 
proposals? In the first place, the state is required to provide a legal order 
to support the economy, but not to intervene in it. It must provide facilities 
so that individual economic actors can determine the shape of their economic 
activities, without actually commanding them to do so. The solution is to 
be found in the model of liberal "legalism: basically, an autonomous legal 
system consisting in the main of protections for private property, and the 
rules of contract law because:-
1. Specialization and exchange require a high degree of 
coordination between economic units, and 
2. The law of contract permits the parties to economic 
transactions to define the norms of economic co-ordination 
themselves, with state power used to sanction their breach. 
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The agenda for lawmakers demanded by the regime of contract seems 
reasonably well defined. It consists of the conventional Western wisdom for 
economic development. What is needed are legal devices to make possible 
entrepreneurial activity, principally contract law in all its ramifications. 
Facilitative forms must be provided by which capitalists can organize the 
economy. Finally, in some states, there may be a direct delegation to 
entrepreneurs of the lawmaking power, by the creation of officially 
endorsed cartels in particular industries, the outlawing of trade unions, 
and the like. Law can help to encourage private capital by providing an 
hospitable investment climate: easy tax laws, an educated labour force, research 
institutes, law and order, a we11-developed infrastructure generally. 
In the realm of political affairs, the law can provide for clear lines of 
demarcation between administrative power and individual rights, and devices 
to ensure that the governors are fairly selected by the majority of the 
population. Beyond the range of potential solutions are direct state 
interventions into the economy or systems of cooperative ownership (such 
as producers' cooperatives) which are antithetical to individual ownership. 
Planning is mainly a matter of setting targets for the private sector, and 
preparing an agenda for government expenditures on infrastructure. 
Plan Theories 
An alternative set of explanations is exemplified in an article 
by Ann Seidman. Her explanation of the poverty of nations is quite different 
from Samuelson's:-
1. The way that members of a society interact with each other 
given the material conditions of a particular society, 
determines how material resources are allocated in that 
society. 
2. How members of a society interact with each other is a function 
of the norms defining their roles and the sanctions supporting 
those norms. 
3. In every modern polity, the states possesses some formally 
legitimized power to formulate norms, and the best organized 
and most powerful instruments of coercion to enforce them. 
In every society, the classes or groups that have economic 
power and privilege tend to control the machinery of the 
state in their own interests. 
5. In every less developed country, the formal and informal 
normative structures existing on the emergence from the 
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imperial era denoted a dual economy: They consisted of 
the following:-
a. An export enclave, consisting of a few foreign 
entrepreneurs, local entrepreneurs, managers and bureau-
crats with high incomes; wage workers and cash-crop 
peasants with low incomes; and an economy with a high 
degree of specialization and exchange, predominantly 
producing raw materials for export overseas to the 
developed countries; 
b. A hinterland, consisting of the great mass of peasants 
engaged in subsistence farming with low technology in 
conditions of poverty; 
c. A system t of compulsions supported by state power by which 
peasants are driven from the subsistence sector to form 
a labor force at low wages for the entrepreneurs of the 
export enclave. 
6. The power and privilege of the political elites and the economic 
ruling.class in thg exjjprt enclave can be maximized by 
continuing the existing "set of institutions and making 
incremental changes only where necessary to maintain 
stability and equilibrium or to increase their own power 
and privilege, 
7. In most countries, foreign and local entrepreneurs, managers 
and bureaucrats in the export enclave have effective control 
of the state machinery, 
This explanation points to significantly different variables than 
does Samuelson's. Rather than asserting that private entrepreneurs are the 
necessary engine of development, it suggests that it is the state, in its 
relative control over the normative system, that determines the shape of 
development, although it leaves problematical, whether in any given case 
private or public enterprise is to be preferred. Rather than ignoring the 
institutional structure, it asserts that it is precisely the received 
institutional structure, embodied in the dual economy, which is the cause of 
the poverty of the great mass of the population. Since the African polities 
experience their present deplorable economic conditions as the result of a 
colonial regime in which contract was the central jural theme, this explanation 
suggests that contract, far from being a solution for the troubled situation, 
was its cause. If the institutions of contract are left as they are, they 
will reproduce themselves. Unless they" are changed, this explanation 
suggests that poverty will continue. 
This model does not make the sharp distinction between 
economics and politics that underlies Samuelson's. On the contrary, precisely 
because it insists that the explanation for poverty lies in the institutions 
of the economy, it proposes that the state must consciously intervene into 
the economy to change those institutions. Far from limiting the. state to 
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extracting revenues from the private sector for governmental purposes, this 
explanation points towards an explicitly interventionist policy. Rather than 
limiting the state to infrastructural or social welfare functions, it 
suggests that the appropriate role of the state includes doing whatever is 
necessary, particularly in the productive sectors, to induce development. 
Rather than pointing towards marginal changes in the existing law, it looks 
to major changes in the institutional structure. It suggests that until 
changes are made in the elites who control the machinery of the state, the 
existing relationships will change, if at all, only incrementally. It argues 
that because the existing institutional structure will necessarily provide 
greater>rofits to entrepreneurs, will direct production to overseas markets 
and preserve the existing economic system, state power must be used to 
restructure the existing institutions to provide a balanced, nationally 
integrated econony with a strong internal market. 
Finally, and perhaps most important of all, it suggests that so 
long as particular classes have radically disproportionate shares of power 
and privilege, they are apt to gain control over the political machinery in 
their own interest. Therefore, institutional change will be necessary to 
bring about more equitable shareouts of income and greater participation in 
decision-making by wage earners and peasants. 
This definition of 'development' is markedly different from 
Samuelson's for it includes a distribution function: 
The explicitly stated goal of development is attainment of 
increased specialization and exchange leading to increased 
productivity directed to raising the level of living of the 
entire population as rapidly as existing material constraints 
permit. 
The regime of law suggested by this explanation and its associated 
solutions seemingly is toto coelo different from that suggested by Samuelson's 
model. The process by which law is used to order new behaviour appears, at 
least superficially, to be entirely removed from the process by which law 
merely extends facilitative devices to economic actors. Rather than separate, 
seemingly autonomous systems, law, government and the economic order become 
a continuum, erasing the sharp discontinuity so beloved by analytical jusists 
and Weberian scholars alike. We can state this as the law of the plan:-
1. Specialization and exchange require a high degree of 
coordination between economic units. 
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2. How members of a society interact with each other is a 
function of the normative system defining their roles and 
applying the related sanctions. 
3. The state can and does determine what the content of this 
normative system is or ought to be. 
4. The state should use this power to define institutions which 
will lead away from the dual economy towards a nationally 
unified and integrated economy, expressed in national plans. 
5. The political structure of the state must provide for maximum 
feasible participation of the large masses of the people in 
the decision-making processes. 
The law of the plan is obviously a very different sort of law 
than the law of contract. Indeed, much of the conceptual difficulties that 
have plagued the study of law and development have arisen from an insistence 
that somewhere^ somehow there was a magic formula which would explain the 
uses of law in every sort of economy. We shall explore the difference 
between the law of the plan and of contract in the remainder of this chapter. 
The Choice Between Alternatives 
The different definitions of development advanced by these two 
writers are plainly related to, and arise out of, their explanations of 
underdevelopment. The choice of definition is not, as it might appear, an 
exercise in taste or values. It flows from the different explanations 
advanced. Not the definitions, but the explanations are functional to 
problem-solving. 
How to choose between these- all-embracing explanations? 
The function of these paradigms is to guide problem-solving> 
policy oriented research. The last and most important test of the research 
is whether the implementation of the solutions for which it argues alleviates 
the difficulties which inspired it. In the case of development, the paradigms 
used can be tested by asking whether they have led to a reduction of poverty 
and oppression. 
There is an enormous amount of data to examine — far beyond the 
confines of this chapter. Analyses such as Samuelson's have dominated the 
policy of most of the less developed entries which are usually included in 
the inaccurately-named free world. Everywhere, these states have sought to 
attract foreign capital, tried to improve infrastructure, encouraged the 
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production of export crops, and in general followed the sorts of recommendations 
that flow from Samuelson's explanation. In Africa at least, these programmes 
did not differ radically from those followed in the last decades of the 
imperial regime. 
These programmes, in Africa and elsewhere, have not in fact-
resulted in a significantly increased pace of development. The reasons seem 
apparent. The principal opportunities for investment at a short-term profit 
in the less developed countries today, as in the colonial period, lie in the 
production of raw materials for export'and "the import of manufactured goods "-for 
sale. Increasingly, there are opportunities for investment in manufacturing, 
lading advantage of pathetically low wage rates. Samuelson's explanation 
for underdevelopment suggests that the 'poor countries' ought to exploit 
these comparative advantages (or 'opportunities for investment') and encourage 
private investors to increase their activities in these areas. Pursuant to 
similar prescriptions, immediately after independence every African country 
sought to increase its production of traditional export products. Ghana 
doubled its cocoa i production in a few years, and the production of coffee 
and tea in Kenya, cocoa in Ivory Coast, sisal in Tanzania and copper in 
Zambia all increased. (Largely in consequence, of course, their prices 
Slipped disastrously, giving these countries small advantage for their efforts). 
The solutions; arising from Samuelson's explanations lead to continued or even 
increased external dependency by the less developed countries, not to increased 
independence. They have not, in general, led to a significant increase in 
internal specialization and exchange. They have not tended to decrease the 
bifurcation of the economy. Rather, they have tended to ©xatE.a^ batoe it. 
The countries usually included in the equally inaccurately named 
Communist bloc have in broad outline adopted the sort of policies that tend 
to follow from Ann Seidman's explanation. They seized the commanding heights, 
nationalizing exportc-import trade, major industries and financial 
institutions. Rather than relying upon private enterprise, they have 
consciously sought to change economic institutions through the planning 
process. A few of them have explicitly tried to develop new sorts of 
participatory institutions. 
The relative success of these different policies can hardly be analyzed 
in gross. Detailed case studies are required. In fact, such case studies exist 
for a large number of countries, although far more have been published in 
English about the free world countries than about those which have chosen a 
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different path. A comparative empirical study is feasible, assuming that 
it is the troubles of the disinherited that are to be resolved. Such a 
study is, of course, far beyond our scope here. 
Conclusion 
History permits policy-makers no easy exit from the necessity for self-
reliant problem-solving. The methodology of problem-solving proposed in this 
chapter is inherently value laden. We have suggested that intellectual 
controls over value-filters can be imposed by converting sentiments and vague 
beliefs into propositions, reshaping these propositions into explanations of 
the world, and then testing these large-scale explanations in the fire of 
practical work. 
Now it must be confessed that this inquiry does not propose a complete 
solution. The process of inquiry suggested that intellectual controls can be 
developed for every choice of values, except one, The one choice which seems 
beyond intellectual control is the decision of which overarching trouble requires 
explanation. That question comes down to this: to whose trouble ought a lawmaker 
attend? Out of that question derives one's paradigm of society, and it is that 
paradigm of society which guides the particular inquiry to the solution of a 
particular problem. 
In theory, that question cannot be answered in intellectual terms alone. 
On the scale of whole societies, it is a question that can only be answered, 
ultimately, by force. For individuals, and especially for academics, it can 
be aswered only by an act of- will. The - issue comes down, in the final analysis, 
to the question, with whose troubles does one empathize? A familiar folk 
song puts it more directly: which side are you on? 
To assert that all problem-solving inquiry is ultimately controlled 
by the researcher's response to that question is to say that all research is 
necessarily in a sense committed research. Whether or not he claims that he 
is merely 'descriptive' or 'positivistic', in fact every researcher must make 
discretionary choices in the course of research. Those choices will be 
controlled either by his stated or unstated residues, or by his paradigm or 
explanation of the world. Those residues, or that paradigm, in the final 
analysis must be addressed to the solution of somebody's troubles. All 
research is therefore necessarily committed to those whose troubles are its 
ultimate subject-matter. 
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To say that all research is, in this sense, committed, is not to say 
that the researcher can ignore intellectual controls in favour of what he 
intuits to be the interests of those to whom he purports to be committed. 
The entire thrust of the argument here is that intellectual controls can be 
asserted over every state of enquiry saving only the decision of whose troubles 
to investigate. The researcher who ignores the controls of social science 
is no longer a researcher, but a propagandist, and usually a yes-man for those 
in authority. As such, he is useless, both to those he nominally serves 
and those to whom he declares his commitment. 
For most of us, of course, the question is much simpler. It is 
answered by the rhetoric of every government and every constitution. Every 
government asserts that it represents 'the masses'. The notion of one man-one 
vote underpins every modern constitution. No doubt supporters of the ancient 
regime might argue that it is the troubles of the aristocracy, not of the 
masses to which one ought to attend. The ancient regime,however, no longer 
commands much articulate support. Given a commitment to resolve the difficulties 
faced by the majority of the population, we argue that what the government ought 
to do is a question which can in principle be answered by a rational problem-
solving inquiry. 
Patently, no real-life lawmaker is as totally rational or as scientific 
as pragmatic decision-making requires him to be. Rather, real-world decision 
makers tend to be enchained by interests of their own and of the powerful and 
the privileged, rather than by science and reason. So long as government 
responds to troubles by measures based not on reason, but parochial or class 
interest, prejudice, myth, legend and blind chance, so long will their solutions 
be rather components of the trouble. Being based on unreason, disputes about 
such solutions cannot be resolved by reason. Irrationality excites the raw 
assertion of power in lieu of argument and data. The raw assertion of force 
saps legitimacy. 
Justice is not a static state of affairs. It is not a blue-print 
of how things ought to be. Rather, it is a set of propositions instructing 
people how to act to solve the troubles that plague the human condition. 
Justice is_ the process of rational inquiry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Administration is a creature of its environment. Environmental factors 
such as politics, economics, law and history affect the structure and behaviour 
of administrations in different ways and to varying degrees according to the 
development or underdevelopment of the system in question. 
In developing countries, political and economic factors play major roles in 
shaping the nature and orientation of public bureaucracies. Law is subordinated 
to the two - especially to,the political sub-system. Yet this does not mean 
the absence of legal provisions which are supposed to guide the behaviour of 
officials. However, these legal provisions, wherever they exist, are rarely 
observed by those m power. The political leadership often disregards the 
rule of law. Elements of the law enforcement agencies often violate the law. 
These combine to provide a negative effect on the administrative sub-system. 
The administrators take their turn accordingly and begin to pay only lip-
service to statutory requirements. The practice is so common in developing 
countries that one can safety propose that law has very little effect on the 
behaviour of administrators in these countries. Law is here defined in a 
rather broad sense to include rules and regulations established for the 
purpose of regulating the behaviour of administrators. 
This paper argues that law, as defined here, may have enabling or 
dysf-ictional effects on development administration. The scope of the 
paper is somewhat narrow. It is primarily concerned with how the legal 
system affects the behaviour of administrators engaged in planning and 
implementing national development programmes. In other words, it is 
concerned with the analysis of the interaction between law and administration 
in the development process. 
In every society, there is a set of rules and regulations which is 
supposed to govern the behaviour of public officials as they carry out their 
duties. We are not here so much concerned with internal organizational 
rules and regulations. Rather our major concern is with those rules and 
regulations (commonly known as law) which, though 'external' to the 
bureaucratic organization, stipulate how it has to relate to the general 
public in carrying out its duties. Here both constitutional and 
administrative law 
are important. The two concern the principles which 
regulate the exercise of power by central and local government, the 
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organization and functions of government authorities, and the relation of 
government authorities to the general public and the individual citizen. 
This paper aims to analyse the effect of these principles on the behaviour 
of administrators in the process of development. 
Development has become a major concern of political leaders in many 
developing countries. This concern, where it is genuine, has led to the 
reorganization of public administration with a view to achieving development. 
Development administration is thus concerned with the management of change. 
As a process, it involves structural as well as behavioural changes. As a 
system, it is that aspect of public administration, in collaboration with 
other non-public organizations, working toward the achievement of positive 
social change - i.e., development."'" How the legal environment hinders or 
aids this process is the subject of this analysis. 
ISSUES OF CONTROL 
A "^ ajor concern of law in the administrative process is the question of 
control. The need to control public services grows as their scale increases 
(Chapman, n.d., p. 181). Legal control ensures that the actions of private 
citizens or public authorities conform to the law of the land. There is also 
the control of policy and expediency. This ensures that the public authorities 
act in accordance with the declared policy of the government or the legislature 
(Chapman, n.d., p. 181). These types of control, although analytically 
separate, are functionally inseparable. As we discuss the legal issues 
involved in development administration we shall treat them as such. 
The approach to the question of controlling the public administration 
reflects both the philosophy of the state and the national social psychology 
(Chapman, n.d., p. 182). Historically, as Chapman points out, there have 
been times when no control of the administration at all was deemed necessary 
because the philosophy of the state denied the subject any rights. On the 
other hand there have been countries which insisted that the administration 
and officials acting on its behalf were not different from other citizens and 
were equally liable before the courts of law. There have also been countries 
in which the officials as individuals were regarded as being on the same 
footing before the law as ordinary citizens but in which the administration 
possessed powers and rights which could not be challenged in the courts. 
Sequentially these categories could be termed:-
1. This is not the place tc define the concept of development. For excellent 
definitions see Khosla 1^7, rp. 16-31, and Fanandiker, 1967, pp. 199-210. 
1. State supremacy, 
2. Supremacy of the Law. and 
3. Executive supremacy. 
In developing countries today one observes variations of all of these, 
with three occuring most often. Regardless of where the emphasis lies, it 
does seem that many political systems today recognize that the government 
bureaucracy wields a lot of power vis-a-vis the private citizens. There is 
some fear arising from the size and complexity of today's bureaucracies that, 
if care is not taken, they could degenerate into arbitrary instruments of 
suppression which could alienate the people from their government. 
There are several factors which make it necessary to exercise some 
control over the administration system. These are: -
1) To ensure that the administration acts according to the law. This 
ensures that the general public is protected against an arbirary administration. 
Social development requires sustained enthusiasm on the part of the people, 
and where administrators violate the law through arbitrary rule the partnership 
between the government and the people in the development process breaks down. 
It is therefore important for a government to establish ways and means to ensure 
that the administration does not jeopardise that partnership by arbitrary actions 
which violate the 1 w; 2) a second reason is to ensure that the administration 
acts impartially. Administrators are the agents of a sovereign power for the 
distribution of resources and services. In developing countries these resources 
and services are usually scarce. As a result there are often more people 
needing attention than can be served with the resources available. In such 
a situation, those who are not served must be assured that justice has been done. 
The administration should therefore establish unbiased criteria for the 
allocation of services where decisions are made on biased considerations 
the people who are discriminated against naturally turn against the 
administrators and refuse to cooperate with them. This inevitably limits 
the effectiveness of development administrators. Accordingly, some agency 
should be established to which all those who feel excluded may appeal for 
redress. In the legal context, this would be more often than not an 
administrative court or an officer such as .mbudsman or parliamentary commissioner 
for administration; (3) thirdly the control of public servants ensures that 
they are accountable to the public by accepting responsibility for any damage 
they cause in the performance of their duties. The principle of holding the 
bureaucracy accountable for its own actions is a central theme in the control 
process. The simple meaning of this principle is that administrators can be 
sued for mistakes they make while carrying their duties as public servants. 
Consequently it means that they can be made to compensate the wronged party 
for any losses incurred through administrative actions; 4) a fourth reason 
is to ensure that public servants do not abuse their powers. Abuse of power 
by administrators results in the administration using its power for purposes 
other than those intended. A rural chief in an African country vested with 
the powers of arrest and confinement may use those powers to harass his 
opponents. A police officer may use his powers of arrest for the purpose 
of 'redressing' personal grievances. A district officer may use his 
mobilization powers to compel villagers to participate in the implementation 
of a project they do not wish to be associated with. Thus abuse of power by 
a public officer can greatly impede the relationship between the administration 
and the general public and impair harmonious working relationships in the 
development process. The availability of control mechanisms ensures that 
this does not happen. 
All these reasons indicate that there is a strong need to ensure that 
people are 'legally' protected from any infringement of their rights which 
might arise from the activities of public officials. Whereas this is a 
desireable objective, however, in practice it is very difficult to ' ttain 
in most developing countries for reasons which will be outlined here. 
PROBLEMS OF ESTABLISHING LEGAL CONTROL FOR DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES 
The problems associated with the introduction of legal institutions 
for controlling the behaviour of public officials are deeply rooted in the 
underdeveloped nature of our societies. The very nature of underdevelopment 
makes it difficult to transplant successfully institutions evolved in 
developed societies. Historically, we find that both the political culture 
and the psychology of the people are not adjusted to the use of these 
institutions. That explains why institutions such as ombudsmen have not been 
2 introduced with success in the developing areas. 
The very nature of such institutions requires openness, whereas 
administrative systemp in developing countries are often reluctant to open 
their doors to 'outsiders'. The reasons are obvious. Most of them are 
ridden with corruption and unethical practices, so that opening their 
2. Kjekshuse's study of the institution in Tanzania (1971, pp. 13-29) 
attributes its apparent success to the ideological content of the Tanzanian 
political system. This is rare in African countries. See a second positive 
assessment of the Tanzanian experience in Ghai (1969). 
doors would 'compromise their positions unduly1. Institutions of control 
which seek access to relevant information are accordingly mistrusted. This 
attitude makes it difficult for institutions such as administrative courts 
or ombudsmen to function, for their success depend inter alia on: -
1. The willingness of the public and the bureaucracy to cooperate with 
them; 
2. The proper observance of procedures, 
3. The adequate presentation of cases, 
4. The availability of evidence from both sides, 
5. Access to all relevant documents, 
6. Compensation paid to aggrieved parties, and 
7. The identification of the individual at fault. 
These requirements are fundamental to the control of the public 
administration, but they are frequently not satisfied in underdeveloped countries. 
Often these requirements are at the back of the minds of senior civil servants 
when they advise a government against the adoption of such institutions. In a 
recent decision rejecting the introduction of ombudsmen in Kenya, the official 
government spokesman stated. It is feared that the Ombudsman might be misused 
for witch-hunting and undue victimization (quoted in Rukwaro, 1974, pp. 115-119). 
This fear is deeply rooted in the civil service mentality. 
The establishment of a legal control mechanism also depends on the 
acceptance of the rule of law principle, which involves the absolute supremacy 
or predominance of law, as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power or 
wide discretionary authority on the part of the government. This notion also 
excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others (covertly or overtly) 
from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the 
jurisdictions of the ordinary tribunals (A.V. Dicey, quoted in Sevar. d, 1969, 
pp. 202-203). 
The dilemma as Sevareid points out, is that the growth of the 
administrative process has appeared to be in conflict with the rule of law. 
The placing of wide discretionary powers in the hands of administrators seems 
to invite arbitrary rule. The fact that many administrators act as judges 
and decide matters by the peculiar rules of administrative law would indicate 
that they are supplan ing the ordinary courts of the landj'Sovereid, 1969, p. 15). i 
A relevant question then is how to control the situation which seems to have 
developed legally through judicial review of administrative action. The 
purpose here would be to decide whether the bureaucracy (or the individual 
bureaucrat) had the authority to do what it did, and if so whether that authority 
was exercised correctly. This task is made difficult by the reluctance, especially 
of senior administrators, to obey the law or to support legislation aimed 
at ensuring legal control. 
But even if devices to ensure legal control were established, tneir proper 
functioning would still be impaired because the majority of the people do 
not know their legal rights or how to defend them. Before the institution 
of Permanent Commissioner of Enquiry was introduced in Tanzania, Nyerere 
had recognized this very problem when he observed. 'The educational 
backwardness of the majority of our people means that automatic checks of 
abuse of power are almost non-existent' (quoted in Kjekshus, 1971, p. 24). 
DEMANDS ON DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 
What makes the availability of legal control mechanisms even more 
necessary are the demands which development puts on administrators. In an 
environment of scarcity, choices concerning the allocation and utilization 
of scarce resources must be made. In situations of scarcity, queues are 
naturally long, and those wishing to jump them through corrupt practices 
are many. Many administrators capitalize on such situations and are 
careless about those waiting to be served. Sometimes they may even 1 
adopt a paternalistic attitude about handling public affairs. Sometimes 
they may succumb to pressure from those who wish to coriupi tuem.. When Such 
a situation develops, services are provided on the basis of who can 
afford 'to play the game' rather than on individual need or national 
criteria. A lot of development resources are wasted through this process, 
and those who are aggrieved are not able to have their grievances redressed. 
There are many such cases in Kenya today. A loan officer, whose duty 
it is to approve loan applications submitted by needy farmers, decides to 
make things unnecessarily difficulty for an applicant. The farmer wonders 
why he is being treated in this way until his colleague who has gone through 
the same ordeal 'reminds' him of what tx do. After corrupting the officer, 
he gets the form signed and forwarded to the relevant authorities. Yet the 
farmer has nobody to complain to except perhaps the police or the officer's 
immediate superior, both of whom-may view the incident as'normal'. He may 
not wish to get the officer in trouble, so naturally once he has gotten his 
loan he will forget about the whole transaction. The system of corruption 
thus becomes institutionized with all kinds of negative effects on the 
success of development programmes. 
Another example concerns the recruitment of Junior Agricultural 
Assistants. The Ministry of Agriculture in Kenya has delegated this task 
to the Provincial Directors of Agriculture. A Provincial Director may in 
recruit such personnel only from the people of his home area. Those from 
outside the area are appointed only if they are 'appropriately' introduced 
after working hours by their relatives. Those that are excluded through 
this unfair process usually have no means of appeal. Over time such a 
practice becomes institutionalised, but there are many negative effects 
on development which arise from giving appointments to people otherwise 
unqualified. In fact one can argue, though empirical data are lacking.that 
such practises may in part explain why Junior Agricultural Assistants in 
Kenya tend to be incompetent. Other similar examples could be given. 
The administration of development involves the mobilization of 
resources, both human and non-human, and this task may involve extra-legal 
means to arrive at the desired objectives. We shall take the provincial 
administration in Kenya to illustrate this point. Members of the provincial 
administration have many discretionary powers which are often abused or misused. 
They have frequently compelled villagers to work on projects against their 
wishes, particularly in the case of self-help projects. A major principle 
of self-help development is voluntary participation by the public, but in 
rural Kenya today this principle has given way to compulsion. Officers of 
the provincial administration, especially chiefs and assistant chiefs, use 
(or misuse) their powers by confiscating the property of those 'unwilling' 
to contribute and auctioning it off to pay the owners' financial contribution. 
It is often alleged that some chiefs use the Chiefs Act to lock up individuals 
who refuse to give in to such compulsion. Such allegations are common during 
question time in the Kenya National Assembly, but often they are dismissed 
in a one-sentence reply by a government spokesman. Once so treated, a villager 
becomes hostile toward the administration and any development activities that 
may be introduced thereafter. 
All these abuses occur because, apart from the regular courts, there 
are no legal institutions in Kenya which review the legality of administrative 
actions, and the regular courts are not effective for this purpose. In a 
landmark study of Kenya, Ghai and McAuslan observed:-
On the surface the courts' power of review of 
administrative action is greater under an African Government 
than ever it was under the Colonial authorities, and this 
power remains relatively unmolested. But it is not beyond 
the bounds of possibility that the reason for the immensity 
of the court's control powers is that they are infrequently 
exercised and when they are, it is rarely in the crucial 
areas. The court's powers, in other words do not really 
affect the administrative process. When they do, or might, 
they are whiffled down.... 
We may say then that formally the courts appear as 
an institution of control performing a function similar to that 
which they perform in England. Actually their influence on the 
administration is small because there are relatively few people 
who think of them or use them for this purpose compared to the 
number of people who could, and the number of occasions in which 
the circumstances warrant it, and because there is little impediment 
in the way of administration reducing their control function to a 
very small ambit (1970, pp. 303, 304). 
In addition, development everywhere requires initiative and a 
willingness to try out new ideas, but many development administrators in Kenya 
lack the discretionary powers given to the provincial administration. As 
a result, they find it difficult to take initiative in the course of carrying 
out their duties because any new ideas they may have are subject to approval 
by those higher up in the administration before they can be implemented. These 
restri'^ u.' limit the effectiveness of development administrators in many 
respects. In the planning process for example,all the plans formulated must 
be approved by the centre, and this may take much longer than expected, resulting 
in delays with all kinds of unintended consequences. The implementation of 
development projects is similarly delayed because finances are usually centrally 
controlled and the release of funds takes time. 
The situation is much more serious for local authorities wherever 
they exist in developing countries. Local authorities are creatures of the 
central government which give them their legal personality. Their nature 
is such that they cannot do anything except what has been explicitly 
designated as within their power. But even in the areas in which they are 
empowered to act, they cannot proceed until their programmes have been 
submitted to the central government for approval. In Kenya for instance, 
local authorities cannot do anything which is not specified in the 1963 
Local Government Regulations and their amendments. For example, a local 
authority which wishes to levy an agricultural tax (commonly called cess) 
must make an appropriate by-law which is then subject to approval by the 
central government which will consider how it affects the people in the 
area and whether it is within the power of the authority to make such a 
by-law. For this, the authority must be able to identify a clause in the 
Regulations which empowers it to make such a by-law. 
The power to intervene in the affairs of local authorities extends 
even to routine administration. The central government can institute an 
investigation into the administration of a local authority. 
The effects of these regulations on the activities of local 
Authorities are many. The act literally imposes a ban on initiative at 
this level. It also creates an attitude of dependency in the minds of 
administrators. This may explain why most local authorities, especially in 
the rural areas, are static or actually becoming less active. This state 
of affairs does not conform to the requirements of development administration. 
Local authorities are corporate bodies which can sue and be sued in ordinary 
courts of law. In carrying out their activities they are the most closely 
controlled institutions in Kenya. It is rare to find a local authority, or 
an officer of a local authority, abusing its powers without being made 
answerable. This comprehensive control has proven healthy in some cases, 
but in others it has stifled the initiative and discretion necessary for the 
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administration of development. This situation is found in many developing 
countries. 
CONCLUSION: RESOLVING THE DILEMMA 
From the foregoing analyses it is apparent that there is a need to 
balance control and discretion in the administration of development. There 
is a need to establish some machinery for judicial review of administrative 
action to avoid illegal activities, biassed decisions, lack of accountability 
and the abuse of power. 
At the same time it is recognized that development by its very nature 
requires the delegation of discretion if those charged with the administration 
of development programmes are to be effective. In the absence of such delegation, 
they will be unable to innovate or to respond to new situations created in 
the process of change. The question, however, is how much to delegate to 
development administrators without surrendering authority and control. It 
is submitted here that delegation in administrative organizations does not 
necessarily mean surrender of 'sovereignty'. The delegating authority often 
retains the right to intervene as necessary. If there were no such provisions, 
there would be no way to reconcile the conflicts that arise in the development 
process among various administrators. 
3. For more on local government and development in Kenya see, e.g., 
C lebatch, (1973). 
The relationship between control and discretion, and the 
kinds of institutions established to control the behaviour of development 
administrators, depend on the nature of the political environment. Where 
the rule of law is given only lip-service (as in totalitarian military 
regimes), there are few institutions regulating the behaviour of the 
administrators. Rather, all agencies of the government are geared to 
serving those at the top. 
In civilian regimes dominated by an elite group, again 
institutional checks on the administration have little meaning. Bureaucratic 
elite are the governors and are untouched by any administrative law. 
A major argument in this paper has been that law can aid 
development by prescribing correct behaviour for the administrators of 
development programmes. We have also argued that law can be dysfunctional 
by stifling the initiative of development administrators. How to harmonize 
these two functions is a major task, and not an easy one. A lot depends on 
the system of government which given country adopts, either by default or 
design. 
This paper makes no pretensions of raising all the relevant 
issues involved in law and development administration. As the reader is 
fully aware, this is a research area still to be explored. In the meantime, 
all we can do is to make some broad generalizations in the hope that one 
day somebody will systematically examine the issues raised here. 
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PART 3: LAW AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE 
THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON EXPERIENCE 
by 
Ann Seidman 
and 
Robert B. Seidman 
In the less developed countries, the courts were poorly designed to 
implement rules looking toward development. That task fell upon the admini-
stration . 
Two demands were made simultaneously upon the civil service. The British 
cultural heritage required that officials confine their activities within 
boundaries defined by law, expressed in the rubric, 'the Rule of Law'. 
Simultaneously, they had to meet the demands of what nowadays is called 
development administration, that is, the implementation of coordinated, creative an^ 
flexible development programmes. The-*second made' -'for: chatige ' arid"ihh6Vatibft. Together 
the two were an African version of the universal paradox of the law: law must 
be stable and yet it cannot stand still. Hence all thinking about law has 
struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need for stability and the 
need for change. The African dilemmas of administration and administrative 
law have exemplified this paradox. 
THE DILEMMA OF AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION 
By 1974, Africa had the worst of both worlds. Neither the rule of law 
nor development administration were in practice achieved to an acceptable 
degree. We examine in turn the traditional visions of bureaucracy and the 
rule of law; the inability of the bureaucracy to solve developmental tasks; 
and, last, the paradoxical African situation, which achieved neither change nor 
stability. 
Traditional Bureaucracy and the Rule of Law 
The nyth of bureaucracy is that it is an instrument for the implementation 
of policy: infinitely flexible, turning its diverse talents as easily to the 
denationalization as to the nationalization of industry, to running a postal 
system, a large industrial corporation or a navy, to implementing policies as 
well in foreign affairs as in prisons. 
If this were a description of reality, the troubles which plague 
African administration would disappear. The bureaucracy would be capable of 
implementing both rules looking towards change and rules designed to maintain 
the system. The description, unhappily however, is mythical. 
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The classical paradign of modern bureaucracy was Max Weber's celebrated 
ideal-type. It had the following characteristics:-
1) A continuous organization of official functions bound by rules. 
2) A specified sphere of competence. This involves: a) a sphere 
of obligations to perform functions which has been marked off 
as part of a systematic division of labor; b) The provision 
of the incuirbent with the necessary authority to carry out 
these functions; c) That the necessary means of compulsion are 
clearly defined and their use is subject to definite conditions... 
3) The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; 
that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision 
of a higher one.... 
4) The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be 
technical rules or norms. In both cases, if their application 
is to be fully rational, specialized training is necessary. It 
is-thus normally true that only a person who has demonstrated 
an adequate technical training is qualified to be a member of 
the administrative staff of such an organized group, and hence 
only such persons are eligible for appointment to official 
positions.... 
5) ... The members of the administrative staff should be completely 
separated from ownership of the means of production or 
administration.... 
6) There is also a complete absence of appropriation of his official 
position by the incumbent.... 
7) Administrative acts, decisions and rules are formulated and 
recorded in writing. . . . 
Weber developed his ideal-type as part of a lifelong endeavour to 
understand why Western capitalist societies developed as they did. He assumed 
that the governments of western Europe were governments in the interests of the 
capitalist class. They had to achieve the objectives of that class: instrumentality, 
predictability, equality before the law, and authority. His model of bureaucracy, 
he thought, achieved these objectives. 
Feudal law endowed the governors with a property right in their office. 
It did not violate the law if they used their office in their own interests. To 
require the bureaucracy to be instrumental to publicly defined goals struck at the 
heart of particular list power. The ideal-type of bureaucracy achieved 
instrumentality by subjecting administrators to the governance of rules. 'The 
bureaucracy is supposed to be'politically "neutral"; it does not participate in 
policy determination, it has no specific interests of its own, it does not 
exercise any important power. It is, in other words, the obedient servant of the 
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government, hence of the public whom the regime serves.' 
Secondly, the system made official behaviour predictable. Policy was 
set out in rules. Emergent difficulties were converted into cases. The rules 
stated how administrators were to deal with those cases. Predictability was 
maximized. Predictability was, of course, a principal demand of entrepreneurs. 
Thirdly, the system tended towards formal equaltiy before the law. 
It led to, . . . .. 
the dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality, sine ira et studio 
without hatred or passion.... The dominant norms are concepts of straight-
forward duty without regard to personal considerations. Everyone is 
subject to formal equality of treatment; that is, everyone in the same 
empirical situation.... 
Equality before the law has always been a demand of a rising class. 
Lastly, the new entrepreneurs required an authoritarian government to 
enable them to dominate the lower orders'. Bureaucracy provided the required 
means, and the operation of such a system is clearly evidenced by the scope and 
function of commercial law in African countries. 
The most significant indication is insistence upon appointment, as 
contrasted with election (of bureaucrats), but (Weber's) delineation 
of the hierarchical aspect, as well as of discipline and control are 
also symptomatic. The very words vibrate with something of the Prussian 
enthusiasm for the military type of organization, and the way seems barred 
to any kind of consultative, let alone cooperative, pattern.... It seems... 
striking that Weber's fully developed bureaucracy is most nearly represented 
by three modern-organi zations: 1) an arny, 2). a b.usiness concern without ary • 
sort of employee or labor participation in management, 3) a totalitarian 
party and its bureaucratic administration. Weber defines 'imperative 
control' as the probability that certain commands from a given source will 
be obeyed by a given group of persons . Is it not equally revealing that dis-
cipline is defined as the probability that a command will receive 'prompt 
and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms' as the result of habituation? 
It was not the case, however, as Professor Lon Fuller naively supposes, that 
these demands by the middle classes represented the wishes of all of us. 
The propertyless- masses especially are not served by a formal 'equality 
before the law' and a calculable adjudication and administration, as 
demanded by 'bourgeois' interests. Naturally, in their eyes justice and 
administration should serve to compensate for their economic and social 
life-opportunities in the face of the propertieF classes. 
It was a principle of the Weberian model of bureaucracy that the rules 
defining power grant no more than a minimum of discretion. 'Equality before 
the law' and the demand for legal guarantees against arbitrariness required 
a formal and rational 'objectivity' of administration, as opposed to the 
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personally free discretion flowing from the 'grace' of the old patrimonial 
domination. Functions cannot be said to be bound by rules when the official 
had unlimited discretion to act or not to act, or to decide what acts to 
perform, or the grounds upon which to act or not act. 
Lawyers, developed much the same notions as Weber, only somewhat earlier, 
under the rubric of the rule of law. In 1885, Dicey wrote that law consisted 
of a body of fixed and ascertainable rules. By the rule of law, we: -
mean... that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer 
in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the 
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In this 
sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government 
based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary or 
discretionary powers of constraint. 
The rules of administrative law were the principal instrument of lawfully 
controlling the administration and therefore to implement the rule of law. 
Ideal-types have a well-defined tendency to pass over from intellectual 
construct to normative goal. Weber waxed positively rhapsodic: -
Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucractic 
type of administrative organization.. .is... capable of attaining the 
highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most 
rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. 
As for Weber, so for all of us. Bureaucracy in the ideal form defined 
by Weber, and its concomitant legal ideology in the form of the rule of law, 
passed into the common culture. African lawyers, too, came to believe that 
adherence to the norms implied by these concepts would ensure the infinite 
flexibility, perfect obedience and superior efficiency of the administration, 
capable of implementing any programme of government, performing equally well 
whatever tasks might be asked of it, without sacrificing efficiency, predi-
ctability and equality before the law. This was the myth about bureaucracy. 
Substantive Legitimacy and Development Administration 
There was a counter-nyth about bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was, in its 
vulgar usage, 'bureaucratic': hide-bound, conservative, snarled in red tape, 
unable to get out of its own way. It was incapable of change and development. 
The bureaucratic ideal-type paid a price for legal-rational legitimacy: 
it was rule bound. It was through the device of rules that the bureaucratic 
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structure ensured instrumentality, predictability and equal treatment. 
Control may have produced certainty. It rarely produced creativity. 
Development meant change. It required an administration to solve novel 
problems. 'Hierarchy and routinization are appropriate institutional 
characteristics of the classic governmental tasks of maintaining order, 
collecting taxes and providing services', but 'flexibility and innovation 
are the traits a bureaucracy needs to promote development'. Bureaucracy 
may be useful to tend the machine; it is impotent to change it. 
The myth about bureaucracy extolled its infinite flexibility. The 
response to the demands for development was not to change its structure, but 
to give bureaucrats exceedingly broad grants of power and discretion. Discretion 
is the opposite of governance by rules. The result was an administration that 
contradicted the legal-rational ideal. 
The myth and the counter-myth seemed contradictory. It seemed that one 
might enjoy instrumentality, predictability and equality before the law and 
suffer authority, narrow discretion, and compartmentalized, hierarchical 
decision-making. One might enjoy change, creativity and flexibility — and 
suffer discretion. One could not have both simultaneously. That was the 
'deadlock' of development administration. 
Practically all African leaders believed that they were faced by just 
such a dilemma. Not surprisingly, they tended to opt for broad discretion. 
Ghai and McAuslan conclude that in Kenya',...in an attempt to increase the 
effectiveness of the administration, wider discretions are conferred upon 
officials by law, and these officials are prepared to take, and can get 
away with taking, short-cuts'. As in Kenya, so everywhere. Dean Pound 
wrote that' Almost all the problems of jurisprudence come down to a 
fundamental one of rule and discretion'. Broad discretion in Africa 
opened the door to particularism, corruption, favour and oppression. 
Perhaps the African fall from the grace of the rule of law might have been 
tolerable if it had led to development. Unfortunately, Africa fell between two 
stools. 
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African Administration: Neither Stability nor Change 
Bureaucracy or development administration? Rule of law or legality? 
Stability or change? Brake or accelerator? These choices between opposites 
seemingly posed insoluable dilemmas. Africa managed, by and large, to achieve 
the worst of both worlds. 
On the one hand, African administrations by 19 74 were shot with 
particularism. Hyden^g^^d of the Kenyan civil service that:-
at present everyone pulls his own strings in order to get things 
done or settled in the civil service. There is often inconsistency 
in treatment, because both politicians and members of the public have 
come to realize that the quickest way of achieving results is often 
in contacting friends in the relevant ministry who can arrange that 
the matter is given preferential treatment. 
President Nkrumah made a similar observation about Ghana. The same was 
true all over Africa: discretion was omnipresent. It was used in large 
part for private ends . 
Despite the broad discretion which in action permeated African 
administration, on the other hand it was a common complaint that African 
bureaucracies had the usual constraints on administering development. The 
administrations were highly compartmentalized. What Dresang says of the 
Zambian bureaucracy was true elsewhere: it was not'a unified and hierarchical 
body that is capable of pursuing a common policy. Rather, the administrative 
system is best characterized as a collection of departments enjoying a great 
deal of autonony and only loosely tied to each other.' National planning 
in such a condition is an exercise in frustration. 
Nor were African administrations noted for their creativity or 
experimentation. Robert Jackson asks:-
Whether this essentially bureaucratic system of administration 
(in Kenya) — with its sharp hierarchical structure, its preoccupation 
with defining and delimiting jurisdictional area, its emphasis upon 
replicability within a framework of clearly indicated rules and precedents — 
is entirely appropriate for present development needs. 
He comments, that in Kenya:-
the most striking feature of government administration is... its rather rigid 
bureaucratic nature which is a contemporary legacy of the colonial past. 
The structure is well adapted to the quest for control but was not fashioned 
with the aim of initiating and guiding development change.... Bureaucratic 
administration requires and fashions leaders who tend to be preoccupied 
with procedure and routine and with correctly applying predetermined rules 
to every decision confronted. But development and social change generate 
novel problems and new situations for which pre-existing rules and 
decision-making precedents may offer no solution. 
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Kenya's Ndegwa Commission summed up prevailing dissatisfaction with 
existing administration (and it might have been speaking for all Africa). 
The administration:-
must be highly change-orientated; it must reward initiative and 
experimentation; it must have a high concern for cost-effectiveness 
and a routine habit of evaluating all ongoing programmes; it must be 
prepared to compromise between unified central control and the need 
for flexibility, variety and a degree of autonomy in field organizations 
charged with implementing policy; It must be extremely strong on action, 
time sequences, logistics and clearly defined goals; and at the same 
time it must retain a clear consciousness of its role as the servant, 
not the master of the public, if its efforts to induce change are not 
to be self-defeating. 
This paradoxical combination of de facto discretionary powers and compart-
mentalized, non-developmental bureaucracy both destroyed legal-rational legitimacy 
and fell short of developmental goals. It resulted instead in the maximization 
of the power and privilege of the bureaucrats and the political and economic 
elites with whom they were allied. 
These results came about despite the existence of the same rules of 
administrative law that lawyers fondly believe maintain the rule of law in 
England. We turn now to an explanation for the African dilemma. 
AN EXPLANATION 
We attempt an explanation of the failure of African administration in a 
summary form: -
1. The task of inducing development in Africa imposed upon administrator;:; 
the task of solving problems, rather than implementing rules laid down 
by political authorities. 
2 Hierarchical, authoritarian, compartmented institutions limit outp 
to incremental change . 
3. African admi ..isti„ ions were hie 'ar'chica±s authoritarian and 
compartmented. 
4. Authoritarian, hierarchical bureaucracies tend to be punishment-orKi.:- d 
5. African administrations were authoritarian and hierarchical. 
6. The rules defining the roles of administrators in Africa endowed them 
with broad, discretionary powers. 
7. Bureaucrats will tend to exercise their discretion to maximize rewardn 
and minimize strains for themselves and the bureaucracy of which they 
are a part; this tendency is strengthened to the extent that: -
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a. Subordinates and clients have little power to resist it; and 
b. Decision-making is secret. 
8. In Africa:-
a. Subordinates and low-status clients had little power to resist; and 
b. There was great secrecy in administrative decision-making. 
Development requires changed behaviour by wide numbers of people; 
behavioural change is best accomplished by participation; African administrations 
were authoritarian. Development requires problem-solving; problems come as 
a whole, not broken into bits; African administrations were compartmentalized. 
Development requires much more than punishment as an obedience-inducing 
measure; African administrations were punishment-oriented. Where African 
administrations dealt with matters that might be routinized in rules, excessive 
grants of discretion defeated the rule of law. Where they dealt with emergent 
problems of development, hierarchy, authority and compartmentalization blocked 
their goal. They fell between two stools. 
'Development from above' must always fail in this way. Law, so long as 
it is a set of rules handed down from above and enforced through compartmented, 
authoritarian, punishment-oriented organizations can at best haltingly induce 
social change . 
THE FAILURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN AFRICA 
Administrative law as received in Anglophone Africa takes as a basic 
assumption that the bureaucracies with which it deals match the classical 
Weberian pattern — that is, that the rules defining the bureaucracy outline 
an authoritarian, hierarchical structure; that they divide the overall task 
of the organization into sub-tasks; that they limit the power of each official 
to his sub-task, with little scope for discretion; and that they provide that 
where there is discretion, it is exercised only for the purpose for which it 
is granted. Thus, the rules are completely devoid of flexibility, but they 
provide the authoritarian governmental system which the few entrepreneurs need 
to enable them to dominate the lower orders. 
Taking these characteristics as given, the rules of administrative law 
provided a set of concepts: to ensure that officials stayed within their 
boundaries, (the ultra vires rule); to limit the scope of granted discretion; 
to ensure that where discretion was granted, it would be exercised only with 
account to appropriate considerations; and to provide a set of institutions 
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(the courts) with which to enforce these rules. 
As received from the former colonial government, however, the bureaucracies 
denied the Weberian requirements in two principal ways, They were shot with 
discretion, and hence defied review by courts; and in any event, courts were 
unavailable to most Africans., These factors have continued in independent 
Africa. In the event, the received administrative law remains incapable of 
controlling the administration„ 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
African governments have made some attempts to solve the problems of 
administration, although in the main they have responded to the felt insufficiencies 
of classical bureaucracy by separating out particular problems into parastatal 
organizations, circumventing compartmentalization by central planning, and trying 
to undercut the impact of authoritarianism by developing decentralized, 
participatory structures. 
Concerning the bureaucracy itself, Ghana attempted a constitutional rule 
requiring structured discretion; it was eviscerated by the judges construing 
it. In a few places, decisions and their reasons have had to be recorded. 
Tanzania, Ghana and Zambia made provisions for an Ombudsman, a new enforcement 
agency; of these, only Tanzania's has had a substantial amount of experience. 
It is plainly one of the most innovative legal institutions to emerge in 
Africa. 
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Willy Mutunga 
Faculty of Law 
, University of Nairobi 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we attempt to analyse how two branches of commercial 
law, that is, sale-of-goods law and hire-purchase law facilitate development 
in Kenya. A complete paper on this topic would have to include analyses in 
particular of banking law and negotiable instruments, company law, insurance 
law and the law of agency. Our attempt in this paper will inevitably include 
an incidental analysis of the law of contract which forms the basis of the 
two branches of commercial law to be analysed. These two branches of 
commercial law are relevant when we discuss the neo-coloni=al roles imposed upon 
Kenya by international capitalism. International capitalism has imposed upon 
Kenya three roles: 1) Kenya must provide raw materials to monopoly enter-
prises and foodstuffs to metropolitan populations; 2) Kenya serves as an 
area of investment of foreign surplus value in the form of finance capital; 
and 3) she also serves as a market for foreign manufactured goods. The common 
denominator of all these roles is the maintenance of the status quo in the 
international capitalist economic system as more fundamentally facilitated 
by the class alliance between the international bourgeoisie and the Kenyan 
African petty-bourgeoisie."'' 
1. Our only quarrel with the works on Kenya is that they tend to' mystify 
class analysis. One of the glaring errors of these analyses is the view 
that in Kenya we now have an African bourgeoisie proper. Undeniably there 
are a few individuals in Kenya who have accumulated their own capital which 
they can invest. But we would think that these few individuals have consoli-
dated a sub-class of their own. Their class position is petty-bourgeois, 
and we feel Rodney is right about Kenya if we construe his general analysis 
to refer to Kenya. He points out:-
The South Africans contain a anational bourgeoisie with 
capital to invest. This is distinct from the rest of 
Africa where mainly we have a petty-bourgeoisie proper. 
The distinction is essentially that our so-called bourgeoisie 
is dependent for sources of capital. They become very 
imitative and lack dynamism. (1974, p. 42) 
A class analysis of Kenya has been undertaken by Colin Leys (1975), 
Brett (1973), Mutiso (1975), Matunga (1974), P. Noworjee (1972) R. Van Zwanenberg 
(1974). 
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Our other task in this paper is to discuss the role of the two 
branches of commercial law in the dialectic of underdevelopment in Kenya. 
This will involve a jurisprudential perspective on the role of law in the 
development of Kenya. We will then follow this up with a theoretical 
discussion of how the two branches of law facilitate the neo-colonial roles 
set out above. We will then briefly look at the effective facilitation of 
these roles, that is, the effectiveness of the legal rules on the ground. 
This latter point emerged from field research which focussed on the Kenya 
National Trading Corporation, the Coffee Board of Kenya, Brooke Bond Liebig 
(Kenya) Ltd., and Cetco, Ltd. The study also included a number of car 
dealers in Nairobi, among them D.T. Dobie (Kenya) Ltd., Cooper Motor 
Corporation, Ltd., Westlands Motors, Ltd. and Simba Motors, Ltd. Four major 
finance companies were also studied^ Credit Finance Corporation, National 
Industrial Credit, the Diamond Trust, Ltd. and the National Bank of Kenya. 
All these institutions are directly relevant to the neo-colonxal roles dis-
cussed here. 
We must point out at the outset that we do not attempt to discuss 
the role of customary sales law in Kenyan development. There are, of course, 
relevant'issues worthy of discussir in that field: for example, the impact 
of general sales law on customary sales law with the attendant conflicts. 
Such conflicts are inevitable when a more progressive mode of production -
British monopoly capitalism - is imposed upon a less progressive mode of 
production - Kenya's traditional economy. What we may call customary sales 
law is part of the decadent superstructure protecting the old, dead and dying 
traditional economic base - dualistic approach here would be misleading. 
Kenya must be seen entirely as an underdeveloped capitalist country and our 
discussion of law and development renders irrelevant any discussion of customary 
sales law.^ 
We realise that in such an attempt we tread on grounds that are 
slippery for a lawyer. And indeed this is one of the purposes of this seminar. 
Ruthless criticism by economists, political scientists, accountants or any 
2. Shem Ong'ondo has written a very good and convincing dissertation 
on the impact of sale of goods law on customary sales law in Maragoli 
Kenya. He notes the persistence of customary sales law and how it is being 
phased out by general sales law, giving a thorough analysis of the conflict 
and the political-economic ramifications. 
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other discipline is very acceptable. Non-lawyers are also entitled to say 
what law for development ought to look like. 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
Development 
What is development? Definitions of the word can correctly be said 
to fall into two camps: there are definitions which seek to justify and 
perpetuate the capitalist economic system', others reject that system. Writers 
consciously or unconsciously take sides when formulating a definition. There 
are also the mystified ones who attempt a middle way and fall in between 
the two camps. Our popinion is that there is no middle way. On deeper analysis, 
writers who propose a 'middle-of-the-road' definition of development either fall 
in with the capitalists or do not. For exploited societies there is not 
even a question of taking sides: Few people in an exploited'sbciety seems--to 
opt openly and consciously for capitalism. Thus the innumerable brands of 
'socialisms' characteristic of most of the exploited societies, and undeniably 
characteristic of normal petty-bourgeois false ideology, are .enough to assure 
revolutionary optimists in these societies that something, if not everything, 
is wrong with capitalism and that socialism is widely accepted as the only cure 
for all social ills. 
We will begin with definitions of development which perhaps consciously 
or unconsciously seek to justify capitalism. One of these is given by Professor 
R.B. Seidman:-
By development, ... we mean 'the process whereby the entire 
economy is monetized and integrated, with a high degree of 
specialization and exchange together with associated political, 
social and other changes. 
This means, and especially for the exploited societies, capitalist develop-
ment. A capitalist society is based upon the economic phenomenon of the 
exchange of commodities, buying and selling. This can squarely be read into 
the definition. The associated political, social and other changes are 
assumed to follow logically from that economic phenomenon. 
The following definition, which appears in the International Legal 
Centre publication Law and Development, confines itself to the exploited 
societies. The Research Advisory Committee on Law and Development gives 
this definition of development:-
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We agreed that 'development' includes efforts by the LDCs 
(Less Developed Countries) to secure some of the material, 
social and cultural conditions that prevail in materially 
wealthier societies. 
But we do not limit the term to such efforts; we also use it 
to refer to attempts to enrich and deepen the cultural 
traditions of the LDCs, spread the unique benefits of these 
traditions to wider groups within society and to seek new and 
original paths for the realization of a better life for the 
people of these countries. Thus 'development' in the broad 
sense used here means activities through which the LDCs seek 
to realise their own values and secure the goals they define 
for themselves (1975, p. 2, emphasis added). 
This definition justifies capitalism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. 
Further and deeper integration into the international capitalist system is 
envisaged. The narrow definition - that of achieving some form of developed 
3 
capitalism - has been condemned as false and impossible. The International 
Legal Centre definition also indirectly seems to assume the impossibility 
of the goal by its use of the word 'some'. The broader definition of course 
does encompass socialist activities in LDCs, but socialist activities in LDCs 
have tended to be capitalist, and 'attempts to enrich and deepen the cultural . 4 traditions of the LDCs ...' are unhistorical and undialectic. We, therefore, 
3. See Baran (1972), P. Jalee (1970), W. Rodney (1972), Tamas Szentes 
(-1971), D. Wadada Nabudere (1976) and Frank (1967). 
4. Works of Okot P'Bitek are famous in this regard. See in particular 
his Song of Lawino and Ocol, (1972). Just to quote a stanza from Song of 
Lawino:-
Listen Ocol, my old friend 
The ways of your ancestors are good, 
Their customs are solid and not hollow 
They are not thin, not easily beakable 
They cannot be blown away by the winds 
Because their roots reach deep into the soil (p. 48). 
See also L. Senghor (1964):-
We shall retain whatever should be retained of our institutions, 
our techniques, our values, even our methods. From all this -
African acquisitions and European contributions - we shall 
make a dynamic symbiosis to fit Africa and the twentieth 
century ... (p. 9). 
This sort of exercise has been condemned as preparing Africa for Fascism. 
For whatever that argument is worth, these exercises do not advance the 
cause of African revolution. They either support the status quo unconsciously, 
or they are dangerously retrogressive in that they fail to understand the 
essence of the conflicts of the two modes of production referred to here and 
the effect of those conflicts on African traditional values. 
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need to analyse the essence of these activities within the broader definition 
before we call them development. 
Then there are definitions which reject the capitalist system. They 
try to show that capitalism is a stage of development which must give 
way to a more progressive stage of development, that is, socialist development 
and ultimately communism. Thus,Walter Rodney criticises the superficiality 
of definitions or explanations given by bourgeois scholars for the phenomenon 
of development. He rightly points out that the essence of the phenomenon is 
left out. He argues:-
No mention is made of the exploitation of the majority which 
underlay all development prior to socialism. No mention 
is made of the social relations of production or classes. No 
mention is made of the way that the factors and relations of ; 
production combine to form a distinctive system or mode of pro--
duction, varying from one historical epoch to another. No 
mention is made of imperialism as a logical phase of capitalism. 
In contract, any approach which tries to base itself on socialist 
and revolutionary principles must certainly introduce into the 
discussion at the earliest possible point the concepts of class, 
imperialism, and socialism, as well as the role of workers and 
oppressed peoples.... However, one has at least to recognise the 
full human, historical and social dimensions of development, 
before it is feasible to consider 'underdevelopment' or the^strat-
egies for escaping from underdevelopment (1972, pp. 20-21). 
Rodney, a committed Marxist and revolutionary, is interpreting Marx 
on the stages of development of human society which the bourgeoisie have 
limited to economic development - analysis of productive forces in isolation 
from the socio-economic order of society. Marx's analysis of the stages 
of development is set out in the preface to A Contribution to a Critique of 
5. See Brett (1973):-
The term 'development' is...used.... to denote a change process 
characterized by increased productivity, equalization in the 
distribution of social product, and the emrgence of indi-
genous institutions whose relations with the outside world, and 
particularly with developed centres of the international economy, 
are characterized by equality rather than dependence or subordination 
(p. 18). 
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Political Economy. These stages of social development are communalism, 
slavery, feudalism, capitalism and communism. Socialism has been observed 
as a transitional stage prior to communism. 
The Role of Law in Development 
7 
The various schools of bourgeois jurisprudence have defined law. 
David Williams (1973) has dealt with this issue at some length. His view 
is that only two schools are relevant to us: the sociological school of 
jurisprudence and Marxist theory of state and law (p. 193). Our view 
is that the positivist shcool of jurisprudence is worth discussing as well, 
and it is relevant to East Africa because it is the dominant school of 
jurisprudence here. This school emphasizes the maintenance of the status 
quo without much mystification. Hart defines positivism in his Concept 
6. Marx wrote:-
In social production for their existence, men inevitably 
enter into definite relations, which are independent 
of their will, namely, relations of production appropriate 
to a given stage in the development of their material forces 
of production. The totality of theSe relations of production 
constitutes the economic foundation on which arises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms 
of social consciousness... At a certain stage of development, 
the material productive forces of society come into conflict 
with the existing relations of production or - this expresses 
the same thing in legal terms - with the property relations 
within the framework of which they operate hitherto. From forms 
of development of productive forces these relations of production 
turn into fetters. Then begins an era of socialist revolution. 
The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the 
transformation of the whole immense superstructure. 
7. See, generally, Lloyd (1972). For a brilliant and successful 
attack of these schools, see S.S. Golunskii and M.S. Strogovich (1972). 
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of Law, making it clear that a positivist approach to law rejects all other 
approaches. 
The sociological school of jurisprudence also emphasises the maintenance 
of the status quo; Roscoe Pound's (1954 mystification does not disguise this 
9 fact. Pound realizes that his scheme of individual, public and social 
8. .Hart's definition is as follows:-
Legal positivism: The expression 'positivism' is used in 
contemporary Anglo-American literature to designate one or 
more of the following contentions:-
1. That laws are commands of human beings; 
2. That there is no necessary connection between law and 
morals or law as it is and law as it ought to be; 
3. That the analysis or study of the meaning of legal 
concepts is an important study to be distinguished 
from (though in no way hostile to) historical inquiries, 
sociological inquiries, and critical appraisals .of' law 
in terms of morals, social aims, functions, and so on; 
4. That a legal system is a closed logical system in which 
correct decisions can be deduced from predetermined 
legal rules by logical means alone; 
5. That moral judgement, cannot be established, as statements 
of facts can, by rational argument, evidence or proof.... 
9. At the end of the last and the beginning of the present century, a new 
way of thinking grew up. Jurists began to think in terms of human 
wants or desires or expections rather than human wills. They began to 
think that what they had to do was not simply to equalize or harmonize 
wills but, if not equalize, at'least harmonize the satisfaction of 
wants 
Three elements contributed to shift the basis of theories, as to the 
end of law from wills to wants, from the reconciling or harmonizing 
of wills to reconciling or harmonizing of wants. The most important 
Part was played by psychology which undermined the foundation of the 
metaphysical will philosophy of law. Through the movement for 
unification of social sciences, economics also played an important part, 
especially indirectly through the attempts at economic interpretation 
of legal history, reinforcing psychology by showing the extent to 
which law had been shaped by the pressure of economic wants. Also 
the differentiat ion of society, involved in industrial organisation, 
was no mean factor, when classes came to exist in which claims to a 
minimum human existence, under the standards of a given civilization, 
became more pressing than claims to self-assertion. Attention was 
turned from the nature of law to its purpose, and a functional attitude, 
a tendency to measure legal rules and doctrines and institutions by the 
extent to which they furthered or achieved the ends for which law exists, 
began to replace the older method of judging law by criteria drawn 
from itself (p. 42). 
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interests cannot be secured in entirety: 'Put simply, it has been and is to 
secure as much as possible of the scheme of interests as a whole as may be 
with least friction and waste' (1940, p. 76). This legal theory also ; 
justifies state intervention into the economy. The view is that the capitalist-
can protect his private property, and, while enjoying that right, he can 
serve the general welfare. State intervention in the economy has only one 
* 
acceptable justification to prop up and perpetuate the irrational capitalist 
economic system. Then laissez-faire policy which decreed the state's non-
intervention in the economy was disproved by crises - the First World War, 
the Great Depression, other inter-war crises, inflation, etc. The capitalist 
states had to resist the revolutionary potential of these crises, as stated 
by Engels (1972).10 
On the question of the role of law in development we will confine 
ourselves to the Marxist theory of state and law as the only relevant theory 
for discussion. For the Marxists, law is a 'system of judical standards and 
prescriptions expressing the will of the ruling class and protected by the 
coercive power of the state' (Duff, 1968, p. 127). This definition brings in 
the role of law in terms of economic classes and its close alliance to the 
institution of the state. While for the bourgeoisie the state is an impartial 
institution, the Marxists agree with Engels that the state is the 'collective 
capitalist', 'a dictatorship of the dominant class and its political arm' 
(Chkhikuadze, 1969, p. 13). They trace the origin of law to the birth of the 
state (Engels, 1972). Both state and law are to the Marxists tools of exploita-
tion in the hands of the most powerful and economically dominant class. Thus 
10. Engels maintains:-
Because the state arose from the need to hold class 
antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the same 
time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it 
is as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically 
dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, 
becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires 
new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed 
class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the 
state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding 
down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of 
the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and 
bandmen, and the modern. representative state is an ., 
instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital 
(1972,p. 168). 
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the state and law cannot be divorced from the socio-economic order of a 
society and its class struggles. 
In analysing law and development it is important that we under-
stand two important terms in Marxist political economics, economic base 
and superstructure. The economic base refers to the economic system at 
a certain stage of social development, that is, the sum total of the 
relations of production. The relations of production refer to the relations 
established among people in the process of the social production of material 
goods. Relations of production have three crucial aspects: the first and 
decisive aspect is the form of ownership of the means of production. This 
aspect is the basic relations of production. It determines the social division 
of a society and its class composition, and the class composition in turn 
determines the character of all the superstructural features. The super-
structure embraces social views on politics, law, philosophy, art, religion, 
etc. and the political, legislative and judicial bodies and systems correspond-
ing to these views. 
Dogmatic Marxists interpret Marx to hold that the only way of 
effecting development is by changing the economic base and that making minor 
changes in the superstructural features such law will not bring about social, 
change. Their argument is that the economic base plays the principal and 
decisive role. The superstructure is formed on the economic base and its 
character is decided by the character of the base. They argue further that 
the decisive role of the economic base can also be seen in the fact that 
Marx wrote that, 'with the change of the economical foundation the entire 
immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed'. 
This view of the dogmatic Marxists must give way to the view that 
the superstructure does not merely conform to the economic base passively. 
It is relatively independent and has its own immense effect on the economic 
base. An advanced superstructure is established to meet the needs for 
growth of an advanced economic base. It promotes the formation and consoli-
dation of its base, destorys the old economic base and becomes the pro-
gressive agent propelling the growth of production forces. A decadent 
superstructure protects the old economic base and hampers the growth of the 
new economic one. For an obvious example of this analysis, we need only 
refer back to our views on customary sales law. 
In relating these two terms to the Kenyan situation we need to point 
out that this is an underdeveloped capitalist society fully integrated in 
the world economic system. That is our economic base. Our neo-colonial state 
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British feudalism. The bourgeoisie demanded 'free' labour market and the 
'free' play of economic forces on which capitalism was to be based for a 
long time. A 'free' labour market meant workers who were 'free' of the 
feudal fetters of dependent serfdom and 'free' of property (the serf depended 
on land for his subsistence - by freeing him from land, he was also freed 
from his sole means of subsistence) and who would be driven by hunger to 
"the factories. To quote Marx:-
The workers were to be free from the old relation of clientship, 
villeinage or service but also free from all goods and chattels, 
from every real and objective form of existence, free from all 
property. Such a mass would be reduced either to the sale of 
labour power or to beggary, vagabondage or robbery as its only 
source of income. History records the fact that it first tried 
beggary, vagabondage and crime, but was herded off this road on 
the narrow path which led to the labour market by means of gallows, 
pillory and whip (1964, p. 98). 
Finally law permanently declared all persons equal. A worker was 
in law equal to a capitalist. Thus Seagle, in his Quest of Law, has written 
that 'there was no god but contract and Sir Henry Maine was its prophet' 
in the 19th century (p. 266). The doctrines of 'freedom of contract' and 
the 'sanctity of contract' were the inevitable counterparts of the free-
enterprise system. In a society based on private ownership of the means 
of production and where law had declared all to be equal, this'freedom'actually 
13 
served to strengthen the dominant position of the property-owning class. 
Legal relations are always fundamentally derived from economic relations. They 
are property rights. The indispensability of contract to the development 
of capitalism is well advanced by F. Kessler:-
With the development of a free enterprise system based 
on unheard of division of labour, capitalistic society needed 
a highly elastic legal institution to safeguard the exchange 
of goods and services on the market. Common law lawyers,responding 
to this social need, transformed 'contract' from the clumsy 
institution that it was in the sixteenth century into a tool of 
almost unlimited usefulness and stability. Contract became the 
indispensable instrument of the enterpriser, enabling him to go 
about his affairs in a rational way (1943, p. 629). 
13. Mandell writes:-
At the same time money begins to conceal the real economic 
relationship, formerly transparent, between serfs and lords, 
between necessary and surplus labour. Landowners and tenants, 
employers and wage earners meet on the market as free owners 
of commodities, and the fiction of this 'free exchange' hides 
the continuation of the old relationship of exploitation under 
its new forms (1968, p. 97)c 
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Later in the 19th century, the individual enterpriser was replaced 
by large-scale enterprises and ultimately the multinational corporations. 
The form of the contract changed, but its essence continued. The new 
form was more detailed and elaborate with more exemption clauses. It was 
the necessary development of the concept of contract, stemming from the 
14 development of large-scale enterprises under monopoly capitalism. 
Right from the beginning, freedom of contract had a class content. 
Freedom of contract, stripped of its ideological cloak, means no more 
and no less than freedom to exploit and be exploited. In a calss society 
where parties will not have equal bargaining power, except where two equal 
capitalist firms are involved (see McCaulay, 1969, p. 194ff), it is false 
to talk of freedom of contract. In truth, state intervention in contracts 
by legislation partially recognises that this equality is illusory. Trade 
union movements underline this basic fact as well. So does the judicial 
creation of the doctrine of fundamental breach (see Whitford, 1969, p. 87). 
Physical freedom, which the doctrine of freedom of contract emphasizes, 
ignores the relevant consideration - the economic power of the parties to 
a contract. 
15 
This doctrine of freedom of contract has been imposed on Kenya. 
As for the general principles of contract law, based on this doctrine of 
14. Kessler writes:-
The development of large-scale enterprise with its mass production 
and mass distribution made a new type of contract inevitable -
the standardised mass contract. A standardised contract, once 
its contents have been formulated by a business firm, is used 
in every bargain with the same product of service. The individuality 
of the parties which so frequently gave colour to the old type 
of contract has disappeared. The stereotyped contract of today 
reflects the impersonality of the market. It has reached its 
greatest perfection in different types of contracts used on the 
various exchanges. Once the usefulness of these contracts was 
discovered and perfected in transportation, insurance, and banking 
business, their use spread in all other fields of large-scale 
enterprise into international as well as national trade, and into 
labour relations. It is to be noted that uniformity of terms of 
contracts typically recurring in a business enterprise is an important 
factor in the exact calculation of risks. Risks which are difficult 
can be excluded altogether. Unforseable contigencies affecting 
performance, such as strikes, fire and transportation difficulties, 
can be taken care of. The standard clauses of insurance policies 
are most striking illustrations of successful attempts on the part 
of business enterprises to select and control risks assumed under 
a contract (1943, p. 629). 
15. See section. 3 of the Judicature Act, 1967 (No. 16 of 1967). 
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16 freedom of contract, the Contract Act of 1872 of India was imposed on Kenya 
by Britain. This act was repealed by the Contract Act, Chapter 23 of the 
Laws of Kenya (section 3). This latter act adopts the English law of. contract 
for Kenya (section 2). The Kenyan Sale of Goods Act, Chapter 31 of the Laws 
of Kenya, enacts the Sale of Goods Act, 893 of Britain with very minor modi-
fications. The Kenyan Hire-purchase law is also fundamentally English law. 
What the Kenyan Hire-Purchase Act, 1968 has done is to modify, confirm and 
supplement English common law concerning hire-purchase (Mutunga, 1975). 
THE NEO-CQLONIAL ECONOMY 
The neo-colonial economic system has already been described in terms 
of roles and the maintenance and perpetuation of the international capitalist 
economic system. Metropolitan finance capital is invested in the production 
of raw materials and foodstuffs (Nabudeze, 1976, chapter 11) where it earns 
better returns. Metrolpolitan industrial capital (more correctly, finance 
capital because industrial capital cannot free itself from finance capital) 
is invested in the production of manufactured goods which find a ready market 
in less developed countries. For the industrial capitalists to realize their 
surplus valve (profits), these goods must reach their ultimate consumer, and 
this process is facilitated by the role of commercial capital which serves 
industrial capital. 
Mandel correctly paraphrases Marx on this topic:-
When the production of commodities is completed, the industrial 
capitalist already possess the surplus-value produced by workers. 
But this surplus-value exists in a particular form; it is still 
crystallised in commodities, just as capital advanced by the 
industrialist is too. The capitalist can neither reconstitute 
16. A good example of this is the general rule that a court will not 
determine the adequacy of consideration in contracts (although it will 
determine equaity in certain circumstances, see Treidel, pp. 65-66). This 
rule has been justified on the following grounds:-
It is rather than they (the courts) should not interfere with 
bargains freely made.... The courts are not well equipped to deal 
with the social and economic questions involved in determining 
whether a bargain is fair; and it seems that their refusal in 
general to judge adequacy of consideration is correct (Treidel, 
pp. 64 - 65). 
Again, behind this argument the doctrine of freedom of contract is clearly 
operative. This general rule supports the essential feature of all 
contracts in capitalist societies - that they are tools of exploitation. 
This is why the exploitation of one party to a contract by the other does 
not make the contract invalid. 
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this capital nor appropriate the surplusvalue so long as 
they retain this form of existence.... To realize the surplus-
value" must sell the commodities produced. But the industrialist 
does not work for definite customers (except when he carries 
orders for the 'ultimate consumer'); he works for an anonymous 
market. 
Every time that a production cycle is completed, he would thus 
have to stop work at the factory, sell his commodities in order 
to recover his outlay, and then resume production. By buying 
what the industrialist produces, the traders relieve him of 
the trouble of going himself to look for the consumer. They 
save him the losses and charges involved in interrupting pro-
duction until the commodities have reached their destination. 
They, so to speak, advance him the money capital that allows him 
to carry on producing without any interruption. 
But the traders who advance to the industrialists the funds they 
need to reconstitute their capital and realise their surplus 
value, must in their turn quickly sell the goods thus bought, 
so as to begin the operation anew as soon as possible (1968, p. 185). 
The ultimate objective of all this is quick appropriation of an 
increased surplus-value, as Mandel points out:-
Now each production cycle brings in the same amount of surplus-
value, provided that the capital and the rate of surplus-value remain 
the same. Increasing the number of production cycles accomplished 
in one year means increasing the total amount of surplus-value 
produced that year. Reducing the circulation time of commodities 
is thus not only a way of realizing surplus-value more quickly, 
it is also a way of increasing the amount (1968, p. 187), 
And commercial capital shares in the division of the total 
surplus-value on equal footing with industrial capital 'because by reducing 
the circulation time of commodities it help> the industrialists to increase 
the total amount (of surplus-value) and the annual rate of surplus-value' 
(Mandel, 1968, p. 187). 
The whole question of investment centres on the fact that capital 
invested reaps higher returns in less developed countries through high rates 
of interest. In Kenya, there are beneficiaries from the investments of 
finance capital. The producers of raw materials and foodstuffs, though 
they surrender interest to their creditors, still earn more than if they 
had not borrowed. These beneficiaries are the African and European 
petty-bourgeoisie. While the European mixed farms have been transferred 
to the middle and lower levels of the African petty-bourgeoisie, the upper 
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levels of the African petty-bourgeoisie have become capitalist farmers. 
(Leys, 1975, pp. 63-66}. In the commercial sector* the sub-class of the 
Asian commercial petty-bourgeoisie has not been liquidated. The European, 
Asian and African commercial petty-bourgeoisie all participate in the 
distribution of foreign manufactured goods (Leys, 1975, pp. 150-159). Their 
role takes the form of commercial capital, which in reality in Kenya is 
finance capital advanced to these sub-classes who then function as merchant 
capitalists. The role of commercial capital in Kenya is to cement and 
perpetuate the alliance between the local petty-bourgeois sub-classes and 
the international bourgeoisie. Because of the on-going class struggles 
between the sub-classes, the alliance which is really significant is between 
the African petty-bourgeoisie and the monopoly bourgeoisie. The African 
petty-bourgeoisie control the state, and the European and Asian sub-classes 
are definitely in the process of dissolution. 
THE LEGAL RULES AND THEIR APPLICATION 
Contract is the fundamental legal rule in a capitalist system. 
The law, covering the sale of goods (section 3 of the Sale of Goods Act) 
a hire-purchase agreements (section 2 of the Hire-purchase Act) are based 
on the doctrine of freedom of contract. The definition of goods under 
Sub-section (1) of the Sale of Goods Act and section 2 of Hire-Purchase Act 
encompasses raw materials, foodstuffs and foreign manufactured goods. The 
sub-section under the Sale of Goods Act defines goods to include 'all 
chattels personal other than things attached to or forming part of the land 
which are agreed to be severed before sale or under contract of sale'. The 
section under the Hire-purchase Act contents itself by providing that goods 
under the act 'have the same meaning as in the Sale of Goods Act'. 
Protection of private property is supported in both acts as a 
funcamental principle in a society whose economic structure is based on 
private ownership of the means of production. In both fields of law this 
legal expression is enshrined in the principle of nemo dat quod non habet 
which literally means 'no one can give what he does not have'. Sub-section 
(1) of Section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act reflects this principle. It 
provides:-
Where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, 
and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent 
of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than 
the seller had 
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The Hire-Purchase Act adheres to the same principle under Sub-
section (1) of Section 2. This is clear when the definitions of hirer, owner 
17 and hire-purchase agreement are analysed. 
Both acts facilitate the circulation of commodities as described 
above. Under monopoly capitalism, the nemo dat principle has come to be 
a legal fetter in the field of commercial law. While under feudalism it 
had performed a useful function in a personalised market, under capitalism, 
and in particular under monopoly capitalism with its mass production and 
mass distribution of commodities, this principle has had to be modified. 
Exceptions to the principle must be seen in this light. The unmitigated 
legal expression of the nemo dat principle could inhibit merchant or 
commercial capital from serving industrial capital. The Sale of Goods Act, 
for example, specified the following exceptions to the nemo dat principles:-
1. Where the owner is stopped from denying the seller's 
authority to sell - S. 23 (1), 
2. Where the sale is by a mercantile agent; - S. 26 (3), 
3. Where the goods are sold under any special common law or 
statutory power of sale or under an order of a court 
of a competent jurisdiction - S. 23 (2) (b), 
4. Where the apparent owner disposes of the goods as if he 
were a true owner thereof - S. 23 (2) (a), 
5. Where the seller's title is voidable and at the time of sale 
has not been avoided - S. 24, 
6. Where the goods are seized under a writ of execution and are 
sold to a bona fide purchaser - S. 27, and 
7. Where goods are disposed of under the conditions described in 
sub-sections (1) (2) of section 26. 
17. For example a hire-purchase agreement' means an agreement for 
the bailment of goods under which the property in the goods will or may 
pass to the bailee '. 
The fundemental principle under hire-purchase law, that property in 
the goods does not pass until the hirer exercises the option to 
purchase, is clearly enacted; c.f., Holby v. Mathews (1895) H.L; 
Bandali v. Lombark Tanganyika Ltd. (1963) E.A. 
304; Matayo Musoke v. Alibhai Garage (1960) E.A. 
31; Mukembo v. Republic :(1974) E.A. 100. 
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Under the hire-purchase law , the form of transaction facilities 
the circulation process as well. In the so-called triangular transaction, 
whereby the dealer sells the goods to a finance company which then lets 
them out on hire-purchase to the hirer, .the circulation process is initiated 
when the dealer finds a customer who is ready to buy the goods and the 
finance company agrees to finance the buyer. This triangular transaction 
involves two forms of contracts: a sales contract between the dealer and the 
finance company and a hire-purchase agreement between the finance company and 
the hirer. Besides this transaction, there must also be a sales contrast 
between the industrial capitalist (the real owner of the goods) and the 
dealer. That contract favours the interests of the industrial capitalist 
in terms of his production cycle and profits. 
Under the provisions of both acts, are not specified, according to 
the doctrine of freedom of contract. Nor is there any regulation of the 
interest rates charged by finance companies which provide credit to facilitate 
18 the quick circulation of goods. 
How are these legal rules facilitated in practise? Research was 
carried out on transactions involving two raw materials produced in Kenya: 
coffee and tea. For tea, we looked into the operations of Brooke Bond 
Liebig Kenya, Ltd., which produces tea and exports it to other African 
countries and elsewhere in the world. The mode of payment is invariably 
by a letter of credit, and the payment process consists of the following 
stages:-
1. The importer completes a bank form which contains full 
instructions on how the letter of credit should be constructed, 
2. The importer's bank transmits the letter of credit to its 
correspondent bank in the exporting country, 
3. The correspondent bank notifies the exporter and sends 
him the detailed letter of credit, containing all the require-
ments and showing the value of the credit and the length 
of time for which it is valid, 
4. The exporter then proceeds with shipment and carefully collects 
all the required documents ensuring that they conform with 
requirements specified in the letter of credit, 
18. For a more detailed discussion on the half-heartedness of the Hire-
Purchase Act, see Mutunga (1975). 
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5. When the credit, documents are complete, the exporter 
presents them (usually together with a draft) to the 
correspondent bank, which checks them for conformity 
and then pays according to the form of credit (Walker, 
1970, p. 124). 
It is important to note that a letter of credit will specify the 
basis for the export/import contract (for example, C.F., F.O.B., F.O.R., 
etc.), but the basic contract for the entire transaction is a separate 
document. The letter of credit also specifies which documents are required 
as evidence of current shipment (for example, a bill of lading or insurance 
policy), the name of the ship and details of the voyage, particulars 
concerning the goods to be shipped, etc. of course the details vary according 
to the mode of transportation. 
In the case of Brooke Bond, the company transports its tea to London, 
paying all the expenses and insurance. In London, the company has agents 
who auction the tea weekly in the London market. The company pays the agents 
a commission. The agents advise the company on the stock available in 
London and sends the money earned at the auctions the following week through 
a system of bank transfers. The company also sells tea in the USA and 
Canada through its sister companies there. The mode of payment is by a letter 
of credit valid for 60 days. 
The Coffee Board of Kenya has weekly auctions in Nairobi and it is 
paid the week after the auctions. The exporters, CETCO, for example, are 
also paid by letters of credit valid for periods of from 60 to 120 days. 
The Kenya National Trading Company (KNTC) plays a key role in the 
distribution of manufactured goods in Kenya. The KNTC was launched by the 
government in 1965 in an effort to Africanise commerce. The KNTC is an 
19 
importer of foreign goods with agents all over the country. The agents 
purchase imported goods from the KNTC either for cash or by banker's draft. 
The KNTC's mode of payment for imports is by a letter of credit, usually a 
sight letter of credit. The period of credit varies from 60 to 120 days. 
The pricing system of the KNTC is based on expanses and profits, as with 
any merchant capitalist. The KNTC invests capital in the distribution of 
19. For imported goods, these agents are in fact legally designated as 
buyers, not as agents. 
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goods, which is actually finance capital from the ICDC (Industrial and 
Commercial Development Corporation), financed by government and foreign 
financial institutions. The KNTC has many foreign suppliers, principally 
from Western capitalist countries. 
Car dealers in Kenya were also investigated. There are car dealers 
who are importers, such as D.T. Dobie, Simba Motors, the Cooper Motor 
Corporation and Westlands Motors. There are also sub-dealers who buy from 
the importers, for example Joginder Motors. The mode of payment by all 
car importers is by letter of credit, the duration of credit varying from 
60 to 90 days. The dealers sell the cars to finance companies who make 
hire-purchase agreements with the consumers. 
Four finance companies were studied. All four operate as savings 
banks, but the local capital which is invested is denationalised (Shivje, 
1973, pp. 359-382). A close look at these companies reveals that they ask 
for a deposit of 50% of the hire-purchase price. The other 50% is paid 
off over periods varying from 18 months to 2 years. The National Bank of 
Kenya departs from this pattern, however, when dealing with civil servants. 
The other three finance institutions have all offered 20% of their share 
capital to the public. 
These companies charge exorbitant interest (Goode, 1970, p. 51). The 
Credit Finance Corporation, for example, gives 6% interest on money deposited, 
but charges 12% interest on loans, Loxley (1966, p. 765) and Mandel (1968, 
p. 236) correctly argue that the rate of interest charged over a period is 
actually higher than the stated rate because the balance is reduced monthly 
over the period. A flat rate of, say, 10% per annum, they argue, is effect-
ively equal to almost 18% per annum. It can be argued, therefore, that the 
Credit Finance Corporation charge 21.6% per annum on all loans. 
Such institutions undeniably facilitate the circulation process, both 
of final consumer goods and of raw materials and foodstuffs. Production 
in monopoly enterprises can proceed uninterrupted, as the necessary supply 
of raw materials and sale of products are uninterrupted. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the two branches of commercial law discussed 
here are effective legal expressions of neo-colonial roles. If we agree that 
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in Kenya we have skipped certain stages of development and that we cannot 
accept a state of underdeveloped capitalism, then we consider these two 
branches of law as part of a decadent superstructure, protecting an under-
developed capitalist base which should be eradicated. The two branches 
are tools of underdevelopment, imposed upon Kenya by monopoly capitalism. 
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THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN LAW AS AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE TOOL IN DEVELOPMENT 
by 
J. H. Ob as o 
Kenya Institute of Administration 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper focusses on the administrative applications of law. 
The treatment of the subject is not meant to represent a specialist view of 
law but a generalist administrative Interpretation of law and administrative 
problems which have legal implications. It is hoped that the legal and 
administrative issues discussed will stimulate thought on the application 
of law in general, and administrative law in particular. The paper is 
written with Kenya in mind, but the theoretical examples given will also 
apply to other countries, both developing and developed. As far as possible, 
practical examples will be avoided, but the theoretical examples given will 
be real and close enough to practice to enable discussants to cite actual 
examples relating to various countries. 
This paper also attempts to discuss the pace of legal development 
in the context of general social change, which in many developing countries 
is occurring very quickly. The point is briefly made that law, in its 
theory and practice, tends to be conservative in its outlook and can be 
accused of insensitivity to its social context. 
The main objective of the discussion of various examples in this paper is 
to highlight problems that are felt to be relevant to the application of 
law in development. The paper is too short to develop comprehensively some 
of the issues it touches on relating to the development of theory and 
practice. It is hoped, however, that such issues will-be handled on a 
practical level during discussions on law and administration. 
Some of the accusations made in this paper concerning the law and lawyers 
could apply to many other professions. But due to lack of space and time, 
the discussions and examples are deliberately confined to legal matters. 
- 1 2 2 - ID'S/OP 29 
THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ITS PROBLEMS AS A SCIENCE 
Law as a social science faces many problems both in development 
and application. Its development originates from the ideas of men in the 
context of history. This historical context has had, as a component, the 
various cultures of the world, which in the past have been very many and 
distinct, but which at present are becoming more and more difused into 
one mass-culture shaped by modern communication technology. The world 
has become smaller and the ideas of men are communicated much faster. 
If the Englsih law made sense in England in 1850, today it would 
come into contact with, and be influenced by, Puerto Rican or Japanese law 
much more quickly. If we were to develop, for example, something called 
Tanzanian law, and insist that the Norwegians use it, the Norwegians would 
consider us crazy or unfair, to say the least. And yet some of us consider 
it natural to be applying in Africa what we believe is Englsih law. The cri-
f + h a t a view like this is unscholarly is based on the assumption that 
the development of any science ought to be research-based. Lawyers ought 
to carry out national and international research to derive principles 
from human action and make such principles the basis for legal development, 
both situationally and universally. It is only through this that we can 
discard the idea of Kenyan law, English law or Chinse law. It is surely 
time law developed a more universal context in theory and in practice, 
basically concerned with human behaviour. Feelings of inferiority from 
the colonial era should not continue to dominate and inhibit scientific 
development. 
Law, like all other disciplines in the social sciences, should 
identify its area of concern as human behaviour, and should concern itself 
with observing, understanding, explaining, controlling, influencing, 
changing and, where possible, predicting human behaviour. Human behaviour 
is always dynamic and explanations for human behaviour cannot be based on 
dated and static "jng./sh notions that are several centuries old. 
One would wish to believe that the study of law is based on 
certain universal principles which explain its operation as a science. If 
this is so, concepts that limit a whole body of science according to cultural 
biases and prejudices should surely be abandoned. A lot of credit is given 
to various scholars for certain theories that they have developed through 
research or by accident. Such theories or hypotheses could have been made 
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in the fields of physics, sociology, economic, or engineering, but 
knowledge developed in these fields is not identified by its country 
of origin as with, e.g., English law. No one talks of Kenyan sociology 
or Tanzanian mathematics. Why should we continue to talk of English 
law, as if lawyers cannot develop frames of references other than those 
that are English. Where is the place for comparative analysis in law? 
How can such an analysis fail to be both international and comparative? 
In the study of law, one is aware of examples of local acts, 
which provide local sources of law, and legal scholars in each country 
should study these sources, using a common scientific approach so that 
this work can contribute to the international scientific development of 
law. The principles would be universal, but application would be local, 
adapted to specific 'situations. 
It is only through such an approach that the conservative and 
rigid attitude of the legal profession can be relaxed to facilities its 
effective role In development compatency and the absence of local 
research leads some scholars and professionals to accept foreign ideas 
too readily. Some over-identify with foreign ideas, so much so that 
they cannot engage in the type of analysis which would enhance the 
development of their profession and help make its local application 
effective. 
To what extent are law and lawyers subject to this accusation? 
Is it possible, for example, in Kenya that we believe an African cannot 
make a good lawyer and that a good lawyer in Kenya must necessarily be an 
Englishman, or at least not a black African? To what extent may this 
feeling of Inferiority be plaguing the legal profession in Kenya and in 
Africa? Must one wait to hear Lord Denning speak to learn and appreciate 
the extent to which law should be viewed as a well-balanced social science? 
He is not so naive as to demand that the application of law be confine 
exclusively to the English interpretation, and yet he himself is an English-
man. Why? This is because he is not an active professional dead-wood 
(or maybe because he did not develop the sense of personal inferiority 
which comes with living in a black colony). 
Management and administration suffer from these attitudinal 
limitations, even more than law. 
The sources of law should be closely related to what constitutes 
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human behaviour in general. Principles of law that are to be used in 
Africa in the 1980s should be derived from Africa's needs of the 1980s, 
and not from the English experiences of 1784. One is not saying that the 
history of law or any discipline should be disregarded, but rather that 
its application should be modernized and made relevant to present real-life 
situations rather than to the situation in another culture hundredsrqf years 
ago. 
Such a frame of reference cannot be developmental. Law, and some 
lawyers, tend to suffer from this. Lawyers should see law as an administrative 
tool, and should endeavour to facilitate its research-based development, 
to make it relevant to the needs of the society in which it is to be applied. 
One expects that there ought to be by how some universal legal 
principles which serve as a basis for legal practice. Such principles 
should be flexible enough to enable the appropriate application of law 
in different situations. Otherwise, it would be difficult to conceive of 
law as a social science, which it is. Development presupposes flexibility 
and change; a static approach to the explanantion of individual and group 
behaviour cannot be developmental. 
Lawyers-in-training should spend more tims studying behavioural 
science to learn about the area which law is expected to influence, change, 
control and predict>human behaviour. 
The basis of law ought to be seen as human behaviour, both by 
lawyers and non-lawyers who deal with legal matters. The basic problem 
for all legal workers is the problem of understanding human behaviour. 
Added to the problem of human behaviour is the problem of the social 
environment. Human behaviour varies according to different cultures, and 
the social sciences have not yet developed a scientific way of developing, 
controlling and predicting human behaViou®',"- In many cases, we just sit 
and wait for people's actions to show us what their intentions are. Lawyers 
share some of these problems with other professionals, and they will not 
solve them successfully by being rigid in their approach to explaining 
human situations. It is a widespread rigidity and non-flexibility which in 
fact justify a seminar such as this one. Development logically pre-supposes 
flexibility., If law is to be an effective tool for development, it has to 
be flexible and relevant to people's real needs. The legal, behavioural 
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frame of reference also has to be current, and not exclusively historical. 
Lawyers should be innovative and risk-taking. Lawyers should also inject 
more of a challenge into legal training by pushing it beyong the mere 
mastery of old established ideas, to the quest for new ideas which will 
facilitate an acceptable and modern application of law. 
THE APPLICATION OF LAW TO DEVELOPMENT 
This section is meant to reiterate and explain the obvious: that 
law is, and has always been, a necessary part of human development. Law 
is, in fact, quite a natural phenomenon in human life and behaviour. It 
is naturally built into the statuses people hold and the roles they play 
which all constitutes' human1 behaviour. In a process of social interaction, 
people are motivated to satisfy their needs in response to certain stimuli. 
Behavioural expressions can be negative or positive depending on whether 
they do or do not satisfy expressed needs. Negative behaviour is extinguished 
by many forms of social pressure and positive, acceptable behaviour is 
reinforced. Law contributes to this function of controlling human behaviour 
in a more formalized way through institutional arrangements. 
Rules and regulations are an essential part of a bureaucracy. 
It would be impossible to set standards, set deadlines and lay down dos and 
don'ts, if there were no rules and regulations. It would be impossible to 
sequence activities and control behaviour if some generally agreed upon 
rules and regulations did not exist. 
Bureaucracy needs rules and regulations to exist, or else there 
would be chaos. Governmental development activities, which are based 
on bureaucracies, can only survive on the basis of rules and regulations. 
All of these activities have legal aspects, while some are directly legal. 
Much as these laws are needed, they must be flexible if they 
are to facilitate development. Whether rigid or flexible, laws are needed* 
and one cannot conceive of a society without codified and publicised laws, 
Even within the short period of a military coup ( a topic on which Africa 
is the consultant/expert), people have to plan some strategy to which they 
must adhere for some given time. It is the responsibility of lawyers as 
members of the judiciary to interprete and inplement legal procedures as 
a service to the legislature, to the executive and, most important of all, 
to the society which is the focus of change and development. If law did 
not exist, there would be"'bureaucratic or-"1 socia'l chaos. 
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Law and Politics 
In modern government, politics is the source of both 
administration and law. In the first instance, the notions of the 
'separation of powers' and the 'independence of the judiciary' are 
determined by law. Parliament creates laws, but it then becomes the 
responsibility of the judiciary to interprete and to apply these laws. In 
other words, the powers of the judiciary are distinct from those of the 
legislature and the executive. Everybody knows that this distinction is 
clearer in theory than it is in practice. In practice, it always tends 
to be the politician's world. 
In the interaction between law and politics, lawyers face a great 
challenge with regard to their role and influence in development. Not only 
in the developing countries but also in the developed world, the lawyers 
are often helpless in the hands of politicians. Lawyers have sometimes 
been the instruments of very antisocial acts and policies. There are also 
cases in many countries where political/legal issues are reported in the 
press on which legal guidance is urgently needed, but the lawyers remain 
silent as a matter of expediency. Sometimes lawyers have "the' 
law themselves, although the public would expect them to, be good examples. 
This may appear an unfair and personal attack but then where does one ^draw 
the line? Is it unfair to expect lawyers to fo 1 lowvthev1 legail-ppimcipJles 
they are expected to uphold? 
Administrators and politicians are known the world over for 
corruption. Should we expect the same? pf,.lawyers? One would wish to say, 
no. It would seem to be inviting chaos and anarchy to leave law in the 
hands of amoral lawyers, who may want to Ped'efine. the law to suit their 
personal goals. 
There; have been cases where national politicians have gone so 
far as to . amend;..constitutional on to justify their own actions or to 
perpetuate their interests in the struggle for power and material wealth. 
Precisely in this area of law and politics, firm rules and 
guidelines are called for, and yet this is the one area where law becomes 
so fluid as to be non-existent. There should be an effort to control 
politics by legal means so that for example, economic planning and develop-
ment can be more rational and effective. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Conservatism, rigidity, lack of innovation and consequently 
irrelevance, these are soma of the qualities that have been attributed to 
legal practice in this paper. As an administrative tool needed to cope 
with dynamic situations, law should be flexible and developmentc idri^ ntfed 
In a developing country, where the pace of change is even faster than 
elsewhere, law needs to be particularly flexible and responsive if it 
is " to be effective as a change agent. It needs to keep ahead of social 
change if it is to control and guide it. 
This flexibility -requires a re-orientation, both in the statutes 
and in the lawyers who interpret and apply statutes. This re-orientation 
has by necessity to be research-based rather than the result of armchair 
theorizing to ensure its scientific validity. 
In Kenya, as has been mentioned above, it appears that law 
has borrowed too heavily from England. This situation tends to perpetuate 
conservatism and rigidity and results in irrelevant applications. A legal 
case described here provides an example of a situation where an English 
explanation legal precedent may not be appropriate or beneficial in a Kenya 
context. 
A Divorce Case in Kenya 
A man and a woman, both Kenyans from the Kikuyu tribe, were marrie 
The man was an agricultural officer and the wife a trained primary school 
teacher. They married in the Christian church, though many of the man's 
ideas about marriage and property ownership remained traditional. 
Disagreements developed in the marriage and the woman moved away from the 
man's home and took up residence in a rented house with her children against 
the expectations and wishes of her husband and his relatives. 
Unfortunately, without writing a will, the husband died while 
his wife was still living separately. The woman then moved back to her 
husband's home to live in his house and claim his property. The relatives 
of the deceased chased the woman away, denied her all access to her husband' 
property and refused to cooperate with the government officers responsible 
for arranging the administration of the dead man's estate. The woman then 
hired an Indian lawyer to seek redress through the application of the 
English law in a Kenyan court. 
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This is a case of two Kenyans having a legal dispute in Kenya 
and asking an Indian lawyer to use English law to solve their conflict. 
This is a commonplace example in Kenya today. People try to solve 
conflicts in the absence of a common frame of reference, due to the dynamics 
of social change. It takes a long tims before any solution is reached. 
In the meantime the lawyers become wealthy, collecting fees from people 
with problems which possibly have no clear legal definitions. 
The problem here goes beyond the individual lawyer or the 
individual member of the community. It is the responsibility of legal 
researchers to increase our understanding of marriage problems, including 
such issues as social structures, family structures and roles, family 
functions, family relationships, the power structure within the family, 
acquisition of property and inheritance, the economic power of family members 
and the traditional notion that a wife is always dependent on a husband 
economically. 
This case is an example of a situation where the application of 
law has.1 lagged behind social change. In the USA and Britain it is still 
mistakenly assumed that a working woman depends on her husband economically, 
with the result that it is the wife who normally benefits financially 
from a divorce, but never the husband. 
Through research carried out by lawyers on the economics, the 
sociology, psychology and politics of the family, a legal framework ought 
to be developed which is relevant to modern family life. Legal decisions 
should have a degree of universality, but should also be flexible enough 
to accomodate individual cases and more general social change. 
The problem of money-making is a common problem that the legal 
profession shares with many others. Lawyers provides a service which is 
very much needed by individual members of the public and by public and 
private organizations. To make matters worse, the legal profession has 
developed an aura which functions as a very strong built-in mechanism for 
survival. Lawyers, who are basically social scientists, use a terminology 
which is unintelligible I: ifeoi manypeople,although the cases they handle involve 
human beings, and issues which should be familiar. They show a strong trade 
union mentality, which keeps lawyers, in their training and practice, in 
a closely-knit inward-looking group. 
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Lawyers are well placed in a developing country where people 
are forced to explain themselves in new ways in which only lawyers are 
experts. In a country such as Kenya, a lawyer in private practice, if 
he works hard and has good business sense can become rich very quickly. 
He can do this while sticking to his legal ethics, or by violating them. 
And it is difficult to control the practices of lawyers. Members of the 
public have no idea what is a fair charge for legal service. Sometimes 
people do not even know when they need a lawyer to protect them from other 
members of the public, or from other social systems. And these problems 
stern mainly from the language used by lawyers. For example, hardly 
anybody, including highly educated people, can claim to understand their 
life-insurance or mot or-insurance policies, both of which are the work 
of legal draftsmen. 
This deliberate wall of jargon built between the law and the 
public enables lawyers to get away easily with unfair profit-making and 
corruption. The legal charges for house purchase in Kenya, for example, 
are very high, but members of the public have no avenue for formal complaint. 
The quest for money and the get-rich-quick mentality does great 
harm in many professional areas. Law, medicine and administration are 
very good examples of this problem in Kenya today. Every week, at least 
one case is reported in the press of corruption in law, medicine or 
adminis trati on. 
It is evident that because of money, lawyers also will compromise 
all standards of scholarship or ethics. They will overcharge. They will 
distort the law to seek favours and survive politically. They will become 
professors or lecturers at a university, but will spend their time in 
regular, full-time private legal practice to make more money. This will make 
it impossible for them to do research to continue to study on to develop 
a high degree of professionalism. 
When professionalism is widely compromised for money, all 
professionals find it difficult to uphold high standards. They may fail 
to influence issues in the way the public expects. For instance, lawyers 
and administrators often fail to prevent or mitigate socially undesirable 
political acts. 
Can lawyers take their professional responsibilities seriously, 
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rather than merely concentrating on becoming wealthy? Should it not be 
possible for lawyers to play a beneficial note when other groups, or 
the whole social system, are suffering from serious problems? 
This is the role one would wish to see the law and lawyers 
play in development. The legal system provides mechanisms to act as a 
brake when a social system is politically and economically moving towards 
increased problems and chaos. If law cannot do them, then the greed for 
money and power will continue to bring about social chaos in pursuit of the 
self interest of afew leaders. 
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APPENDIX 1 : WHY DO PEOPLE DISOBEY LAW 
THE PROBLEM OF HIGH-LEVEL BRIEERY 
by 
Ann Seidman and 
Robert B. Seidman 
High-level bribery - that is, payments to high level political 
decision-makers in return for the exercise of discretion in favour of the 
briber—is plainly a difficulty the world around. It effectively transfers 
power to make the decision from the official to the briber. It therefore 
serves as a vehicle to subvert government policies. 
Everywhere, the criminal law contains stringent prohitions against 
bribery. Everywhere, the criminal law is disobeyed by high-level officials. 
How to explain this systemic disobedience? 
A GENERAL THEORY OF OBEDIENCE TO LAW 
Role-occupants obey the law when their behaviour conforms, to its 
commands. They behave as they do because they make choices within the range 
of constraints and resources thrown up by their physical and social 
environment as they perceive them. Of what elements relevant to choice does the 
environment consist? 
Explanations of behaviour in the facr of law fall into two general 
categories. Sociologists and psychologist have generally focussed on the 
issue of deviance. Their definition of deviance leads them to invoke the 
individual's internalized values as tne explanatory variable. Legal 
tradition favours a contrary model.' 'A person weighs the benefits to 
him of the prohibited conduct against all the costs and the chances that 
he will have to pay those costs'. The sociologists' model emphasized the 
subconscious operation of values and attitudes; the lawyers', conscious choice. 
The sociologist' model was built upon three assumptions. In the 
first place, it was assumed that disobedience to law was relatively rate. 
Disobedience threatens both the stability of the state, and our own security 
as middle-class academics. Classical strands of jurisprudence reinforced this ^ 
sentiment. Analytical jurisprudence ignored the question of the efficacy of law; 
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it was merely assumed. Sociological jurisprudence taught the contrary, but 
paradoxically reached the same result. So long as law matched custom, it would 
be obeyed. The common law claimed to be 'the custom of the country'. 
Obedience was to be expected. It became the fashion to deny the independent 
efficacy of law. In fact, of course, disobedience to law is everywhere 
widespread. Nobody would enact a law which merely prescribes behaviour which 
in any event will occur. Disobedience is as 'normal' as obedience. 
Second, the sociologists' model is based upon a consensus version of 
society. Third, it assumes that people do not calculate in deciding whether or 
not to obey the law. They are, as it were, programmed by the values and 
attitudes built into their neural nets. That is a circular notion. 
Given these three assumptions, disobedience can never be an issue . 
Of course everyone will disobey positive law which does not match the consensus . 
Deviance is the issue: Why are there a few individuals whose values and 
attitudes differ from those of all of us, and thus lead them into deviant 
behaviour? The principal explanations inevitably have been psychological, 
not structural. 
The lawyers' model has, of course, many versions. In all its 
versions, it differs from the sociologists' model described above by its 
emphasis on choice, and hence on calculation. Two principal arguments are made 
against the proposition that people calculate . 
The first argument made against the lawyers' model attack a carica-
tured version of it. That model sometimes is taken to assume that the only 
consideration taken into account in making choices about behaviour is the 
legal sanction. Self-evidently, choices are made in the light of all the 
constraints and resources of the environment, of which the commands and 
sanctions of the law are only a part. 
The second argument made against the lawyers' model is more 
substantial: that the ordinary functioning of society denies that we make 
conscious choices in deciding to obey or disobey the law. Most people go to 
their jobs, return to their families, engage in their everyday activities, 
without consciously 'choosing' to do so . We do not calculate our advantage 
minute by minute. Even criminals frequently do not do so. 
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This argument is obviously the case with respect to a great deal 
of law in any reasonably we11-integrated society. Any society is a society 
because of the repetitive patterns of behaviour which define it. It is 
a going concern. However well it responds to the claims and demands made 
upon it, at whatever level it functions, nevertheless it does function. 
It functions because the whole set of norms and roles, of positions and 
statuses, of value sets, of formal and informal rewards and penalties —in 
short, the entire culture —is more or less integrated. If it were not, the 
society would not be a society, but anarchy. Laws that are more or less 
consistent with the existing social order need not rely upon the threat 
of legal sanction to induce obedience. The surrounding institutional matrix 
structures rewards and punishments, constraints and resources so that the role-
occupant usually makes a personally advantageous decision - at least in the 
short run - when he chooses to conform. So obvious is the choice that likely 
he is not conscious of making it. Indeed, it is precisely in such cases 
that one can talk about behaviour being institutionalized. 
There are many situations, however, even in highly institutionalized 
societies, in which choice does occur. Firms calculate the consequences of tax 
law and of anti-trust law in deciding how to run their businesses. My decision 
about where to park my car is frequently dependent upon the parking ordinance, 
and the chances of getting a ticket. As Lemert puts it, 'the captured 
position of individuals in modern, pluralistic society sheds light on the 
choice of ends and means One general consequence of this position is the 
increase in calculational behaviour and a heightened awareness of alternatives, 
a necessary willingness to consider a wide variety of values and norms as 
functional alternatives to end. ' Many legal rules require or permit doing v?aa 
what would ordinarily not be done if the rules did not exist. Since these 
rules have such a high nuisance value for human beings, or, conversely, 
sometimes offer such great advantages, it seems inconceivable that most people 
do not calculate extensively. 
The laws concerned with development are mainly .rules 1 ..J 
which do not match institutionalized ways of doing things. They look to 
induce changed behaviour. They require the role-occupant to choose between 
norms, a condition characterized by Durkheim as 'anomie'. Calculational 
behavior is a chief consequence. A farmer does not change from the 
subsistence crop that has for generations kept his family alive, to a new 
cash crop without considering the consequences . Developmental rules require 
whole sets of acts done 'on purpose.' The proposition that all behaviour "is 
non-calculational is plainly contradicted by the facts. Especially, 
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laws aimed at changing behavior induce calculated responses. 
If both law and behaviour are the mere epiphenomena of values and 
attitudes, then neither can be changed until values and attitudes are changed 
first. That is at best a slow process. It runs into the 'common paradox' of 
the sociologists: 'If a law is not supported by the mores of the community, 
it is ineffectual; if it is, the law is unnecessary.' Some evidence of the 
invalidity of that paradox is that around the world governments do seek to 
use law to induce change, based on the belief that people do calculate. Do 
they all act in vain? Ought they be told to abandon their efforts to 
improve their lot? 
In lieu of these two sorts of explanations for obedience to law, we 
offer a third that tries to define the categories of choice. 
A role-occupant will choose to obey a law aimed at changing his 
behavior if, but only if, the following elements are present: -
1. The occasion arises for him to make a choice, whether or not 
to obey the law, requiring 
a. That the law be effectively communicated to him, and 
b. That he has an opportunity to either obey or disobey the 
law: and 
2. He has the capacity to obey the law; and 
3.' The law maker has calculated that to obey the law will be in 
the interests of the role-occupant (including conformity-
inducing measures by the state) and has included in that 
calculation all the factors affecting choice by the role-
occupant; and 
4. The role-occupant perceives that the rewards for obeying the 
law are greater than the disrewards, which depends upon:-
a. The processes by which he solves the problems posed by the 
requirement of choice; and 
b. The perceptions, tastes, role-self images, ideologies and 
other subjective factors which enter into decision making 
by the role-occupant. 
This theory is still dismayingly general. It can be made more 
specific. 
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A person will obey a law aimed at changing behaviour if, but only 
all the following conditions are present:-
1. The law is communicated to him in a way that will lead to 
his acting upon it, 
2. He is physically able to comply with it, 
3. His social place is such that he can comply with it, 
4-. Others supply any inputs that are necessary to obedience, 
5. He has the capacity to obey, 
6. Performance is likely to yield a net reward for the role-occupant, including in the balance all the facts affecting choice, to wit-f 
a. The premiums and penalties paid or imposed by existing 
institutions for such behaviour; 
b. The manifest and latent consequences of official activity; 
c. The sanctions imposed by antagonistic interest groups; 
d. The sanctions imposed by antagonistic interest groups 
upon whom the role-occupant is dependent; 
e. The sanctions imposed by disobedient reference groups; and 
f. The sanctions imposed by other members of the role 
occupant's class, elite grouping, or other stratum, 
7. The role-occupant will likely obey if he perceives obedience 
as likely to yield a net reward (that is, if his assessment of the 
constraints and resources of his environment matches what the law-
maker expected his assessment to be), which depends upon:-
a. Whether the role-occupant uses a means-ends methodology 
for deciding whether or not to conform, 
(i) Whether his personal ends are those which the law-
maker expected him to hold, 
(ii) Whether his perceptions and weightings of the 
constraints and rewards of the environment are those 
that the law-maker expected him to have; and 
(iii) If the announcement of the decision to conform 
or not is made publicly, the announced decision (but 
not necessarily the consequent behaviour) is likely 
to be conformity, 
(iv) Whether the role-occupant has internationalized 
any norm which he believes is so powerfully sanctioned 
as to outweigh his perception of the net gain 
otherwise accruing from obedience to the new law; and 
(v) Whether his role-self image requires him to disobey 
the new law; 
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b. If the role occupant uses a problem-solving methodology 
for deciding whether or not to conform, 
c. If the difficulties to which the law is addressed, the 
alternative explanantions, the data, the alternative 
possible solutions, and the experience with those 
solutions are similar to those used by the law-maker'in 
deciding to enact the law; and 
d. If the new law involves matters of immediate use and 
enjoyment, according to his personal tastes. 
EXPLANATIONS FOR HIGH-LEVEL BRIBERY. 
High-level bribery involves two different sets of role-occupants: 
officials and the givers of bribes. We suggest an explanation for the 
behaviour, first, of high-level officials who accept bribes. 
High-level officials in developing countries frequently accept 
bribes because:-
1. The processes of development create manifold opportunities 
for the exercise of discretion by officials (in granting government contracts, 
import licenses, pioneer industry status, and so forth), which favour some 
entrepreneurs and not others, 
2. The laws defining the power of officials in these various 
programmes clothe them with broad and usually unreviewable discretion; 
3. The laws defining the power of officials in these various 
programmes permit them to exercise their discretion secretly, 
The laws defining the power of officials contain few procedures 
ensuring accountability for many of the actions of officials in connection 
with these programmes, 
5. Private entrepreneurs exist and compete for government favours; 
6. It is in the economic interest of officials to accept bribes; 
7. Many bribes are received and used for political purposes,to 
increase the power of officials; 
8. Detection, prosecution and punishment of high-level officials 
is extremely rare, because the difficulties of detection and the political pre-
eminence of the high-level officials taking bribes insulate them from prosecution^ 
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9 . The reference groups of politicians approve of bribery, 
10. Many politicians believe that it is right and proper for 
politicians to take bribes; 
11. Many politicians adopt- the role-self image of the 'big man' 
and require very large sums to support their clients, and 
12. The decision to obey the laws against bribery are invariably 
made privately and secretly. 
An explanation can also be suggested for why expatriate 
businessmen, sometimes (but by no means invariably) with excellent reputations 
for probity in their own country as they step off the airplane in 
a less developed country seemingly metamorphose into arrant corruptorsi-
1. There are ample opportunities for corruption (see preceding 
explanation); 
2. If any single businessman is prepared to bribe, and an 
official is prepared to accept it, then all businessmen dealing with that 
official must be prepared to bribe if they want to do business with him, 
3. The executives of multinational firms doing business in any 
particular less developed country do not have reference groups within the 
country which might disapprove of bribery; although such groups sometimes 
exist in some of the developed countries; 
4. The executives of the multinational firms doing business 
in the less developed countries frequently have racist assumptions about the 
moral character of officials in the less developed countries; 
5 . The executives of the multinational firms doing business 
in the less developed countries quently believe that the culture of these 
countries requires and approves of bribery: That belief became a self-
fulfilling prophecy; and 
6. The ideologies and role-self' images of luisiineissmen?.te6mbine 
to justify them in an amoral search for profits. 
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REFORMS IN THE FIELD OF LAND ADJUDICATION AND CONSOLIDATION 
by 
Department of Land Adjudication 
Kenya Ministry of Lands and Settlement 
INTRODUCTION 
The paper is intended to provide a summary of the most important 
directions in which land reform has been achieved in Kenya during recent 
years . 
The paper consists of two sections dealing with reform through 
conduct of land consolidation and adjudication and reform in the- field 
of registration of titles to land. These sections have been prepared by 
the Department of Land Adjudication in the Ministry of Lands and Settlement 
of the Government of Kenya. 
It will be appreciated that in a short paper of this kind it has 
not been possible to consider in detail all aspects of Kenya's programme 
of land reform. It is hoped, however, that delegates to the seminar will 
be able to satisfy their desire to know more on particular points. 
REFORMS IN THE FIELD OF LAND ADJUDICATION 
In this paper an attempt is made to indicate the manner in which 
the law governing land tenure in the former African reserves of Kenya has 
evolved from a tribal system under which land is held communally by clans 
or tribes to a sophisticated system of individual holdings held by farmers 
with a Government-guaranteed registered title. In a short paper of this kind, 
it is not possible to go into much detail on the question of the tribal land 
tenure system, which varies widely from one tribe to another, and notably 
between pastoral and arable tribes, the former having clung more tenaciously 
to the traditional communal system of land ownership. Suffice it to say 
that the customary system of land tenure in Kenya, like that of any other 
nation, is based fundamentally on the rights of a man and his sons to 
the use, so long as they need it, of whatever farming land they have hacked 
out of the bush; over the generations the family becomes a clan, and as 
it is required, new land is cleared by members of the clan for the clan's 
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use - and the elders of the clan determine any disputes arising over the 
allocation of unoccupied land. But the rights allocated are only rights to 
use the land, not rights of ownership. As population rises the land comes 
to have an exchange value, the concept of individual proprietory rights in 
land emerges, and the sale, mortgage and lease of the land ( as distinct from 
its use) are recognised by the tribe in its customary law. 
As early as 1930, the concept of individual ownership of land was 
emerging in certain parts of Kenya, and notably in Central Province. However, 
it was not until 1954 that it became the Government's policy, with the 
acceptance of the Swynnerton Plan, to issue African farmers with individual 
titles to their holdings. In his 'Plan to Intensify the Development of 
African Agriculture in Kenya', Mr. R.J.M. Swynnerton high-lighted the urgent 
need, from the agricultural development point of view, to take active steps to 
furnish each African farmer with an indefeasible title to his land. 'Every 
African farmer', he said, 'must be provided with such security of tenure, 
through an indefeasible title, as will encourage him to invest his labour 
and profits into the development of his farm, and as will enable him to offer 
it as security against such financial credits as he may wish to secure 
from such sources as may be open to him' He strongly recommended that where 
farmers' holdings were severely fragmented, and particularly in the densely 
populated Central Province (as a result, largely, of the tribal customs 
concerning marriage and succession, as related to land tenure), a process of 
consolidation of fragments and the establishment of rights to holdings, 
possibly through special courts, should be introduced; that where,- in the 
rather less densely populated areas of communally held land, as in Kericho 
District where the process.of enclosure of individual farming units was 
being carried out, urgent action should be taken to create conditions to prevent 
subdivisions below an economic level and thus forestall possible fragmentation 
through inheritance; and that fully negotiable registered titles should 
then be issued to the farmers whose rights to their holdings (after 
consolidation in Central Province) had been satisfactorily established. The 
process of land consolidation and registration was thus introduced in Kenya 
as part of an overall plan to intensify agricultural development. 
In June 1956 the Kenya Government issued the following policy 
statement: 'It is the policy of the Government to encourage the emergence 
of individual land tenure amongst Africans, where conditions are ripe for 
it, and in due course, to institute a system of registration < 
of negotiable title...' . 
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The first legislation enacted to put these policy decisions into 
effect consisted of the Native Land Tenure Rules 1956 (published in October 
1956), and the African Courts (Suspension of Land Suits) Ordinance 1956 
(published in January 1957). Prior to the enactment of this legislation, but 
as part of the implementation of the Swynnerton plan for intensification 
of African agricultural development, a process of determination of land 
rights and of consolidation of fragmented holdings had been in operation in 
Central Province for some time (in Nyeri and Kiambu Districts as early as 
1953). 
The object was to ascertain what land each person was entitled to, 
and then with a view to improving agriculture by the elimination of scattered 
fragments of land of uneconomic size, to allocate to him, in a planned lay-
out, a single plot of land equivalent to the aggregate of the plots to which 
he had been found to be entitled. There is not sufficient time to give a detailed 
description of the land consolidation process, but the following is a brief 
outline of the procedure. The field work of determining, for each sub-location, 
the boundaries and ownership of existing holdings in the area and of deciding 
upon the siting of each individual's new consolidated holdings is carried out 
by committees of local'elders, applying their own intimate knowledge of the 
history of the land, but with the guidance and assistance of various government 
officers - Measurers, Recorders, Demarcation Officers, Surveyors, Field 
Supervisors, etc.; the work is planned and controlled, and objections are 
heard by Adjudication Officers, each one normally responsible for a province 
originally, though these days there is an Adjudication Officer in charge of 
a single district. Originally these officers were attached to District 
Commissioners, but in 1963 the direction of this work was centralised under 
the Minister for Lands and Settlement, in a new Department originally known 
as the Land Consolidation Department, but now named the Land Adjudication 
Department. 
It should be stressed that this work is carried out only after the 
land adjudication process and its effects have been widely publicised at 
baraza (meetings) held in the area, and only after, in open barazas, the 
people of the area have agreed to it being carried out and have chosen the 
numbers of their local Land Committee from amongst their elders. All 
successfully established claims to land are entered in the Record of Existing 
Rights and after objections have been settled, consolidated plots are 
demarcated on the ground by the Committee and recorded in the Adjudication 
Register and Demarcation Plan. Everything is widely publicised, including the 
dates and places for inspecting the Record of Existing Rights and the Final 
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Adjudication Register, and these two records are available for inspection and 
objections for a period of two months each. In allocating new consolidated 
holdings, the Committees provide first for public-purpose land (for roads, 
schools, etc,) on a percentage basis, and then take care to allocate to 
each individual, so far as possible, land of a similar quality and similarly 
situated to the land previously held by him, A noteworthy feature of this 
Committee system - a system, incidentally, which differentiates Kenya's land 
tenure reform methods from those of most other countries in the world - is 
that it is firmly rooted in customary law, in so far as the Committee 
members are, for the most part, the elders traditionally empowered to 
allocate land within their clan areas, The result of this exercise of their 
power, however, is to remove those powers from them in respect of any land 
adjudicated upon by them, since in future any disputes relating to that land 
will be decided by courts of law, on the basis of the statute law relating to 
registered title to land. Thus the new sophisticated system of land tenure is 
soundly based on the old customary tribal system. 
This system of land consolidation and registration, which had been 
started in Central Province as early as 1953, was given legislative sanction 
by the Native Land Tenure Rules 1956 and the African Courts (Suspension of 
Land Suits) Ordinance 1956, This latter ordinance was needed to prevent 
the work of the Committees from being upset by proceedings pending in or 
subsequently commenced in African courts which by themselves could not 
possibly cope with the task of adjudicating upon all land rights. The 
principles of adjudication, consolidation and registration of land rights 
were accepted, and the benefits accruing from this process were rapidly 
appreciated, though here and there small pockets of opposition were experienced. 
There arose a steadily increasing demand for the work to be introduced, not 
only in Central Province but in any other parts of the country, and people 
sent parties to Central Province to see the process in operation. Indeed the 
momentum was such that grave and widespread discontent would have ensued if 
any attempt had been made to slow it unduly. 
However, certain difficulties arose over the Native Land Tenure 
Rules. One of the chief difficulties stemmed from section 68 of the Native 
Lands Trust Ordinance, under which the rules had been made, and which provided 
that 'every African tribe, group, family and individual shall have all the rights 
which they enjoy or may enjoy by virtue of existing law and custom or any 
subsequent modification thereof ..„..;' by this section the Government was pre-
cluded from recognising or creating, by the rules made under that section, 
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any rights unknown to the law and custom of the tribe concerned. Thus under 
these rules it was not possible to make clear the nature of the rights to be 
recognised by the act of registration, or to discriminate between rights 
amounting to ownership and lesser rights for which no legislative provision 
had been made in the rules, but which existed in customary land law. Further-
more the African Courts (Suspension of Land Suits) Ordinance 19 56 had never 
been intended to be more than a temporary measure pending substantive 
legislation. The Working Party on African Land Tenure 1957-58 therefore 
recommended that a new ordinance should be enacted (to take the place of the 
Native Land Tenure Rules 1956) so as to embody legal provision for the staying 
of land suits; to provide for definition of the nature of the rights in land 
recognised by registration so as to differentiate between those rights 
which do and those which do not amount to full ownership of the land; to 
provide for a fully detailed procedure for the registration of title after 
final adjudication and allocation of holdings, for the registration of 
subsequent transactions, and for the maintenance of full land registry; and 
for implementing a number of modifications to the procedure prescribed by the 
rules, found necessary, in the light of experience. In 1959 the Native Land 
Registration Ordinance was enacted, based on a bill prepared by that working 
party. Apart from the points already referred to above, the main innovations 
in the new ordinance were an increase from 5 to 25 in the minimum number of 
members of a committee, and provision for a panel of between 6 and 25 from 
which an Arbitration Board might be appointed with a minimum membership of 5, 
(as against a previous fixed membership of 8) - this was done to reduce the 
risk of partiality by such bodies; provision for the committees to specify 
the rights in land which may be converted into ownership, and for the 
recording of rights enjoyed by tenants under customary law, and for other 
rights and interests existing at the time of adjudication; under the rules 
any objections to the Record of Existing Rights were referred by the District 
Officer back to the committee whose decision was final, but under the new 
ordinance the Adjudication Officer was given certain powers of hearing 
appeals against decisions of Committees and Arbitration Boards reflected in 
the Record of Existing Rights; the period for submitting objections to that 
record and to the register (restyled Adjudication Register in the new 
ordinance) was increased from 30 days to 60 days in each case; and provision 
was included to empower the Committees to safeguard the interests of those 
claimants with rights not amounting to ownership, even when the owner of 
the land in respect of which they claimed rights lost possession of that 
piece of land in the process of consolidation or provision of public purpose 
land. 
- 148 - IDS/OP 29 
The work of land adjudication, consolidation and registration has 
proceeded at a steadily increasing pace under the comprehensive provisions 
of the Native Land Registration Ordinance 1959; the following year its title 
was changed to the Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance, and then 
in 1963 this ordinance was broken down into its two major component parts, 
dealing respectively with the adjudication of claims to land (together with 
consolidation of holdings), and with the registration of titles to those 
holdings after adjudication and consolidation (together with subsequent 
transactions in such holdings). The result was the Land Adjudication Act 1963 
and the Registered Land Act 1963. The latter will be considered in the section 
of this paper dealing with registration of titles. The former was unfortunately 
mis-named, since it provides a procedure for not merely adjudicating claims 
to rights in land, but also for consolidating holdings the rights to which 
have been successfully established. It should perhaps have been styled the 
Land Consolidation Act, but this will be referred to later. Suffice it to 
say at this point that the legal provisions of the Land Adjudication Act 
1963 relating to adjudication and consolidation are to all intents and purposes 
identical with those of the Native Lands Registration Act 1959 and the Laid 
Registration (Special Areas) Act 1960. 
During the early 1960s, and especially after independence in 
December 1963, the demand intensified for Land Consolidation teams to be set 
to work in different parts of the country. Practically every Member of 
Parliament brought pressure to bear on the Minister for Lands and Settlement, 
to persuade him to arrange land consolidation work to be pressed ahead in 
that member's constituency. In consequence, the staff and resources of the 
Department of Land Consolidation, in spite of being considerably augmented, 
were widely dispersed over practically the whole country - a most uneconomic 
use of available resources. This tremendous pressure brought to light the 
fact that a further 25 million acres of land in Kenya still required to be 
processed and that, at the then rate of about 300,000 acres a year, it would 
take an unacceptably long time (upwards of 80 years) to complete those 25 
million acres of Kenya, unless some considerable acceleration of the process 
could be effected. 
In 1965 a joint Kenya-British mission, under the chairmanship of 
Mr. J.C.D. Lawrance (formerly Permanent Secretary for Land Tenure in Uganda), 
was appointed to carry out a study of land consolidation and registration 
work in Kenya, to advise on an accelerated programme of such work and its 
costs, and to suggest the best means of implementing such a programme. Up 
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to the end of 1965 when the mission started work, rather less than two 
million acres had been completed in the ten years or so that work had been 
in progress. The report of that mission contains a great many recommendations 
for improving the methods used, for varying the process to suit the particular 
circumstances of the categories of area processed, i.e. consolidation areas 
on the one hand, and non-consolidation areas on the other, including lightly-
populated arable areas, areas suited to irrigated or other agriculture of 
a block-cultivation type, pastoral areas, and areas where the process was 
simply one either of enclosure of distribution. They also made numerous 
recommendations relating to the staffing of the three departments concerned 
(i.e., Lands, Surveys, and Land Consolidation), and for the production of 
the mapping required by the field staff, and for land registry plans. The 
major recommendations on the question of legislation were that a new Land 
Adjudication Act should be enacted providing a simplified and speedier process 
for application to non-consolidation areas where no consolidation of 
fragments was needed; that the same Adjudication Act should be applied to this 
new act, and that the existing act to be re-styled Land Consolidation Act; 
that provision be made for registration of title to land held communally by 
groups, particularly in pastoral areas; and that the present Registered Land 
Act should be amended so as to provide for an appeal to be made to the High 
Court, by leave of the Court, for the rectification of the Register in respect 
of any first registration of title which is alleged to have been effected by 
fraud or error (under the Land Adjudication Act the Land Adjudication Officer's 
decision on an objection is final, and the Registered Land Act specifically 
excludes first registrations from the scope of any of its provisions relating to 
rectification of errors in the Register). 
The Government accepted practically all the mission's recommendations, 
and has been implementing them over the years,. As regards the mission's 
recommendations on legislation, two new bills were enacted by X &r I lament.: 
the Land Adjudication Act, Chapter 284 of the Laws of Kenya, and the Land 
(Group Representatives) Act, Chapter 287. The major one, the Land Adjudication 
Act, provides for a process of adjudication of land rights and their registration 
without any consolidation of fragments as is the case under the land 
Consolidat 
ion Act, Chapter 283. It clearly defines the powers and responsi-
bilities of the officers legally concerned with this process: Recording 
Officers, Demarcation Officers, Survey Officers and Adjudication Officers. 
The duties of the Committees are reduced to little more than taking decisions v. \ 
on disputes as to ownership or boundary ali-^nmertthat the recording and 
demarcation officers cannot settle, and therefore submit to them. The 
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statutory minimum period of six months for submission of claims is omitted, 
and with the omission of consolidation and the related Record of Existing Right 
it could be possible to complete the adjudication process, up to the finality 
of the Adjudication Register, within six months in any given area. Practice 
has shown, however, that it takes at least one year to complete the process 
in the agricultural areas. In the act provision is made for the registration 
of groups and for such groups to be advised to apply for incorporation of 
group representatives, Appeals to the Arbitration Board, to the Adjudication 
Officer and to the Minister are provided for, and responsibility for collection 
of land adjudication fees is trasferred from the Director of Land Adjudication 
to the Chief Land Registrar, who may enter them as a charge against the title, 
to be cleared before any transaction may be effected. These are the main 
points on which the Land Adjudication Act differs from the Land Consolidation 
Act, these changes being aimed at greater speed and efficiency, together 
with increased opportunities to appeal against what might be thought to be 
an unfair decision. 
The programme administered by the Registrar of Group Representatives 
under the provisions of the Land (Group Representatives) Act is concerned 
with the initial registration and subsequent supervision of groups of people 
as owners of group ranches in the range areas. It forms an important part 
of the development programme for the range areas. The act provides for the 
appointment of a Registrar of Group Representatives and for the procedure by 
which such representatives are selected by a group and incorporated by the 
Registrar. It also provides for the powers and duties of the group represe-
ntatives and for the submission of returns by them to the Registrar, and 
for the maintenance of records. In the act, a group means a tribe, clan, 
section, family or other group of persons whose land under recognised customary 
law belongs communally to the persons who are for the time being the members 
of the group. Tha act was introduced to deal with the specific situation 
where it is felt that in a particular area block farming is more desirable 
than individual farming and hence the need for registration of the block of 
land is favour of the group representatives, who will have perpetual succession 
to the land and in whose favour it will be registered under the Registered Land 
Act, Chapter 300. 
The Government's land reform programme, operated through the 
medium of the Land Consolidation and the Land Adjudication Acts, has 
manifold benefits. Time and money no longer need be spent on land 
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litigation, nor is it necessary for farmers to waste time travelling between 
numerous scattered plots of land. The reform acts as a powerful stimulus to 
agricultural development. Farmers are willing to make long-term improvements 
to their land, and they can obtain agricultural credit more easily to help 
them effect these improvements, for the land title deeds provide good 
security for agricultural loans. Because agricultural development proceeds 
more rapidly after land rights have been adjudicated, the reform also 
tends to encourage a much higher level of employment in the rural areas. 
The agricultural development strategy pursued during the last 
few years had placed major emphasis on the acceleration of land adjudication 
and registration. By the middle of 1973, 2.5. million hectares had been regis-
tered, covering 632,000 holdings in 21 districts in all provinces except 
the arid north-east. In addition, adjudication was in progress on another 
1.6. million hectares. Thus, 37 per cent of total registrable land was 
either adjudicated or under adjudication, compared with only 5 per cent 
in 1963. 
In spite of the great advances made in the land reform programme, 
there still exists the problem of devising some effective means of preventing 
new fragmentation by inheritance of consolidated holdings, in a country with 
a high rate of population increase, but almost entirely dependent on 
agriculture. The provisions of the Land Control Act 1967 may help, to 
some extent, in holding this process of refragmentation in check, but is 
unlikely to provide anything like a complete answer to this problem. However, 
the Kenya Government is satisfied that the programme has had a very 
beneficial effect on the economy of the country to date, and is determined 
to press ahead with applying it throughout the country. Currently, out of 
a total of 23 districts being adjudicated, consolidation under the provisions 
of the Land Consolidation Act, Cap.283, is being undertaken in only three. 
In the majority of areas, the work involves only adjudication and registration 
of land rights under the Land Adjudication Act, Cap.284. 
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REFORMS IN THE FIELD OF REGISTRATION OF TITLES TO LAND 
The purposes 
to assure title to the land and to simplify dealings and . them less 
expensive. The first purpose is achieved by means of a Register and Registry 
Map compiled and maintained by the state. The Register contains a record of 
all privately owned land and the ownership of interests therein and is kept 
up to date as dealings take place. The title of the registered owner is 
guaranteed by the state. The Registry Map facilitates the identification 
of any particular piece of land and its boundaries. The second purpose is 
achieved by providing simple document forms which must be used for effecting 
dealings with registered land. 
A system of titles registration was first introduced in Kenya 
under the provisions of Part X of the Government Lands Act 1915, and the 
great majority of the titles granted by the state prior to 1920 are still 
registered under that system. It does not, however, fulfil the conditions of 
an ideal system as the titles registered under it are not guaranteed and 
simple document forms are not provided. 
In 1920, a further system was introduced under the provisions of 
the Registration of Titles Act 1919. This applied to all titles created from 
then onwards, and remedied the two principal defects in the previous system 
by providing for the guarantee of titles and the use of simple document forms. 
This system is still in operation, not only in respect of titles granted 
since 1920 but also in respect of all titles now being granted in areas to 
which the Registered Land Act 196 3 does not apply. 
Neither of the two acts under which these earlier registration 
systems were established in any way affected the law governing the rights 
of landowners and parties to land transactions. This law is contained in the 
Indian Transfer of Property Act, which remains the substantive real property 
law except in respect of land the title to which is registered under the 
Registered Land Act, dealt with later in this paper. 
In 1954, the Kenya Government, with the object of increasing the 
country's agricultural productivity, decided to embark upon a programme of 
land consolidation in areas where land was owned under African customary law. 
It was immediately recognised by Government, first, that this form of owner-
ship did not give the landowner the security of tenure necessary to encourage 
him to develop his land, and, second, that it would not be acceptable as 
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security for any loan which he might require for development purposes. As 
this would have largely frustrated the Government's aim of increased produc-
tivity, it was decided that each landowner should be given a registered 
and guaranteed title. 
The Native Lands Registration Ordinance was therefore enacted 
in 1959. This provided not only for the consolidation of landowner's 
holdings into one, more economic unit, but also for his registration as the 
guaranteed owner. The system established under this act was a considerable 
advance on the two existing systems, as it not only provided for a guarantee 
of title and simple document forms but also included a code of real property 
law to take the place of that contained in the Indian Transfer of Property 
Act. A good deal of this new law was based on the experience and legislation 
of other countries, but adapted to the outlook and needs of the African 
landowners where this could be done without infringing the basic principles 
of title registration. 
The position in 1959, therefore, was that there were three 
registration systems under which land titles were registered and two codes 
of real property law, all differing widely in their effect. This prompted 
Government to appoint in 1961 a small Working Party 'to examine the existing 
law and to make recommendations for the co- ordination and unification of the 
existing systems.' As a result of the Working Party's report the Registered 
Land Act was enacted in 196 3. It is intended that this Act should eventually 
be the only law governing real property and the registration of land titles. 
It provides a code of law and a system of registration which are capable of 
application in all circumstances. The property law and registration 
provisions of the Native Lands Registration Ordinance, the title of which had 
been altered to the Land Registration (Special Areas) Act, have been replaced 
and all titles which arose from land consolidation and adjudication are now 
registered under the act. All future titles arising from land consolidation 
and also, where practicable, those in respect of future grants of land by the 
state will also be registered under it. With regard to existing titles 
registered under the earlier acts, these are gradually being converted into 
titles under the act. In the course of time, therefore, all titles will 
be subject to the same law and registered under the same system. 
